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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
But every schoolboy in the United States knows that [the Senate] is practically the only 
parliamentary body in the world where the majority cannot transact the public business, and 
where the minority instead of the majority transacts the business of the country. 
-Senator William E. Mason (R-IL), 21 April 18971 
 
The Senate is not a majoritarian body. 
-Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY), 10 May 20052 
 
  
In many other ways—including the issues on its agenda and the demographic 
composition of its membership—the United States Senate at the end of the 20th century would 
have been unrecognizable to a member of the body at the end of the 19th.  The prevailing 
interpretation of the chamber as non-majoritarian, however, is a rare point of consensus across 
both time and party.  The notion that the Senate is to be a slower-moving, more deliberate body 
than the House of Representatives dates to the Constitutional Convention, where Madison 
characterized the chamber as proceeding with “more coolness… [and] more system.”3 Since 
abolishing the previous question motion in 1806, the chamber has been unable to end debate by 
simple majority vote (Binder and Smith 1997); it took nearly a century of increasing obstruction 
(Koger 2010) before the cloture rule provided a supermajority solution in 1917 (Wawro and 
Schickler 2006).  The subsequent routinization of the filibuster as a procedural tool over the 
course of the twentieth century has been well-documented (Koger 2010; Smith 2014). 
While scholars continue to debate the reasons for the persistence of the filibuster (Binder 
and Smith 1997; Wawro and Schickler 2006), the existence of the supermajority vote rule 
                                                     
1 30 Congressional Record S779. 
2 151 Congressional Record S4801. 
3 See Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), p. 83. 
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imbues our understanding of deliberation and activity in Congress.  The filibuster sits at the 
center of Krehbiel’s (1998) well-known model of lawmaking in the separation of powers system 
in the form of the filibuster pivot—that is, the senator who, based on his ideological location, 
must consent for change to be enacted. Work on gridlock and legislative productivity (Binder 
2003; Brady and Volden 2006; Chiou and Rothenberg 2003) and executive nominations (Rohde 
and Shepsle 2007; Primo, Binder, and Maltzman 2008) has similarly embraced the notion that 
the filibuster dictates what the Senate, and by extension, the House and the president, can 
achieve. 
There exists, however, a set of procedures in the Senate that complicate this account.  
Over the past nearly fifty years, Congress has repeatedly included in statutory law provisions that 
I call “majoritarian exceptions.”  By reallocating power within the chamber in three different 
ways, these special rules make operations of the Senate more majoritarian.  Some prior work on 
these procedures explores them only in the context of broader arguments and not as an 
independent object of interest (e.g. Brady and Volden 2006; Den Hartog and Monroe 2011; 
Binder 1997; Binder and Smith 1997).  In other instances, the rules are explored in-depth, but 
only as specific, substantive case studies (e.g. Mayer 1995; O’Halloran 1994; Becker 2005).   
Here, then, I begin to fill this gap in the literature between the narrow and the broad by analyzing 
systematically the creation, use, and consequences of these special procedures in the Senate. 
 
What Constitutes a Majoritarian Exception? 
 
Since 1969, Congress has created 113 “majoritarian exceptions;” a full list of these 
provisions, and the bills in which they were included, appears in Appendix Table A1.1.  They 
cover a wide range of policy areas, including trade (such as the multiple provisions providing the 
president with fast-track trade authority); foreign policy (including rules for the adoption and/or 
waiving of international sanctions); defense matters (such as procedures for closing military 
bases); the federal budget (including the process for developing and passing the congressional 
budget resolution); and health care (such as the provisions governing the adoption of proposed 
cuts in Medicare spending). 
The process by which these observations are identified and coded is described at length in 
Chapter 2, but for the purposes of definition here, I will highlight three relevant components of 
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an exception using an illustrative example.4  In 1970, Congress passed the Federal Pay 
Comparability Act of 1970, making permanent a system of automatic annual adjustments to 
federal employee pay and eliminating the need for Congress to continually revisit the question of 
whether to increase federal salaries each year.5  As part of the legislation, Congress delegated 
responsibility for developing recommendations about the adjustment rate necessary to keep 
federal pay “comparable” to a combination of actors in the executive branch, including a Federal 
Employee Pay Council (comprised of representatives from the major federal employee unions) 
and the Advisory Committee on Federal Pay (consisting of three non-federal employees).  The 
president would then either act on those recommendations, or submit an alternative plan to 
Congress.6  If he chose the latter option, Congress could disapprove of the proposal, using 
special, expedited procedures—the “majoritarian exception.” The section of the bill defining 
those rules has several relevant components.  Of most importance is the following: 
 
Debate on the resolution is limited to not more than 2 hours, to be divided equally 
between those favoring and those opposing the resolution.  A motion further to limit 
debate is not debatable.7 
 
This stipulation that debate on the resolution can last no longer than two hours has the effect of 
preventing the measure from being filibustered and represents the defining component of a 
majoritarian exception: 
 
Definition of Majoritarian Exception:  A majoritarian exception is a provision, 
included in statutory law, that exempts some future piece of legislation from a filibuster 
on the floor of the Senate by limiting debate on that measure. 
 
                                                     
4 Indeed, this example represents the earliest enacted exception in the dataset explored in Chapters 1 and 2.  Other 
majoritarian exceptions were created prior to 1969, but because limited data availability for various independent 
variables used in Chapters 1 and 2, I limit this study to the period from the 91stto 112th Congresses. 
5 See “Report on the Federal Salary Comparability Act of 1969,” H. Rpt. 91-480, 91st Congress, 1st Session. 
6 An alternative plan was permitted in the event of “national emergency or economic conditions affecting the general 
welfare” (Public Law 91-656, §3(c)(1)).  Because this exception takes a power previously reserved for Congress, 
gives it to an external actor, and then grants a subsequent proposal procedural protections, it is considered a 
“delegation exception” and is explored in Chapter 3. 
7 Public Law 91-656, §3(i). 
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In examining the exceptions described in Table A1.1, we see that this debate cap may be as short 
as two hours (such as the federal employee pay recommendations provision, or the provision by 
which Congress can disapprove oil and gas leases negotiated by the Secretary of Energy) or as 
long as 50 hours (as is the case with the annual congressional budget resolution).   Regardless of 
its length, the maximum threshold eliminates the need for the measure’s proponents to marshal 
60 votes in order to end debate and proceed to a final vote.   The number of votes needed to 
prevent policy change, then, is larger (51) than under regular order (41).   
Two additional provisions in the 1970 federal employee pay legislation illustrate other 
common, but not required, components of majoritarian exceptions.  Many majoritarian 
exceptions contain provisions similar to these, but a set of legislative procedures need not do 
either of the following in order to constitute a majoritarian exception: 
 
An amendment to, or motion to recommit, the resolution is not in order.8 
 
If the committee, to which has been referred a resolution disapproving the alternative 
plan of the President, has not reported the resolution at the end of 10 calendar days after 
its introduction, it is in order to move either to discharge the committee from further 
consideration of the resolution or to discharge the committee, from further consideration 
of any other resolution with respect to the same plan which has been referred to the 
committee.  A motion to discharge may be made only by an individual favoring the 
resolution, is highly privileged.9 
 
The first of these corresponds to the fact that any majoritarian exceptions prevent the designated 
legislation from being amended, either in committee or on the floor.  Of the 531 proposals in my 
dataset, 85 percent prevent amendments to the filibuster-proof measure on the floor.  An 
additional 5 percent permit only germane amendments.  Both of these restrictions on 
amendments represent a significant departure from the Senate’s usual procedures, which allow 
for amendments to bills regardless of topic (see Senate Rule XVI).  As we will see in both 
                                                     
8 Public Law 91-656, §3(i). 
9 Public Law 91-656, §3(e) and Public Law 91-656, §3(f). 
5 
 
 
Chapters 2 and 4, this feature of majoritarian exceptions plays a substantial role in explaining 
both the development and use of the procedures. 
The second provision, meanwhile, reflects the fact that many majoritarian exceptions 
provide a mechanism to prevent obstruction of the legislation by the committee with jurisdiction 
over the measure.  In some cases, the time the panel can spend deliberating over the legislation is 
often limited by a firm day limit.  After a prescribed number of days have elapsed, the bill is 
either automatically placed on the Senate calendar for debate or can be forcibly discharged from 
the committee by a privileged, filibuster-proof motion.  Other instances, moreover, stipulate that 
the protected measure be reported directly to the floor, bypassing committee consideration 
altogether.10   
These three conditions not only define the set of procedures under study here, but they 
also help us distinguish “majoritarian exceptions” from other similar procedures that fall outside 
the scope of this analysis.  First, majoritarian exceptions are not the same thing as legislative 
vetoes, defined as “statutory provisions that reserve for Congress the ability to overrule or 
otherwise affect policy-making powers that have been delegated to executive officials without 
having to pass subsequent legislation” (Berry 2009, p. 247).  Some majoritarian exceptions—
especially the oversight exceptions discussed in Chapter 2—could be considered legislative 
vetoes, but not all legislative vetoes involve protecting future legislation from a filibuster on the 
floor of the Senate.  Second, majoritarian exceptions are not the same as “Statutory Legislative 
Procedures,” a categorization included in the House Rules Manual that includes procedures 
roughly analogous to those considered “legislative vetoes.”  Again, not all of these rules exempt 
future measures from a filibuster; in addition, some only apply to consideration in the House, not 
the Senate.  Finally, majoritarian exceptions are also not equivalent to what Elizabeth Garrett 
calls “framework legislation,” or “laws about lawmaking in a particular area…[that] supplement, 
and sometimes supplant, ordinary rules of procedure only for a defined set of future decisions” 
(Garrett 2004, p. 1).  In this case, all majoritarian exceptions could be considered “framework 
legislation,” but only a subset of “framework legislation” would meet our definition of 
majoritarian exceptions.11  
                                                     
10 See, for example, the procedures for approving alternative sequester proposals generated by Congress in the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-119), §105. 
11 Thanks are due to Richard Beth of the Congressional Research Service for suggesting I clarify these distinctions. 
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 An additional relevant distinction between majoritarian exceptions and other kinds of 
procedural change involves the process by which the former are enacted.    Majoritarian 
exceptions represent changes, made through statutory legislation approved by both houses of 
Congress and signed by the president, with “the same force and effect as the standing rules either 
house adopts by simple House or Senate resolution to govern its own organization and 
procedure” (Davis 2003).12  The 2013 modification made for judicial and executive branch 
nominations (Peters 2013), meanwhile, involved “reform-by-ruling” (Koger 2010); the Senate’s 
presiding officer ruled on a question of precedent (i.e., the implementation of the chamber’s 
rules) and a subsequent vote by a simple majority of that chamber sustained that ruling.  This 
latter kind of rule change is easier to achieve from a coalition-building perspective, as a simple 
majority coalition is sufficient.  The majoritarian procedural changes under study here, 
meanwhile, not only require supporters to overcome the threat of a filibuster in the Senate, but 
also to gain the support of a majority in the House of Representatives and the signature of the 
president. 
 
What Do Majoritarian Exceptions Do?  Central Claims and Assumptions 
 
 Throughout this dissertation, I document one way in which Senate policymaking is 
actively, rather than remotely (Krehbiel 1991), majoritarian.  In particular, I make two principal 
arguments about the ends produced by this particular form of majoritarianism.  While the four 
ensuing substantive chapters take up different substantive matter, it is these two basic claims that 
unite both their theoretical accounts and the accompanying empirical tests.  First, majoritarian 
exceptions ease the passage of the bills to which they apply.  Each of the three potential 
components of a majoritarian exception—the protection from a filibuster, the prohibition on 
amendments, and the preclusion of committee obstruction—reduces the hurdles that the measure 
must clear on its way to passage.  Put differently, majoritarian exceptions expand the size of the 
coalition needed to block changes away from the status quo.  In terms of voting rules, exempting 
a bill from the filibuster and thus reducing the number of votes needed to prevent policy change 
is larger (51) than under the current regime (41).  The committee-related provisions reduce the 
                                                     
12 This status has consequences for how the observations in the empirical tests in Chapters 2 and 3 are identified; see 
the Data section of Chapter 2 for more information. 
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ability of a simple majority of a committee to prevent a measure from coming to the floor.  When 
a committee is automatically discharged, or when the protected legislation is placed directly on 
the calendar, no number of votes can prevent a proposal that changes the status quo from coming 
to the floor.  For the exceptions that include a privileged motion to discharge, meanwhile, rather 
than a simple majority of the committee being able to prevent a proposal to change the status quo 
from making it out of committee, a floor majority must be formed to vote down the discharge 
petition.  Decisions about when exceptions should be created and used, then, are shaped by the 
fact that it will be more difficult to engage in future obstruction on the underlying legislation. 
 The second goal of majoritarian exceptions, I argue, is to deliver benefits to the Senate’s 
majority party; this applies to both the rules’ creation and to their use.  Much of the 
contemporary literature on the Senate portrays the chamber as the home of two competing 
partisan ‘teams’ that work together to achieve shared goals as the expense of their partisan 
opponents (e.g. Koger 2010; Lee 2009).  The majority team attempts to pass legislation it favors, 
while the minority team works to obstruct those initiatives.  For proponents of this account, it 
would follow that making obstruction more difficult—as majoritarian exceptions do—should 
help the majority party achieve its policy goals.  At the same time, however, if the Senate’s 
parties are weak and/or diverse, the simple majorities empowered by majoritarian exceptions 
may not be composed of co-partisans working together to achieve shared goals (Krehbiel 1993).   
 Here, I come down in favor of the former characterization of the Senate.  To build my 
argument about exactly how majoritarian exceptions advantage the majority party, I rely on 
several familiar assumptions.  First, I assume that the individual members that comprise the 
majority caucus are seekers of re-election (Mayhew 1974).  Second, I assume that the majority 
party acts as a procedural cartel (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005); that is, rank-and-file 
members delegate some of their power to the leaders of their party, who, in turn, assume 
fiduciary responsibility for acting in the party’s favor.  In this context, leaders must satisfy this 
fiduciary responsibility both when new rules are created, as well as when they are used.  Finally, 
I assume that the proximate shared goal of majority party senators is for their party to maintain 
its majority status (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Balla, et. al. 2002; 
Lee 2009); the benefits to a party’s members of  having their party hold majority status are well-
documented empirically (Albouy 2013; Cox and Magar 1999).  Convincing voters to return 
majority party members to office requires both collaboration between co-partisans to enact a 
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popular legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Matthews and Stimson 1975) and 
creating opportunities for individual members to claim credit for accomplishments (Mayhew 
1974; Fiorina 1989) and to avoid blame for negative events (Weaver 1987).   
Because the creation and use of majoritarian exceptions has been largely neglected by the 
literature, as I make these arguments, I begin to fill an important substantive gap.  We have little 
systematic knowledge of these procedures’ creation and use, and documenting these patterns is 
particularly important given their wide-ranging policy implications.  In Chapter 5, I explore at 
length how the use of one particular exception (the budget reconciliation process) has had wide-
ranging consequences for mandatory spending programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, food 
stamps, and farm price supports, but the list of provisions in Table A1.1 demonstrates that these 
special rules have consequences for how policy is made in many other policy areas.  The 
examples discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, moreover, include proposed and enacted exceptions 
involving the conduct of the war in Iraq, the sale of weapons to other countries, the negotiation 
of international trade agreements, the closing of military bases, and the review by Congress of 
regulations promulgated by executive branch agencies.  The wide reach of this final exception 
alone suggests the breadth of the procedures’ potential policy consequences. 
In addition to addressing this substantive gap, my account builds on important previous 
work on how both parties in Senate use procedural tactics to either enact policies they prefer and 
obstruct ones they oppose, while also bolstering their electoral fortunes (Koger 2010; Lee 2009; 
Den Hartog and Monroe 2011; Sinclair 2000; Smith 2014).  It also contributes to our 
understanding of from where institutions come.  On one hand, a number of important accounts of 
Senate policymaking (e.g. Krehbiel 1998) assume that institutions like the filibuster are 
exogenous and immutable; both my theoretical and empirical investigations here demonstrate the 
limitations of that assumption.   
Instead, I join others who have illustrated how new procedures are created to achieve 
proximate political goals; indeed, notable works on the evolution of the filibuster have argued 
that Senate rules are changed in response to short-term political forces, rather than principled 
commitment to supermajoritarianism.  One prominent account of the creation of the cloture rule 
(Rule XXII) in 1917, for example, examines the political circumstances surrounding the measure 
whose passage was facilitated by the existence of new procedures for ending debate.  Senate 
(majority) Democrats and President Wilson framed that bill, which permitted the arming of 
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merchant ships during World War I, as a “national security measure,” portraying the procedural 
question as a matter of policy.  The new rules, they argued, were needed if the Senate was going 
to enact a popular and salient policy change (Binder and Smith 1997).   
This account of Rule XXII’s creation is, of course, but one example of how short-term 
political considerations may have shaped choices about procedural change; indeed, others have 
offered competing narratives explaining the same decision that de-emphasize the role of public 
opinion (Wawro and Schickler 2006).  Some might argue, moreover, that the policy-specific 
nature of majoritarian exceptions makes this claim less plausible.  If the current Senate majority 
seeks a rule change in order to help it achieve some partisan goal, it must reasonably expect that 
the situation anticipated by the exception will come to pass in short order.  Put differently, the 
new procedures are of little value to the current Senate majority party if the measure they protect 
does not appear on the agenda in the near future. 
The amount of ambiguity about when any partisan advantages might accrue varies across 
exceptions.  On one end are exceptions that, in delegating responsibility for developing a policy 
proposal to a set of internal or external actors, provide a hard deadline for when that proposal is 
to arrive in the Senate for consideration.  The statute authorizing the most recent round of 
military base closings, for example, carried a deadline for reporting to the recommendations to 
Congress of September 8, 2005.13  Any electoral consequences of the base closings, then, could 
reasonably be expected to be felt in the 2006 Senate elections.  
A second relevant example is more recent.  The Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011—
best known for ending a showdown between Congress and the president over whether to raise 
the debt ceiling—contained a provision creating the Joint Select Committee on Deficit 
Reduction, a congressional entity tasked with developing a proposal to cut the federal deficit by 
$1.2 trillion over ten years.  This package of budgetary reforms was to be completed in the fall of 
2011 and then approved by both chambers by January 2012 (Labonte and Levit 2012); in the 
Senate, the measure was covered by a procedural exception with a limit on floor debate of 30 
hours.  The Committee failed, however, to reach agreement on a set of cuts (Steinhauer, Cooper, 
and Pear 2011), rendering the existence of the special rules to consider them on the Senate floor 
moot.  Despite the fact that choices by the members of Congress developing the proposal meant 
that the procedures were never actually used, only a few months elapsed between when they 
                                                     
13 Public Law 107-107 §2914. 
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were created and when they would have been deployed.  For Senators hoping for the ability to 
claim credit for cutting the deficit and/or for forestalling the “sequester,” or the deep automatic 
spending cuts realized in the absence of a congressional proposal under the BCA, it was clear 
that any potential electoral gains of revisiting the issue would come before the 2012 elections. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, meanwhile, are exceptions that increase the capacity 
of the Senate to check the unilateral power of the president, but for which the timing of the 
president’s next relevant action is uncertain.  Various provisions of the Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA) of 1976, for example, provide Congress with the opportunity to prohibit proposed arms 
sales from proceeding.  The president is not required, however, to sell defense articles on a 
prescribed timetable—or ever, if he wishes to take U.S. security policy in a particular direction.  
While creating the exception ensures that Congress will be able to weigh in on the president’s 
decisions in the future, it does not necessarily increase the institution’s knowledge of when that 
opportunity for input will be. 
For these more uncertain policy areas, it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the 
beliefs of the Senate at the time of the passage of the rule change about when the topic would re-
emerge on the congressional agenda.  To investigate the reasonableness of my claim that the 
chamber assumes that issues will recur quickly, I examined each enacted rule change to 
determine how quickly after its creation it could have been used to by Congress to affect policy 
outcomes.  In the most straightforward cases, this “date of first relevance” represents the actual 
introduction of a resolution under the special, filibuster-proof rules prescribed in the legislation.  
In the case of the AECA, for example, the first attempt by Congress to halt an arms sale 
proposed by the president occurred in September 1976, when Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI) 
introduced a resolution that would have prevented a proposed sale of defense articles to Saudi 
Arabia.14  While Nelson’s effort to use the new procedural exception was unsuccessful, the brief 
period of time that elapsed between the rule’s creation—less than three months—suggests that, 
prior to the AECA’s passage, senators would likely have believed that opportunities to weigh in 
on arms sale policy would be soon in coming. 
Similarly, in September 1996, Senator Trent Lott (R-TN) introduced the first resolution 
to overturn a rule proposed by the executive branch (regarding hospital reimbursement under 
                                                     
14 See S. Con. Res. 150, 94th Congress.  See also companion legislation in the House: H. Con. Res. 740, H. Con. 
Res. 757, H. Con. Res. 766, H. Con. Res. 770, and H. Con. Res. 777, all 94th Congress. 
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Medicare) under the provisions of the Congressional Review Act (CRA), which had been 
enacted five months prior.15  While that resolution was not successful—indeed, only one 
measure exercising Congress’s authority under the CRA has even been signed into law 
(Rosenberg 2008)—its existence is a reliable indicator of the return of the underlying issue to the 
congressional agenda.  The fact that it only took five months for a senator to utilize the new 
oversight powers afforded to him under the CRA suggests that, prior to the law’s enactment, 
members of the Senate could have reasonably expected that any electoral rewards could be 
quickly realized. 
In other cases, a policy change to which an exception could apply is proposed, but 
Congress declines to take the procedurally-privileged action afforded to it in response.  If these 
situations arise close to the enactment of the rule change, even absent affirmative steps by the 
Senate to use the new procedures, the re-emergence of the issue implies that legislators could 
have sensibly assumed that any electoral gains from revisiting the topic would be quick in 
coming.  Take, for example, the provision included in the International Security and 
Development Cooperation Act of 1980 that endowed Congress with a procedurally-protected 
resolution of disapproval of export licenses for commercial sales of defense articles or services 
valued at over $100 million to other, non-NATO countries.16  Prior to the legislation, arms sales 
carried out by the government were subject to potential veto by Congress, but the 1980 law gave 
the legislature the same authority to prevent wholly private transactions.17  The first deal eligible 
to be reviewed by Congress under this law was a proposed aircraft-related sale to Indonesia in 
1982, but the legislature chose to let the sale proceed unimpeded.18  The mere existence of the 
transaction, however, provides a reliable indication of the frequency with which the issue—large 
defense deals, executed by private companies—is likely to recur on the congressional agenda. 
A second illustrative example of this dynamic involves U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in 
Colombia, which, since the mid-1990s, have involved aid to both the Colombian National Police 
and the Colombian military.  In 2000, when President Clinton proposed funneling increased aid 
to the Colombian military as part of this program (a proposal designated “Plan Colombia”), some 
                                                     
15 See S. J. Res. 60, 104th Congress. 
16 See Public Law 96-533, § 107. 
17 See President Jimmy Carter, “Statement on Signing H.R. 6942, the International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1980, Into Law,” 16 December 1980. 
18 Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 2, p. 1559; see also 
Colin Campbell, “Indonesia Seeks to Keep Pace in Arms,” New York Times 30 July 1982. 
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members of the Senate were concerned about increasing American involvement in what they 
characterized as an internal civil war (Marquis 2000).  To ensure that the president did not 
expend more resources on Plan Colombia than expressly authorized, the measure allocating 
funds for Plan Colombia for 2001 included a provision that prohibited the executive branch from 
expending any additional resources in fiscal year 2001 unless Congress explicitly approved as 
such in a joint resolution; that measure, moreover, would be exempt from a filibuster on the floor 
of the Senate.  Ultimately, President Clinton did not seek these supplemental funds.  One 
possibility is that the funds appropriated in the original bill were sufficient to achieve the 
country’s strategic goals for the year.  Alternatively, however, the Senate could have used the 
new special rules to prevent the president from accessing additional funds.  In other words, as 
with presidential vetoes (Cameron 2000), the fact that we did not observe the Senate utilizing 
this particular procedural exception did not mean that the procedure was irrelevant for U.S. 
policy towards Colombia in late 2000 and early 2001.  In addition, because the exception 
covered a clearly defined period of time, the members of Congress who created it in the summer 
of 2000 knew that if they were going to get an opportunity to claim credit for revisiting policy 
towards Colombia, that opportunity would come after the 2000 election and before the 2002 
midterms. 
These examples illustrate a set of three general, hierarchical principles that guided my 
collection of information on when a procedural exception first became relevant following its 
creation: 
 
1. Did the exception contain a specific date by which the proposal covered by the special 
rule was to be introduced? 
2. If no specific date was included, when was the first resolution under the auspices of the 
procedural exception introduced? 
3. If no formal resolution was introduced, when did the first policy change to which an 
exception could have been applied occur? 
 
Using a combination of congressional documents, such as the Congressional Record; other 
federal government resources, such as reports from the General Accounting (now Government 
Accountability) Office; academic articles; and other secondary source publications, I was able to 
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identify the year after the successful creation of an exception in which it first became relevant to 
decisions in the policy area to which it applied.  A complete list of these situations, and the 
sources from which I identified them, appears in Appendix Table A1.2.   
Of the 113 successfully-created exceptions, I was able to identify a date of first relevance 
using the criteria outlined above for 99 of the procedures.  In general, the remaining 13 involve 
some sort of exogenous trigger, the occurrence of which is nearly unpredictable; they include, for 
example, provisions requiring Congress to approve of compensation plans for victims of nuclear 
and commercial space accidents.19  For the median rule that has become pertinent to 
policymaking, meanwhile, only a year passes between creation and relevance; the distribution of 
this elapsed time appears in Figure 1.  As Figure 1 indicates, the majority of procedural 
exceptions become relevant for policymaking quite soon after they are created; indeed, 63 
percent are either originally slated to be used, actually used, or have the potential to be used 
within two years of their enactment.  While this data is descriptive (and prone to some 
measurement error) rather than causal, at the very least, it provides a useful foundation for the 
argument about the role of majority party electoral considerations that unfolds in the ensuing 
chapters. 
                                                     
19 For the former, see Public Law 100-408, §7.  For the latter, see Public Law 103-272, §70113. 
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Figure 1.1: Years Elapsed Between Creation and Year of First Relevance for Majoritarian 
Exceptions 
 
 
Plan of the Dissertation 
 
An initial review of the majoritarian exceptions defined above suggests that they can be 
divided into two general categories, largely based on the content of the underlying legislative 
proposal that they shepherd to and through floor consideration.  One category of exceptions 
seeks to limit unilateral actions by the president in the face of a range of disincentives to do so.   
Depending on preference divergence between Congress and the president, the legislative branch 
may disapprove of a unilateral action taken by the president, either through an executive order, 
signing statement, or other method.  By creating an “oversight” exception, Congress can make a 
specifically delineated unilateral action by the president subject to legislative approval.  Because 
the measure acceding to the president’s action is privileged for consideration and cannot be 
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amended or filibustered, Congress is guaranteeing, through a legislative check, that it has 
increased input in a particular policy area.  Take, for example, the provision of the International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 that allows Congress the opportunity 
to disapprove of presidentially-proposed sales of major defense equipment totaling more than 
$1,000,00020.  The resolution rejecting such a deal can be compelled out of committee by a 
highly privileged resolution after ten days and is limited to ten hours of debate on the floor of the 
Senate.  Prior to the enactment of these provisions, arms sales could be handled entirely within 
the executive branch, provided the president certified that the sale would “strengthen the security 
of the United States and promote world peace”—a determination that was made for all proposed 
transactions by both Presidents Johnson and Nixon.21  Congress certainly had the power to 
respond to this act by the president through its regular legislative procedures prior to the creation 
of the procedural exception.  By changing its internal procedures for this particular policy choice, 
however, Congress made it easier for itself to exert power in the policy area by creating 
opportunities for majority rule.  Exceptions of this kind are explored in Chapter 2 using a spatial 
model of these strategic inter-branch interactions and an accompanying empirical test using a 
novel dataset of proposed and enacted majoritarian exceptions. 
The second kind of exception involves efforts by the Senate to delegate some of its power 
to one or more actors, either within or outside the chamber.  The actor or actors to whom this 
power is delegated are tasked with drafting a change to the status quo, and then that proposal 
comes to the floor of the Senate under expedited legislative procedures.  The process for closing 
military bases is a well-known case of this kind of exception.  An independent Base Realignment 
and Closing Commission (BRAC) is authorized by Congress to select bases for closure, and the 
legislation approving those selections cannot be filibustered or amended.  These “delegation” 
procedures are explored in Chapter 3.  Because there are important substantive differences 
between the oversight exceptions investigated in Chapter 2 and the delegation ones discussed in 
Chapter 3, I begin the latter chapter with a separate, theoretical account of exception creation; 
instead of focusing on how rule change creates opportunities for majority party gain in inter-
branch interactions, I describe how new procedures can benefit the majority party by helping it to 
                                                     
20 This threshold has been increased over time to $14 million (Grimmett 2012). 
21 See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, “Foreign Assistance 
Authorization: Arms Sales Issues: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance,” 94th Congress, 1st 
session, especially pp.14-15.    
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solve internal collective action problems.  This discussion is followed by an empirical test of 
exception creation similar in scope to the one presented in Chapter 2. 
Beginning in Chapter 4, I focus on one particular majoritarian exception: the budget 
reconciliation procedures.  Created in 1974, the reconciliation process allows for changes to 
mandatory federal programs and revenue-raising instruments to be made through a filibuster-
proof process that also restricts amendments.  The history and development of the rules are 
described in Chapter 4, followed by a theoretical account that highlights how these particular 
features of the procedures can be leveraged to produce policy outcomes that reflect the 
preferences of the party’s median member, making the caucus appear competent and enhance its 
reputation in the eyes of voters.  An empirical test and series of brief case studies then illustrate 
how these dynamics have played out over the past 30 years. 
In Chapter 5, I explore whether the reconciliation rules are actually used in a way that 
should help the majority party achieve its goal of maintaining its status.  I argue that the 
reconciliation process generates opportunities for majority party members to claim credit and 
avoid blame.  Because the majority party’s ability to maintain its status involves defending 
different sets of seats in different electoral cycles, we should expect the programmatic changes 
made through the process to reflect these varying strategic concerns.  I test this hypothesis using 
new data on programmatic reforms made using the rules.  Finally, in Chapter 6, I summarize my 
findings and offer several implications of this work for the prospects of further procedural 
change in Congress. 
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Appendix 1.1 
Table A1.1: Majoritarian Exceptions Enacted, 91st-112th Congress (1969-2012) 
Congress 
Created 
Year 
Created 
Bill Name and Public Law Number Majoritarian Exception 
91 1971 Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 
(91-656) 
Disapprove of alternative rate increase in federal pay 
proposed by president 
93 1973 War Powers Resolution (93-148) Approve of removal of armed forces engaged outside United 
States 
93 1973 District of Columbia Self-Government 
and Governmental Reorganization Act 
(93-198) 
Approving of bills passed by Washington D.C. City Council 
93 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (93-406) 
Disapprove of certain federal contractor regulations 
93 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (93-406) 
Disapprove of new multiemployer pension schedules 
93 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 (93-344) 
Approve congressional budget resolution 
93 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 (93-344) 
Approve presidential impoundment/rescission requests 
93 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 (93-344) 
Approve reconciliation bills 
93 1974 Trade Act of 1974 (93-618) Approve trade agreements and non-tariff barriers 
93 1974 Trade Act of 1974 (93-618) Disapprove President's certification of that drug-producing 
countries have met requirements to engage in trade with 
United States 
93 1974 Trade Act of 1974 (93-618) Disapprove president's extension of Most-Favored-Nation 
trade status 
93 1974 Trade Act of 1974 (93-618) Disapprove president's proposal to remedy injurious effect of 
imports 
93 1974 Trade Act of 1974 (93-618) Disapprove president's proposal to waive prohibition on 
trade with country that restricts emigration by its citizens 
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Congress 
Created 
Year 
Created 
Bill Name and Public Law Number Majoritarian Exception 
94 1975 Social Security Act Amendments (94-88) Disapprove of certain standards under the Social Security 
Act 
94 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act (94-
163) 
Disapprove of presidential energy actions, including tapping 
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
94 1976 Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act (94-265) 
Approve of international fishery agreement negotiated by 
president 
94 1976 National Emergencies Act (94-412) Terminate national emergency initiated by the president 
94 1976 International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act (94-329) 
Approve commercial manufacturing agreements 
94 1976 International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act (94-329) 
Approve resolution ending arms sales because of human 
rights abuses 
94 1976 International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act (94-329) 
Approve resolution ending military assistance because of 
discrimination 
94 1976 International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act (94-329) 
Approve resolution terminating assistance to countries 
transferring nuclear material to other countries 
94 1976 International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act (94-329) 
Disapprove of sale of defense articles or services and major 
defense equipment 
94 1976 Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory 
Reform Act (94-210) 
Disapprove of certain decisions regarding 
debentures/preferred stock in Amtrak and Conrail 
94 1976 Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act 
(94-586) 
Approve president's proposed natural gas transportation 
system for Alaska 
95 1977 International Security Assistance Act (95-
92) 
Approve limits on economic and military assistance to 
countries selling nuclear technology to other countries 
95 1977 Reorganization Act (95-17) Disapprove reorganization plan for the executive branch 
95 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
(95-617) 
Approve waiver of energy laws to facilitate construction of 
Long Beach-Midland project 
95 1978 Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act 
(95-620) 
Disapprove of president's emergency prohibition on use of 
natural gas or petroleum during severe energy supply 
interruption 
95 1978 Nuclear Anti-Proliferation Act (95-242) Disapprove of presidential recommendations to cut off 
nuclear exports or export licenses 
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Congress 
Created 
Year 
Created 
Bill Name and Public Law Number Majoritarian Exception 
95 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
Amendments (95-372) 
Disapprove bidding system for oil and gas leases proposed 
by Secretary of Energy 
95 1978 Department of Energy Act - Civilian 
Applications (95-238) 
Disapprove of executive branch plan for storing spent 
nuclear fuel 
96 1979 Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (96-39) Approve trade agreements and non-tariff barriers 
96 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act (96-487) 
Approve application for transportation/utility systems in 
Alaska's National Wilderness Preservation System 
96 1980 Federal Trade Commission Improvements 
Act of 1980 (96-252) 
Disapprove regulations promulgated by the FTC 
96 1980 Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments 
Act of 1980 (96-364) 
Approve PBGC recommendations on premium increases 
necessary to support current pension guarantees 
96 1980 International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1980 (96-533) 
Disapprove of export licenses for commercial sale of defense 
articles and services 
96 1980 International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1980 (96-533) 
Disapprove of military assistance to Angola 
96 1980 International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1980 (96-533) 
Disapprove sales of military design or construction services 
96 1980 Energy Security Act (96-294) Approve Department of Energy authorization bill containing 
energy targets 
96 1980 Energy Security Act (96-294) Approve comprehensive synthetic fuel strategy 
96 1980 Energy Security Act (96-294) Disapprove synthetic fuel action 
97 1981 Department of Defense Authorization Act, 
1982 (97-86) 
Disapprove of basing mode for MX missiles 
97 1981 Department of Defense Authorization Act, 
1982 (97-86) 
Disapprove of president's decision on long-range combat 
aircraft 
97 1981 International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1981 (97-113) 
Disapprove of assistance to state that gives nuclear weapon 
to non-nuclear weapon state 
97 1981 International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1981 (97-113) 
Disapprove of defense leases 
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Congress 
Created 
Year 
Created 
Bill Name and Public Law Number Majoritarian Exception 
97 1981 Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement Act 
of 1981 (97-127) 
Approve extension of implementation period for agreement 
with Czechoslovakia 
97 1982 Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 
1983 (97-377) 
Approve expenditures for MX missiles 
97 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (97-
245) 
Approve selection of nuclear waste storage site 
97 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (97-
245) 
Disapprove changes to nuclear waste fee schedule 
97 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (97-
245) 
Disapprove selection of interim storage site for nuclear waste 
98 1983 Department of State Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (98-164) 
Approve of removal of armed forces engaged outside United 
States 
98 1984 Continuing Appropriations, FY 1985 (98-
473) 
Approve funds for Nicaragua 
98 1984 Continuing Appropriations, FY 1985 (98-
473) 
Approve spending on MX missiles 
98 1984 Omnibus Tariff and Trade Act of 1984 
(98-573) 
Approve of agreements modifying tariffs 
98 1984 Department of Defense Authorization Act, 
1985 (98-525) 
Approve of president's decision to acquire additional MX 
missiles 
99 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 (99-177) 
 Suspending deficit reduction provisions in the event of low 
growth 
99 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 (99-177) 
Approve sequester if process invalidated by courts 
99 1985 Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 
1986 (99-190) 
Disapprove of arms sales to Jordan 
99 1985 Energy Policy and Conservation 
Amendments Act of 1985 (99-58) 
Disapprove of antitrust exemption for oil companies granted 
by president 
99 1985 Export Administration Amendments Act 
of 1985 (99-64) 
Approve agricultural export controls 
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Congress 
Created 
Year 
Created 
Bill Name and Public Law Number Majoritarian Exception 
99 1985 Export Administration Amendments Act 
of 1985 (99-64) 
Approve nuclear cooperation agreements 
99 1985 International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1985 (99-83) 
Approve additional aid to Central American peace process 
99 1985 International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1985 (99-83) 
Approve aid to Nicaraguan democratic resistance 
99 1986 Compact of Free Association Act of 1985 
(99-239) 
Disapprove of presidential agreements with Federated States 
of Micronesia and Marshall Islands 
99 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 
1986 (99-440) 
Approve additional sanctions against South Africa 
99 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 
1986 (99-440) 
Approve agreement reached with other industrialized 
countries to impose sanctions against South Africa 
99 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 
1986 (99-440) 
Disapprove of president's decision to suspend sanctions 
against South Africa 
99 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (99-570) Disapprove presidential waiver of required cuts in aid to 
major drug producing countries 
99 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (99-603) 
Approve termination of immigration-related employer 
sanctions program if evidence of nationality-related 
discrimination 
100 1987 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987 (100-
119) 
Approve sequester if process invalidated by courts 
100 1987 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987 (100-
119) 
Approve alternative sequester proposal generated by 
Congress 
100 1987 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987 (100-
119) 
Approve alternative sequester proposal for Department of 
Defense generated by president 
100 1988 Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 
(100-408) 
Approve compensation plan following nuclear accident 
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Congress 
Created 
Year 
Created 
Bill Name and Public Law Number Majoritarian Exception 
100 1988 Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act, 1989 (100-463) 
Approve additional aid to Nicaraguan resistance 
100 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988 (100-418) 
Disapprove of extension of fast track authority beyond 
period authorized 
100 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988 (100-418) 
Revoke fast track authority if president does not consult with 
Congress 
100 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988 (100-418) 
Approve trade agreements 
100 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (100-690) Disapprove presidential proposal for aid to drug producing 
country 
100 1988 Defense Authorization Amendments and 
Base Closure and Realignment Act (100-
526) 
Disapprove base closing recommendations 
101 1990 National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1991 (101-510) 
Disapprove base closing recommendations 
102 1991 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (102-138) 
Disapprove of presidential decision to rescind a prohibition 
on exporting arms to terrorist countries 
102 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act of 1991 (102-240) 
Disapprove of certain actions by the Metropolitan 
Washington Airports Authority 
102 1992 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
1993 (102-391) 
Disapprove president's decision to suspend loan guarantee to 
Israel program 
102 1992 International Narcotics Control Act of 
1992 (102-583) 
Disapproving presidential waiver of prohibition on 
assistance to countries with substantial narcotics production 
103 1993 To provide authority for the President to 
enter into trade agreements to conclude 
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations (103-49) 
Approve trade agreements (temporary extension of power 
delegated as part of Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988) 
23 
 
 
Congress 
Created 
Year 
Created 
Bill Name and Public Law Number Majoritarian Exception 
103 1994 To revise, codify, and enact without 
substantive change certain general and 
permanent laws, related to transportation 
(103-272) 
Approve compensation plan for claim exceeding liability 
requirements 
103 1994 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (103-236) 
Approve of waiver of sanctions against nuclear weapons 
states transferring material to non-nuclear weapons states 
103 1994 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (103-236) 
Disapprove of president's decision to provide aid to certain 
countries enriching nuclear material 
103 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act (103-
465) 
Approve subsidies agreement 
103 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act (103-
465) 
Disapproval of US participation in the World Trade 
Organization 
104 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (104-114) 
Disapprove of president's decision to suspend Cuban 
embargo 
104 1996 To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 and the Arms Export Control Act 
(104-164) 
Disapprove third country transfers of military equipment 
104 1996 Contract with America Advancement Act 
of 1996 (104-121) 
Disapprove of proposed regulation 
104 1996 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 1997 (104-208) 
Approve presidential determination that limits on population 
planning program are onerous 
104 1996 Line Item Veto Act (104-130) Disapprove of proposed budgetary cancellation (“line item 
veto”) 
105 1997 Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 
1997 (105-304) 
Disapprove of recommendations to liquidate Amtrak from 
Amtrak Reform Council 
106 1999 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000 
(106-113) 
Disapprove presidential request for waiver of UN 
reimbursement requirement 
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Congress 
Created 
Year 
Created 
Bill Name and Public Law Number Majoritarian Exception 
106 2000 Making appropriations for military 
construction, family housing, and base 
realignment and closure for the 
Department of Defense for the fiscal year 
ending September 30, 2001 (106-246) 
Approve presidential request for additional funds for Plan 
Colombia 
107 2001 USA PATRIOT Act (107-56) Approve the repeal of provisions on international money 
laundering 
107 2001 National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2002 (107-107) 
Disapprove of base closing commission recommendations 
107 2002 Trade Act of 2002 (107-210) Disapprove extension of “fast track” trade authority beyond 
period authorized 
107 2002 Trade Act of 2002 (107-210) Disapprove of use of “fast track” if no consultation between 
president and Congress 
107 2002 Trade Act of 2002 (107-210) Approve trade agreements 
108 2003 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 
2003 (108-61) 
Approve renewal of sanctions against Burma 
108 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (108-458) 
Approval of proposed minimum identification standards 
109 2006 Henry J. Hyde United States and India 
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 
2006 (109-401) 
Approve presidential waiver of agreement with India from 
certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act 
110 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 (110-343) 
Disapprove proposal to exceed cap on funds to be lent under 
TARP 
111 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (111-148) 
Approve legislation implementing IPAB recommendations 
111 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (111-148) 
Approve legislation to discontinue IPAB 
111 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (111-203) 
Approve emergency plan to ensure bank solvency 
112 2011 Budget Control Act of 2011 (112-25) Approve installment increases to debt ceiling 
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Congress 
Created 
Year 
Created 
Bill Name and Public Law Number Majoritarian Exception 
112 2011 Budget Control Act of 2011 (112-25) Approve recommendations of Joint Committee on Deficit 
Reduction 
112 2011 Budget Control Act of 2011 (112-25) Approve balanced budget amendment to the Constitution 
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Table A1.2: Information on Date of First Relevance for Enacted Majoritarian Exceptions 
Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1971 Disapprove of alternative 
rate increase in federal pay 
proposed by president 
1971 Recommendations 
submitted to Congress 
“Background Paper No. 4: Federal Pay: Its 
Budgetary Implications,” Congressional Budget 
Office, 10 March 1976. p. 4. 
1973 Approve of removal of 
armed forces engaged 
outside United States 
1975 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
Grimmett, Richard F., “The War Powers 
Resolution: After Thirty-Six Years,” 
Congressional Research Service, 22 April 2010. 
1973 Approving of bills passed 
by Washington D.C. City 
Council 
1975 First legislation passed 
by D.C. council under 
home rule charter 
Schrag, Philip G., “The Future of District of 
Columbia Home Rule,” Catholic University Law 
Review 39 (1990): 311-371. 
1974 Disapprove of certain 
federal contractor 
regulations 
1977 Legislation included a 
requirement that 
regulations be issued 
within three years 
“Pension Losses of Contractor Employees at 
Federal Installations Can Be Reduced,” U.S. 
Government Accounting Office, 3 September 
1981, p. 6. 
1974 Disapprove of new 
multiemployer pension 
schedules 
1977 Resolution of 
disapproval introduced 
H. Con. Res. 369, 95th Congress; introduced 
October 5, 1977. 
1974 Approve congressional 
budget resolution 
1975 Resolution introduced H. Con. Res. 218, 94th Congress; introduced 
April 14, 1975. 
1974 Approve presidential 
impoundment/rescission 
requests 
1975 Congressional action 
on funds impounded 
by president 
“Hearings Before the Task Force on Budget 
Process,” Committee on the Budget, U.S. House 
of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 
11-12 December 1979, p. 252. 
1974 Approve reconciliation bills 1975 Reconciliation bill 
introduced 
Keith, Robert, and Bill Heniff, Jr., “The Budget 
Reconciliation Process: House and Senate 
Procedures,” Congressional Research Service, 
August 2005, fn. 7. 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1974 Approve trade agreements 
and non-tariff barriers 
1979 Trade implementing 
bill introduced  
Cooper, William H., “Trade Promotion Authority 
(TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy,” 
Congressional Research Service, January 2014, p. 
5. 
1974 Disapprove president's 
certification of that drug-
producing countries have 
met requirements to engage 
in trade with United States 
1987 Resolution introduced S. J. Res. 93, 100th Congress; introduced March 
17, 1987. 
1974 Disapprove president's 
extension of Most-Favored-
Nation trade status 
1975 Resolution introduced H. Con. Res. 252, 94th Congress; introduced 
April 24, 1975. 
1974 Disapprove president's 
proposal to remedy 
injurious effect of imports 
1976 Resolution introduced S. Con. Res. 213, 94th Congress; introduced 
October 1, 1976. 
1974 Disapprove president's 
proposal to waive 
prohibition on trade with 
country that restricts 
emigration by its citizens 
1975 Resolution introduced S. Res. 219, 94th Congress; introduced July 24, 
1975. 
1975 Disapprove of certain 
standards under the Social 
Security Act 
1977 Resolution introduced S. Res. 416, 95th Congress; introduced March 14, 
1978. 
1975 Disapprove of presidential 
energy actions, including 
tapping the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve 
1976 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
Chubb, John H., Interest Groups and the 
Bureaucracy: The Politics of Energy (Palo Alto, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 154. 
1976 Approve of international 
fishery agreement 
negotiated by president 
1977 Resolution introduced H. J. Res. 240, 95th Congress; introduced 
February 7, 1977. 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1976 Terminate national 
emergency initiated by the 
president 
1980 First requested 
extension of national 
emergency following 
rule creation 
Original national emergency declared by 
Executive Order 12170, 14 November 1979; first 
requested extension transmitted 12 November 
1980 (see 45 FR 75159). 
1976 Approve commercial 
manufacturing agreements 
1978 First proposed 
agreement following 
creation of rule 
“Letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary of 
State for Congressional Relations, transmitting 
notice of the proposed issuance of licenses for the 
export of major defense equipment sold 
commercially to Argentina (MC-35-78), pursuant 
to section 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act 
of 1961, as amended; to the Committee on 
International Relations,” 95th Congress, 2nd 
Session, 1978. 
1976 Approve resolution ending 
arms sales because of 
human rights abuses 
1977 House Committee on 
International Relations 
hearing on 
implementation of the 
provision 
“Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 
1978 (Part 1): Hearings Before the House 
Committee on International Relations,” 95th 
Congress, 1st Session (1977); see also Cohen, 
Stephen B., “Conditioning U.S. Security 
Assistance on Human Rights Practices,” 
American Journal of International Law 76.2 
(April 1982): 246-279, esp. p. 254. 
1976 Approve resolution ending 
military assistance because 
of discrimination 
 No resolution introduced 
1976 Approve resolution 
terminating assistance to 
countries transferring 
nuclear material to other 
countries 
1979 First situation in 
which country 
(Pakistan) is found in 
violation of 
prohibition 
Hathaway, Robert M., “Confrontation and 
Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South Asian 
Nuclear Tests,” Arms Control Today 
January/February 2000. 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1976 Disapprove of sale of 
defense articles or services 
and major defense 
equipment 
1976 Resolution introduced S. Con. Res. 150, 94th Congress; September 7, 
1976. 
1976 Disapprove of certain 
decisions regarding 
debentures/preferred stock 
in Amtrak and Conrail 
1978 Purchase of 
debentures and stock 
for Conrail authorized 
as part of larger 
legislation 
S. 2788, 95th Congress; see “Memo from Senator 
H. John Heinz,” 2 August 1978 
<http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/
awarchive?type=file&item=562320> for 
discussion. 
1976 Approve president's 
proposed natural gas 
transportation system for 
Alaska 
1977 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
“Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline Project History,” 
Office of the Federal Coordinator for Alaska 
Natural Gas Transportation Projects, October 
2013 
<http://www.arcticgas.gov/sites/default/files/docu
ments/alaska-natural-gas-pipeline-project-
history.pdf>. 
1977 Approve limits on economic 
and military assistance to 
countries selling nuclear 
technology to other 
countries 
1979 First situation in 
which country 
(Pakistan) is found in 
violation of 
prohibition 
Rudolph, Lloyd I., and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, 
Making U.S. Foreign Policy Toward South Asia: 
Regional Imperatives and the Imperial 
Presidency (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2008), p. 186. 
1977 Disapprove reorganization 
plan for the executive 
branch 
1978 Plan submitted by 
president to Congress 
“Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, Message 
from the President, February 23, 1978,” 95th 
Congress, 2nd Session. 
1978 Approve waiver of energy 
laws to facilitate 
construction of Long Beach-
Midland project 
1979 Project abandoned 
before waiver was 
necessary 
“The Review Process for Priority Energy Projects 
Should Be Expedited,” U.S. Government 
Accounting Office, 15 October 1979. 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1978 Disapprove of president's 
emergency prohibition on 
use of natural gas or 
petroleum during severe 
energy supply interruption 
1979 First applicable energy 
situation during which 
president could 
declare prohibition 
Presidential Proclamation 4667, 10 July 1979. 
1978 Disapprove of presidential 
recommendations to cut off 
nuclear exports or export 
licenses 
1985 Resolution introduced S. J. Res. 238, 99th Congress; introduced 
November 14, 1985. 
1978 Disapprove bidding system 
for oil and gas leases 
proposed by Secretary of 
Energy 
1981 First action by the 
Secretary of the 
Energy covered by the 
rule 
Provision was challenged as part of Watt v. 
Energy Action Education Foundation 454 U.S. 
151 (1981) 
1978 Disapprove of executive 
branch plan for storing 
spent nuclear fuel 
1978 First action taken by 
executive branch 
covered by the rule 
“Federal Facilities for Storing Spent Nuclear 
Fuel--Are They Needed?” U.S. Government 
Accounting Office, 27 June 1979. 
1979 Approve trade agreements 
and non-tariff barriers 
1980 Trade implementing 
bill introduced  
H.R. 7942, 96th Congress, 2nd Session; 
introduced August 18, 1980. 
1980 Approve application for 
transportation/utility 
systems in Alaska's 
National Wilderness 
Preservation System 
1985 Approval sought as 
part of broader Alaska 
legislation 
H.R. 1902, 99th Congress, 1st Session; see also 
“Measures to Alaska Lands,” Subcommittee on 
Public Lands and the Subcommittee on National 
Parks and Recreation of the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Congress, 1st 
Session, 23 May 1985. 
1980 Disapprove regulations 
promulgated by the FTC 
1981 Resolution introduced H. Con. Res. 178, 97th Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced December 16, 1981. 
1980 Approve PBGC 
recommendations on 
premium increases 
necessary to support current 
pension guarantees 
1985 Deadline for 
recommendations 
included in bill 
Public Law 96-364, Section 4022A 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1980 Disapprove of export 
licenses for commercial sale 
of defense articles and 
services 
1982 First proposed 
agreement following 
creation of rule 
“Letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary of 
State for Congressional Relations, transmitting 
notice of the proposed issuance of licenses for the 
export of major defense equipment sold 
commercially to Indonesia (Transmittal No. MC-
18-82), pursuant to section 36(c) of the Arms 
Export Control Act; to the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs,” 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982. 
1980 Disapprove of military 
assistance to Angola 
1981 Announcement by 
Reagan administration 
that it would seek 
repeal of the rule 
Copson, Raymond W., The Congressional Black 
Caucus and Foreign Policy (Hauppauge, NY: 
Nova Publishers, 2003), p. 25. 
1980 Disapprove sales of military 
design or construction 
services 
1981 Resolution introduced S. Con. Res. 37, 97th Congress; introduced 
October 1, 1981. 
1980 Approve Department of 
Energy authorization bill 
containing energy targets 
1981 Legislation introduced S. 1021, 97th Congress, 1st Session; introduced 
May 15, 1981. 
1980 Approve comprehensive 
synthetic fuel strategy 
 Corporation disbanded 
before undertaking 
any actions 
Bayrer, Ralph.  The Saga of the U.S. Synthetic 
Fuels Corporation: A Cautionary Tale 
(Washington, D.C.: New Academia Publishing, 
2011). 
1980 Disapprove synthetic fuel 
action 
 Corporation disbanded 
before undertaking 
any actions 
Bayrer, Ralph.  The Saga of the U.S. Synthetic 
Fuels Corporation: A Cautionary Tale 
(Washington, D.C.: New Academia Publishing, 
2011). 
1981 Disapprove of basing mode 
for MX missiles 
1982 Legislation introduced Amendment to H.R. 7355, 97th Congress, 2nd 
Session; considered December 7, 1982. 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1981 Disapprove of president's 
decision on long-range 
combat aircraft 
1982 No resolution 
introduced by deadline 
included with rule 
creation 
Mitchell, Douglas D., “Issue Brief Number 
IBB81107: Bomber Options for Replacing B-
52S,” Congressional Research Service, 3 May 
1982. 
1981 Disapprove of assistance to 
state that gives nuclear 
weapon to non-nuclear 
weapon state 
1982 Legislation specified 
timeline for waiver 
authority to which rule 
applied (1982-1987) 
McGoldrick, Fred, Nuclear Trade Controls: 
Minding the Gaps (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2013), fn. 42. 
1981 Disapprove of defense 
leases 
1982 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
Public Law 97-342, 97th Congress, 2nd Session; 
enacted October 15, 1982. 
1981 Approve extension of 
implementation period for 
agreement with 
Czechoslovakia 
1982 If extension was 
required, would have 
been sought within 60 
days of law's 
enactment 
Public Law 97-127 §7, 97th Congress, 1st 
Session; enacted December 29, 1981. 
1982 Approve expenditures for 
MX missiles 
1983 Resolution introduced S. Con. Res. 26, 98th Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced April 20, 1983. 
1982 Approve selection of 
nuclear waste storage site 
2002 Resolution introduced H. J. Res. 87, 107th Congress, 2nd Session; 
introduced April 11, 2002. 
1982 Disapprove changes to 
nuclear waste fee schedule 
 No changes have been 
made to fee schedule 
since initial legislation 
“News Release: NEI Hails Nuclear Waste Fund 
Fee Decision,” Nuclear Energy Institute, 19 
November 2013 <http://www.nei.org/News-
Media/Media-Room/News-Releases/NEI-Hails-
Nuclear-Waste-Fund-Fee-Decision>. 
1982 Disapprove selection of 
interim storage site for 
nuclear waste 
 Legislative authority 
expired before 
selection was made. 
“Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management; Nuclear Waste Acceptance Issues,” 
60 Federal Register 85 (3 May 1995), pp. 21793-
21798. 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1983 Approve of removal of 
armed forces engaged 
outside United States 
1987 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
Grimmett, Richard F., “The War Powers 
Resolution: After Thirty-Six Years,” 
Congressional Research Service, 22 April 2010. 
1984 Approve funds for 
Nicaragua 
1985 Resolution introduced H. J. Res. 239, 99th Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced April 15, 1985. 
1984 Approve spending on MX 
missiles 
1985 Resolution introduced S. J. Res. 71, 99th Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced March 5, 1985. 
1984 Approve of agreements 
modifying tariffs 
1985 Trade implementing 
bill introduced  
H.R. 2268, 99th Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced April 29, 1985 
1984 Approve of president's 
decision to acquire 
additional MX missiles 
1985 Resolution introduced S. J. Res. 71, 99th Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced March 5, 1985. 
1985  Suspending deficit 
reduction provisions in the 
event of low growth 
1991 Resolution introduced S. J. Res. 44, 102nd Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced January 24, 1991. 
1985 Approve sequester if 
process invalidated by 
courts 
1986 Procedures invalidated 
by courts 
Bowsher v. Synar 478 U.S. 714 (1986) 
1985 Disapprove of arms sales to 
Jordan 
1986 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
Middleton, Drew, “Jordanians Irked by Delay in 
U.S. Arms Sale,” New York Times 23 February 
1986. 
1985 Disapprove of antitrust 
exemption for oil companies 
granted by president 
1987 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
“International Energy Agency: Plan to Provide 
Legal Defenses to Participating Oil Companies,” 
U.S. Government Accounting Office, February 
1988. 
1985 Approve agricultural export 
controls 
1986 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
Cooke, John F., “The United States' 1986 
Emergency Economic Sanctions Against Libya--
Have They Worked?” Maryland Journal of 
International Law 14 (1990): 195-232. 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1985 Approve nuclear 
cooperation agreements 
1985 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
“Statement by President Reagan on Signing the 
Export Administration Amendments Act of 
1985,” 12 July 1985. 
1985 Approve additional aid to 
Central American peace 
process 
1986 Provision expired with 
conclusion of 99th 
Congress 
Public Law 99-83, Section 722(k) 
1985 Approve aid to Nicaraguan 
democratic resistance 
1986 Resolution introduced S. J. Res. 283, 99th Congress, 2nd Session; 
introduced February 27, 1986. 
1986 Disapprove of presidential 
agreements with Federated 
States of Micronesia and 
Marshall Islands 
2003 Resolution introduced H. J. Res. 63, 108th Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced September 15, 2003. 
1986 Approve additional 
sanctions against South 
Africa 
1987 First report from 
president that could 
have triggered 
additional sanctions 
Copson, Raymond W., “South Africa: President's 
Report on Progress Toward Ending Apartheid,” 
Congressional Research Service, 19 October 
1987, p.1 
1986 Approve agreement reached 
with other industrialized 
countries to impose 
sanctions against South 
Africa 
1987 First report from State 
Department regarding 
possible agreement 
that would have been 
covered by provision 
Copson, Raymond W. and Jeanne S. Affelder, 
“South Africa: International Sanctions,” 
Congressional Research Service, 22 September 
1987, p. 5. 
1986 Disapprove of president's 
decision to suspend 
sanctions against South 
Africa 
1991 Presidential 
certification that all 
criteria allowing 
suspension of 
sanctions had been 
met 
“The Termination of Economic Sanctions Against 
South Africa,” Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcommittees on Economic Policy and Trade 
and Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House 
of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 
31 July 1991 , pp. 15-16. 
1986 Disapprove presidential 
waiver of required cuts in 
aid to major drug producing 
countries 
1988 Resolution introduced H. J. Res. 493, 100th Congress, 2nd Session; 
introduced March 15, 1988. 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1986 Approve termination of 
immigration-related 
employer sanctions program 
if evidence of nationality-
related discrimination 
1987 First GAO report that 
could have triggered 
termination of 
program 
“Immigration Reform: Status of Implementing 
Employer Sanctions After One Year,” United 
States General Accounting Office, 5 November 
1987. 
1987 Approve sequester if 
process invalidated by 
courts 
 Not challenged in court 
1987 Approve alternative 
sequester proposal 
generated by Congress 
1987 First sequester put in 
place under law 
Keith, Robert, “Budget Sequesters: A Brief 
Review,” Congressional Research Service, 8 
March 2004. 
1987 Approve alternative 
sequester proposal for 
Department of Defense 
generated by president 
1987 First proposal 
submitted by the 
president 
“Proposed Alternative Sequestration Reductions, 
Department of Defense, FY88, Message from the 
President,” House Committee on Appropriations, 
24 November 1987. 
1988 Approve compensation plan 
following nuclear accident 
 Requires nuclear accident to be relevant 
1988 Approve additional aid to 
Nicaraguan resistance 
1990 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
“Chamorro Win Ensures Aid to Nicaragua,” CQ 
Almanac 1990, 46th ed. (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1991), 770-774. 
1988 Disapprove of extension of 
fast track authority beyond 
period authorized 
1991 Extension disapproval 
resolution introduced  
Smith, Carolyn C., “Trade Promotion Authority 
and Fast-Track Negotiating Authority for Trade 
Agreements: Major Votes,” Congressional 
Research Service, 12 January 2011, p. 3. 
1988 Revoke fast track authority 
if president does not consult 
with Congress 
1993 Trade implementing 
bill introduced  
Cooper, William H., “Trade Promotion Authority 
(TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy,” 
Congressional Research Service, January 2014, p. 
5. 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1988 Approve trade agreements 1993 Trade implementing 
bill introduced  
Smith, Carolyn C., “Trade Promotion Authority 
and Fast-Track Negotiating Authority for Trade 
Agreements: Major Votes,” Congressional 
Research Service, 12 January 2011, p. 5. 
1988 Disapprove presidential 
proposal for aid to drug 
producing country 
1989 Resolution introduced S. J. Res. 82, 101st Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced March 21, 1989. 
1988 Disapprove base closing 
recommendations 
1989 Resolution introduced H. J. Res, 165, 101st Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced March 3, 1989. 
1990 Disapprove base closing 
recommendations 
1991 Resolution introduced H. J. Res. 308, 102nd Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced July 19, 1991. 
1991 Disapprove of presidential 
decision to rescind a 
prohibition on exporting 
arms to terrorist countries 
2004 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
“Department of State; Rescission of 
Determination Regarding Iraq,” 69 Federal 
Register 202 (20 October 2004), p. 61702. 
1991 Disapprove of certain 
actions by the Metropolitan 
Washington Airports 
Authority 
1994 First action by 
MWAA covered by 
rule 
Provision was challenged as part of Hechinger vs. 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority 39 
F.3d 97 (308 U.S.App.D.C. 283). 
1992 Disapprove president's 
decision to suspend loan 
guarantee to Israel program 
2003 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
Mark, Clyde R., “Israeli-United States Relations,” 
Congressional Research Service, 28 April 2005. 
1992 Disapproving presidential 
waiver of prohibition on 
assistance to countries with 
substantial narcotics 
production 
1993 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
“Letter from President Clinton to Congressional 
Leaders on Certification of Major Narcotics 
Producing and Transit Countries,” 5 February 
1993. 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1993 Approve trade agreements 
(temporary extension of 
power delegated as part of 
Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 
1988) 
1994 Trade implementing 
bill introduced 
Smith, Carolyn C., “Trade Promotion Authority 
and Fast-Track Negotiating Authority for Trade 
Agreements: Major Votes,” Congressional 
Research Service, 12 January 2011, p. 5. 
1994 Approve compensation plan 
for claim exceeding liability 
requirements 
 Requires commercial space accident to be relevant 
1994 Approve of waiver of 
sanctions against nuclear 
weapons states transferring 
material to non-nuclear 
weapons states 
1996 First situation in 
which countries 
(China and Pakistan) 
are in potential 
violation of provision 
“China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to 
Pakistan,” Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, 
August 1999. 
1994 Disapprove of president's 
decision to provide aid to 
certain countries enriching 
nuclear material 
1999 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
“Presidential Determination No. 2000-04: 
Memorandum on India and Pakistan,” 27 October 
1999. 
1994 Approve subsidies 
agreement 
1999 Legislation included a 
deadline of December 
31, 1999 
“2003 Trade Policy Agenda and 2002 Annual 
Report on the Trade Agreements Program,” 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
2003. 
1994 Disapproval of US 
participation in the World 
Trade Organization 
2000 Resolution introduced H.J. Res. 90, 106th Congress, 2nd Session; 
introduced March 6, 2000. 
1996 Disapprove of president's 
decision to suspend Cuban 
embargo 
 President has not sought suspension of embargo 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
1996 Disapprove third country 
transfers of military 
equipment 
2002 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
“Letter from the Assistant Secretary for 
Legislative Affairs, Department of State, 
Transmitting notification of a proposed transfer 
of major defense equipment pursuant to Section 3 
(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) from 
the Government of Switzerland [Transmittal No. 
RSAT-4-02]; to the Committee on International 
Relations,” 107th Congress, 2nd Session, October 
2002. 
1996 Disapprove of proposed 
regulation 
1996 Resolution introduced S. J. Res. 60, 104th Congress, 2nd Session; 
introduced September 17, 1996. 
1996 Approve presidential 
determination that limits on 
population planning 
program are onerous 
1997 Resolution introduced H. J. Res. 36, 105th Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced February 4, 1997. 
1996 Disapprove of proposed 
budgetary cancellation 
(“line item veto”) 
1997 Resolution introduced S. 1144, 105th Congress, 1st Session; introduced 
September 3, 1997 
1997 Disapprove of 
recommendations to 
liquidate Amtrak from 
Amtrak Reform Council 
2000 First report that could 
have triggered 
resolution 
“Brief History of the Amtrak Reform Council,” 
30 April 2002 
<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/arc/#history>. 
1999 Disapprove presidential 
request for waiver of UN 
reimbursement requirement 
 President has not sought waiver 
2000 Approve presidential 
request for additional funds 
for Plan Colombia 
2000 No resolution 
introduced by deadline 
included with rule 
creation 
Serafino, Nina M., “Colombia: Plan Colombia 
Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001),” 
Congressional Research Service, 5 July 2001. 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
2001 Approve the repeal of 
provisions on international 
money laundering 
2005 Legislation includes 
requirement for review 
under rule after four 
years 
Public Law 107-56 §303 
2001 Disapprove of base closing 
commission 
recommendations 
2005 First action taken 
covered by the rule 
Mason, R. Chuck, “Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC): Transfer and Disposal of 
Military Property,” Congressional Research 
Service, 28 February 2013. 
2002 Disapprove extension of 
“fast track” trade authority 
beyond period authorized 
2005 Resolution introduced S. Res. 100, 109th Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced April 6, 2005. 
2002 Disapprove of use of “fast 
track” if no consultation 
between president and 
Congress 
2003 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
Smith, Carolyn C., “Trade Promotion Authority 
and Fast-Track Negotiating Authority for Trade 
Agreements: Major Votes,” Congressional 
Research Service, 12 January 2011. 
2002 Approve trade agreements 2003 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
Smith, Carolyn C., “Trade Promotion Authority 
and Fast-Track Negotiating Authority for Trade 
Agreements: Major Votes,” Congressional 
Research Service, 12 January 2011. 
2003 Approve renewal of 
sanctions against Burma 
2004 Resolution introduced H. J. Res. 97, 108th Congress, 2nd Session; 
introduced June 3, 2004. 
2004 Approval of proposed 
minimum identification 
standards 
2005 Legislation included 
six-month deadline for 
promulgation of 
regulations subject to 
rule 
Public Law 108-458 §7220 
2006 Approve presidential waiver 
of agreement with India 
from certain provisions of 
the Atomic Energy Act 
2008 First action taken by 
the president covered 
by the rule 
Kerr, Paul K., “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with 
India: Issues for Congress,” Congressional 
Research Service. 26 June 2012. 
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Year 
Created 
Procedural Exception Year First 
Relevant 
Circumstances Source 
2008 Disapprove proposal to 
exceed cap on funds to be 
lent under TARP 
2009 Resolution introduced S. J. Res. 5, 111th Congress, 1st Session; 
introduced January 13, 2009. 
2010 Approve legislation 
implementing IPAB 
recommendations 
 Requires Medicare growth rate to reach certain level before rule is 
triggered 
2010 Approve legislation to 
discontinue IPAB 
 Legislation cannot be introduced until 2017 
2010 Approve emergency plan to 
ensure bank solvency 
 Requires bank crisis to be relevant 
2011 Approve installment 
increases to debt ceiling 
2012 Resolution introduced S. J. Res. 34, 112th Congress, 2nd Session; 
introduced January 23, 2012. 
2011 Approve recommendations 
of Joint Committee on 
Deficit Reduction 
2011 No resolution 
introduced by deadline 
included with rule 
creation 
Steinhauer, Jennifer, Helene Cooper, and Robert 
Pear, “Panel Fails to Reach Deal on Plan for 
Deficit Reduction,” New York Times 21 
November 2011. 
2011 Approve balanced budget 
amendment to the 
Constitution 
2011 Vote on resolution S. J. Res. 10, 112th Congress, 1st Session; 14 
December 2011. 
 
41 
 
 
Chapter 2: Facilitating Policy Gain: Creating Oversight Exceptions 
 
Following the 2006 congressional elections, both houses of Congress were under 
Democratic control for the first time since 1994.  President George W. Bush remained in the 
White House for the duration of the Congress, however, and congressional Democrats were 
faced with a dilemma: the war in Iraq was increasingly unpopular with core Democratic 
constituencies, but their ability to circumscribe the conduct of those military campaigns was 
limited, given the president’s substantial institutional advantage in the defense policy arena (e.g. 
Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008).  In addition to attempts to defund the wars outright 
(e.g. Murray 2007), the congressional majority also sought a less familiar solution, introducing 
three separate bills that would create explicit legislative checks on the ability of the president to 
unilaterally conduct the war.  Under one of these proposals, for example, any future aid to Iraq 
could only be dispersed if the president certified that the government of Iraq had met certain 
security benchmarks.  Both houses of Congress, moreover, would have to affirm that 
determination by passing a “joint resolution of approval”—a measure that would receive various 
procedural protections on the floor of the Senate.  It would be referred to the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, from which it would be automatically discharged at four days.  Once 
reported out of committee, a motion to proceed to consideration of the resolution would be 
highly privileged, not debatable, and not amendable.  Debate on the measure, which itself could 
not be amended, would be limited to 10 hours.1   
This approach was ultimately unsuccessful for the Democrats in the 110th Congress; the 
provision described above was removed from the underlying bill by the Senate, and similar 
standalone legislation died in committee in both chambers.2  The prospect of changing its 
internal procedures in order to increase its capacity to oversee the executive branch, however, 
was not new territory for the Senate.  Throughout the 20th century, Congress has periodically 
                                                     
1 See §1331, H.R. 2206, U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 
Appropriations Act, 2007, as passed by the House of Representatives, May 2007. 
2 See H.R. 1263, the Iraq Benchmarks Act, and S. 433, the Iraq War De-Escalation Act. 
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created this kind of legislative check on the president’s ability to exercise discretion, ensuring 
that the chamber has input into decisions ordinarily left to the executive branch.  These special 
rules represent the first of two kinds of majoritarian exceptions, which I call “oversight 
exceptions.” 
The legislature is not, however, the only branch potentially made better off by granting 
these oversight measures procedural protections.  From the president’s perspective, the 
privileged status of these measures actually induces actions that he would otherwise avoid.  For 
certain status quo policies, the fact that the legislation reviewing the executive’s action cannot be 
amended on the floor of the Senate provides him with more discretion than if his unilateral 
policy choices were subject to revision through the regular legislative process. 
This logic—that it is occasionally Pareto superior to protect certain proposals from 
obstruction in the Senate—flows directly from a model, laid out below, of the strategic 
interaction between the Senate and the president in an issue area in which the president possesses 
substantial authority to act unilaterally.  Comparing the expectations about policy outcomes 
under a set of baseline conditions without special rules to the predicted results in the presence of 
majoritarian procedures illustrates one of my principal claims about majoritarian exceptions: 
they enable particular policy changes that would, absent the special rule, be substantially more 
difficult (if not impossible) to enact.  After outlining the expectations generated by the model, I 
describe how my other claim about majoritarian exceptions—that they benefit the majority party 
in the Senate—has consequences for the issue areas in which we should observe their creation.  I 
then test both the model- and issue-based predictions on original data, finding support for both 
central claims. 
 
The Unilateral Power of the President and Congress’s Ability to Respond 
 
Unilateral action on the part of the president takes a range of forms.  Many scholars of the 
presidency emphasize the specific instruments in the executive’s “tool box.”  Executive orders 
are used to direct specific federal government officials and agencies to either take or avoid a 
given action.  Presidential proclamations perform a similar function, but are directed towards 
individuals and groups outside of government, making them less consequential.  National 
security directives, meanwhile, serve as classified instruments for directing policy, usually in the 
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foreign or military policy arena.  Executive agreements are alternatives to formal treaties, which 
require the advice and consent of the Senate.  Signing statements, finally, describe the 
president’s interpretation of statutory language and how that understanding is likely to play out 
in the executive branch’s implementation of the law (Cooper 2005; Howell 2003). 
From where does the president’s power to engage in these kinds of action come?  Article 
II of the U.S. Constitution grants the president “executive power” and directs him to “take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.”  A series of 20th century Supreme Court cases (United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright (1936), United States v. Belmont (1937), and United States v. Pink 
(1942)) solidified the president’s ability to issue directives regarding “external affairs,” but that 
notion has evolved to include many areas of both foreign and domestic policy (Howell 2003).  
Within this legal context, moreover, the president both has an incentive to push the boundaries of 
his authority and is well-equipped to do so.  Unlike members of Congress, presidents serve a 
national constituency and have a firm, two-term limit for establishing a legacy.  Rather than 
being motivated by re-election (Mayhew 1974), then, presidents are interested in expanding the 
institutional power of their office (Moe 1999).  The fact that presidents serve as executives, 
moreover, means they have organizational resources and informational advantages that facilitate 
this growth in power (Moe and Howell 1999b). 
For our purposes here, however, presidential action is not limited to these specific policy 
instruments.  Congress has also fed the president’s desire for expanding power by delegating 
authority to the executive branch, essentially creating another envelope for the president to push.  
The factors affecting Congress’s decision to delegate responsibility to the president have been 
well-documented.  These include, for example, the costs of subsequent oversight and legislator 
risk aversion (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004), the similarity of preferences between the executive 
and Congress, the degree of uncertainty over eventual policy outcomes, and the expertise of 
legislators vis-à-vis agencies (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999), and the political capacity of 
legislators and the bargaining environment in which they operate (Huber and Shipan 2002).  In 
making these delegation decisions, Congress has various tools available to attempt to monitor the 
executive branch’s exercise of its discretion, including administrative procedures (McCubbins, 
Noll, and Weingast 1987; 1989), writing detailed statutes (Huber and Shipan 2002), and other 
oversight mechanisms (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).  While the 
efficacy of congressional actors’ efforts using these instruments vary, they are at least sometimes 
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able to ensure the production of policy outcomes closer to their preferences (e.g. Weingast and 
Moran 1983).   
In general, however, once the executive has established a certain level of discretion in a 
policy area—either through explicit delegation or an exercise of his constitutional authority—it 
is exceedingly difficult for Congress to claw back that power (Volden 2002).  Indeed, scholars of 
the presidency have argued that Congress’s ineffectiveness at this task only augments the 
president’s ability to undertake unilateral action (Moe and Howell 1999a, 1999b).  The chamber 
and its members are plagued by a range of collective action problems, each of which springs 
from the fact that its members, as seekers of re-election (Mayhew 1974) have an incentive to 
engage in individual behaviors that jeopardize the collective body’s ability to enact legislation.  
A long and wide literature explores how different internal structures, especially committees (e.g. 
Hall and Grofman 1990; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990) and parties (Aldrich 1995; Cox and 
McCubbins 1993), are meant to help solve these collective dilemmas.  These issues are 
especially acute in the Senate, where the ability of individual members to engage in obstruction 
is greater than the House (Binder and Smith 1997; Koger 2010; Wawro and Schickler 2006; 
Ainsworth and Flathman 1995; Smith and Flathman 1989; Smith and Gamm 2002; Evans and 
Lipinski 2005).  Even if Congress is able to overcome these internal challenges to work o 
collectively, their individual re-election incentives suggest that they should be paying more 
attention specific, constituency-centered interests than to maintaining the overall power and 
influence of the institution (Howell 2003).  The voters that House members and senators must 
face every two or six years, respectively, are unlikely to reward or punish incumbents based on 
their work protecting the body’s place in the separation of powers system.  The president, then, 
has good reason to expect that the likelihood of a legislative reprisal for an action he has taken is 
low, so why should he worry about the prospect of these checks on his power? 
Indeed, empirical work on legislative responses to unilateral action by the president 
suggests that it is possible in only limited circumstances.  Moe and Howell (1999a) and Howell 
(2003) argue that any such successful legislative reactions must be rooted in concerns on the part 
of individual legislators about the constituency effects of the precipitating presidential action.  
Black et al. (2011), meanwhile, test a version of this claim using evidence from congressional 
responses to recess appointments under President George W. Bush; they argue that Congress will 
only be able to overcome its internal collective action problems to check the president’s action 
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on a particular issue when the executive’s maneuver creates high political costs for a sufficient 
number of members.  In addition to these constituency-level political concerns, other work points 
to the role of partisan conflict.  Howell and Pevehouse (2011) find that, in the war powers 
context, members of Congress are less likely to check the actions of a co-partisan president than 
an executive of the opposite party.  MacDonald (2010; 2013) documents a similar pattern in the 
use of limitation riders, or specific legislative provisions included in appropriations bills that 
restrict the executive branch’s ability to promulgate regulations on particular topics, finding they 
are more common under divided government. 
Limitation riders also illustrate well another important dynamic of Congress’s difficulty 
in limiting executive discretion.  Historically, we have associate increased presidential power 
with the foreign policy arena (e.g. Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008).  Over the course of 
the 20th century, however, the executive’s ability to act unilaterally has expanded into a wide 
range of domestic policy areas as well.  The media made much of high-profile actions by 
President Barack Obama in 2014 and 2015 on immigration (Shear 2014) and climate change 
(Davis 2015), but such exercises of power are hardly new.  Comprehensive surveys of executive 
orders issued during the 20th century, for example, reveal activity in areas such as social welfare, 
natural resources and public lands, and agriculture, as well as trade, defense, and foreign aid 
(King and Ragsdale 1988; Mayer and Price 2002; Howell 2003).  Other work finds that while the 
president is more likely to issue signing statements regarding provisions that deal with foreign 
affairs, he also uses the tool to counter proposed congressional oversight (Evans 2011).  Even the 
president’s ability to direct the federal government’s procurement and contracting policies have 
allowed him to make headway on important domestic policy goals (Gitterman 2013). 
This broad discretion on the part of the president to act unilaterally in a wide range of 
policy areas, and the fact that Congress is generally ill-equipped to assert institutional influence 
against the executive branch might leave us skeptical that we should ever observe the creation of 
oversight exceptions.  After all, when the president signs a bill containing this kind of rule 
change, he is surrendering some of his unilateral power.  The individual possible components of 
an oversight exception, meanwhile, also reallocate power within the Senate.  First, the senators 
with preferences between the chamber median and the filibuster pivot are also giving up some of 
their ability to dictate the content of a proposal; now, any legislative response to an action by the 
president need not accommodate their preferences, since their consent is not needed for passage 
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under simple majority rule.  Second, the fact that the procedures generally prohibit amendments, 
limits the capacity of individual legislators to affect the content of the bill.  Finally, in an 
oversight exception includes a mechanism by which a proposal can be forced out of committee, 
the members of that committee will also have their influence over the underlying measure’s 
content reduced.  Intuitively, then, we might then expect certain actors to be made worse off by 
this kind of majoritarian procedural change, the model outlined below tells a different story. 
 
A Spatial Model of Exception Creation 
 
To determine the conditions under which we should observe this kind of rule change, I 
rely on a spatial model of a legislature and a president (P), which incorporates the following 
assumptions.  First, the legislature’s rules permit a filibuster, effectively creating a supermajority 
voting rule for both votes to change the rules (i.e., to create a majoritarian exception) and to pass 
bills.3  Second, I assume that bills come to the floor of the legislature under an open rule.  Third, 
all actors have continuous, single-peaked preferences in a one-dimensional policy space.  In 
addition to P, the legislature contains a veto pivot (V), a filibuster pivot (F), and a median voter 
(M) (Krehbiel 1998).  Throughout the model explicated here, without loss of generality, I assume 
that P < M. 
To this point, the model bears a close resemblance to Howell’s (2003) theory of unilateral 
action by the president.  Several additional assumptions, however, distinguish my approach from 
his.  First, rather than parameterizing the amount of discretion possessed by the president, I 
assume P faces no existing legal and/or constitutional constraints on his unilateral action.  Put 
differently, the specific policy area under consideration here is one in which the president has 
substantial authority to undertake policy change.  Because the president is unconstrained in my 
setup, I depart from Howell by eliminating the judiciary as an actor.  Finally, I also introduce the 
majority party median (L), who possesses unique agenda setting/gatekeeping power; this 
assumption follows Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) as a way of incorporating majority party 
                                                     
3 Here, a majoritarian exception is defined as a legislative procedure that provides for a.) an unamendable proposal 
made by the president (P) to change the status quo and b.) a simple majority vote on that proposal by that legislature.  
If that vote fails, the proposal does not take effect. 
47 
 
 
influence and is consistent with the actual powers of the Senate majority leader (Heitshusen 
2013).   
 
Baseline Game 
 
To illustrate most clearly the situations in which we should observe exception creation, I 
first describe a “baseline” game in which changing the rules is not an option for Congress.  The 
baseline notation is summarized in Table 2.1.  Play of this game proceeds as follows, as depicted 
in Figure 2.1.  P moves first, choosing whether or not to take a unilateral action moving the 
status quo, Q, to a new location, x(p).  Importantly, the legislature does not have the ability to 
revise the status quo before the president moves; the legislature is only empowered to revise 
unilateral actions taken by P.4  If P does take a unilateral action moving Q to x(p), L chooses 
whether or not to introduce a bill revising P’s action from x(p) to yet another new location, x(c).  
If L introduces a bill revising P’s action to x(c), F chooses whether or not to filibuster L’s 
proposal.  If F does not filibuster L’s proposal, the legislature votes on x(c) and P chooses 
whether or not to sign it.  If P vetoes the bill, V chooses whether or not to override the veto.  If V 
overrides the veto, x(c) is the policy.  If the legislature does not override the veto, x(p) remains 
the policy.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 This assumption may seem strong and, to some, implausible.  In the policy areas where the president has broad 
unilateral powers, however, it is often because Congress has previously delegated those powers to the president and, 
in doing so, has limited or willingly abdicated its own ability to make the first move.  Take, for example, trade 
policy.  In 1934, Congress delegated to the president the authority to make trade agreements with foreign countries 
and to reduce tariffs by up to 50 percent—authority that was subject to reauthorization every three years.  Congress 
raised and lowered this 50 percent threshold periodically before returning it to 50 percent with the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962.  Under the authority of this law, U.S. trade negotiators returned from the Kennedy Round with 
agreements on non-tariff items, Congress reacted harshly and threatened to withhold implementing legislation for 
the non-tariff components—one on chemicals and one on grains.  Because the president realized that future 
international agreements would likely need to extend beyond just tariffs, and because Congress was concerned about 
ever-expanding congressional efforts in the area, the two branches sought a new balance of power on trade, 
culminating with the Trade Act of 1974, containing a majoritarian exception (Aaronson 2001; Stokes and Choate 
2001). 
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Table 2.1: Model Notation, Baseline Game 
 
P: president; p: president’s ideal point 
V: veto pivot; v: veto pivot’s ideal point 
M: floor median; m: median’s ideal point 
L: majority party median; l: majority party median’s ideal point 
F: filibuster pivot; f: filibuster pivot’s ideal point 
Q: status quo at beginning of game 
Q′: new policy at end of game 
x(p): new policy set by president 
x(c): new policy set by legislature 
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Figure 2.1: Baseline Game Extended Form 
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Given the sequential character of the game, I solve it using subgame perfection.  The full 
solution to both the baseline game and the rule change alternative is presented in Appendix 2.1; 
here, I provide the basic intuition of the underlying strategic behavior.  First, let us consider Case 
1, where the majority leader L is of the same party as the president P, and both L and P are more 
extreme than V.  (Each case is depicted visually in Figure 2.2.) This is a common arrangement of 
preferences, occurring, for example, in 11 out of 29 congresses between 1955 and 2012 when 
preferences are measured using DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997).  In this 
situation, P has full latitude to set x(p) at his ideal point, p, in the baseline game. To respond to 
this action, L would have to introduce x(c), which comes to the floor under regular order.  Thus, 
under an open rule, M would be able to amend x(c) away from L’s ideal point, making L worse 
off.  As a result, L avoids introducing a legislative response.  The final outcome, then, is Q′=p. 
Next, let us consider Case 2, where the president is exceptionally moderate, i.e., when V 
< P.  This is a relatively rare arrangement; since 1955, for example, it has only characterized the 
preferences of the Senate and the president for four years, between 1965 and 1968.  In this 
situation, P is able to set x(p)=p; the congressional constraint does not bind.  P would veto any 
x(c) that moves x(p) away from p, and V will not consent to an override.  Again, policy is 
ultimately set at Q′=p. 
Finally, for the baseline game, let us consider Case 3, when L > V and P ≤ V.  In practice, 
this arrangement characterizes divided government; only in the presence of very large Senate 
majorities is this condition possible under unified government.5  Here, P will set x(p)=v if q > v.  
P cannot move q any farther left than v without provoking a congressional response, x(c), that 
would make P worse off.  If q ≤ v, P will not make a proposal x(p).  Any proposal that would 
make P better off will trigger a congressional response—and because L > V, L is now willing to 
introduce that such a measure, x(c).  The exact location of the proposal x(c) that induces P’s 
equilibrium behavior varies based on the location of L (see Proposition 1 in Appendix 2.1 for a 
full definition of L’s proposal strategy). 
 
                                                     
5 Mathematically, the Senate majority party must have 66 or more members for the median member of the majority 
party to be more moderate than the veto pivot under unified government.  Since 1955, this has been true only twice 
(the 88th and 89th Congresses, 1963-1967). 
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Figure 2.2: Possible Arrangements of Preferences, Spatial Model of Oversight Exception 
Creation 
 
Case 1 
 
 
 
Case 2 
 
 
 
Case 3 
 
 
 
In the baseline game, then, we often observe P getting exactly what he wants; in Cases 1 
and 2, he is able to move policy to his ideal point without provoking a congressional response.  
In Case 3, for most values of Q, P can accomplish most of what he wants, as he is only 
constrained by the existence of the veto pivot.  Both these predictions are consistent with the 
empirical literature discussed above that documents how the president is often able to move 
policy closer to his preferences with little concern about Congress’s response.   
The only exception to this pattern occurs under divided government (Case 3) when the 
status quo is also quite extreme on the same side of the policy space as the president.  In this 
situation, the president avoids taking any sort of unilateral action because if he does so, it will 
provoke a congressional response that produces a final policy that is farther from P’s ideal point 
than the current status quo.  As we will see below, however, when we introduce the possibility of 
rule change, Congress can actually induce revisions to these extreme policies that are Pareto 
superior. 
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Rule Change Alternative 
 
Now, let us suppose that Congress also has the ability to change its rules and, 
specifically, the option of creating an oversight exception.  This second component of the game 
commences when any of the following occur in the baseline game: 
 
1. The president chooses not to take a unilateral action, setting policy at x(p) OR 
2. L chooses not to introduce a bill revising x(p) OR 
3. F chooses to filibuster x(c) OR 
4. P signs the bill revising x(p) to x(c) OR 
5. Once V has chosen whether or not to override P’s veto of x(c). 
 
Once any of those events have taken place, we proceed to the action depicted in Figure 2.3. 
(Relevant additional notation is summarized in Table 2.2.)  L chooses whether or not to 
introduce b, a bill changing the rules.  If L does not introduce b, the game ends.  If L introduces 
b, F chooses whether or not to filibuster b.  If F filibusters b, the game ends.  If F does not 
filibuster b, the legislature votes on b and P chooses whether or not to sign it.  If P vetoes b, V 
chooses whether or not to override the veto.  If V does not override the veto, the game ends. 
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Table 2.2: Model Notation, Rule Change Alternative 
 
P: president; p: president’s ideal point 
V: veto pivot; v: veto pivot’s ideal point 
M: floor median; m: median’s ideal point 
L: majority party median; l: majority party median’s ideal point 
F: filibuster pivot; f: filibuster pivot’s ideal point 
Q: status quo at beginning of game 
Q′: new policy at end of game 
x(p): new policy set by president 
x(c): new policy set by legislature 
b: bill containing majoritarian exception 
r(p): proposal made by P under a majoritarian exception 
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Figure 2.3: Rule Change Alternative Extended Form 
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If b has been successfully enacted—either because P has signed it into law, or because V 
has overridden P’s veto—the president has the opportunity to undertake unilateral action by 
proposing r(p).  Importantly, r(p) differs from x(p) in the baseline game in that r(p) is subject to 
congressional approval under the new procedures.  If P does not introduce r(p), the game ends.  
If P introduces r(p), the legislature votes on r(p).  If the legislature approves r(p), policy is set at 
r(p) and the game ends.  If the legislature does not approve r(p), policy remains at Q′.6 
 Let us now consider the same three cases discussed above.  Recall that in Case 1, P is 
able to set Q′=p.  Can the congressional actors make themselves better off by creating new rules?  
While there are circumstances under which L, V, M, and F would be better off under b’s new 
rules, there is no unilateral action, r(p), that P would take under the new rules that would improve 
his standing AND to which M would consent. In other words, the new rules do not empower P to 
take any actions he was previously avoiding, so creating them produces no gain for the 
legislature.7   As a result, policy will ultimately remain at Q′=p.  The same is true in Case 2, 
wherecreating a majoritarian exception has no effect on policy, which will end up at x(p)=Q′=p.  
There are no circumstances in which all pivotal actors are better off under policy made at b than 
under the existing rules, so there is no incentive for the legislature to create a majoritarian 
exception. 
 So far, adding the option of rule change does nothing to change the ultimate outcome of 
policymaking in the game.  In the divided government world of Case 3, however, we will 
observe oversight exceptions being created in some circumstances—namely, when Q < p.  In 
addition, actors will be indifferent about enacting one if p ≤ Q < v.  When Q < p, we saw that, in 
the baseline game, P does not want to propose x(p).  This is because any x(p) would trigger a 
response, x(c), at 2v-x(p), which makes P worse off than Q.  Under a rule change, however, P 
would have the power to set r(p) at p.  Recall that r(p) cannot be amended, and comes to the floor 
for a simple majority vote.  At least M and all members to the right of M will approve of a 
                                                     
6 This interaction, as modeled, represents a simplification of reality in two important ways.  First, in practice, the 
oversight exception can involve Congress enacting either a resolution of approval or of disapproval.  Second, the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in INS v. Chadha held a one-house veto of presidential action unconstitutional in 1981.  The 
one-period, complete information nature of the game here, however, means that neither of these dynamics affect the 
equilibrium outcome.  See Appendix 2.2 for a further description. 
7 In reality, we might expect the legislature to go ahead and create the new rules anyway, as they look forward to 
possible new presidential administrations.  In the one-period version of the model, however, the legislature considers 
only possibilities in the current period.  The discussion in the Chapter 1 of the fact that majoritarian exceptions are 
often deployed quite soon after initial enactment supports this modeling choice. 
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movement to p.  Because all pivotal actors (L, M, V, and F) in the legislature are better off under 
the new rules, P will reserve his right to take unilateral action until after the rules have been 
changed. 
When p ≤ Q < v, L will be indifferent about proposing b.  P did not move Q in the first 
part of the game, because he did not want to provoke a response, x(c), that made him worse off.  
If L does introduce b in the rule change round, V would override P’s veto of b.  There is no 
proposal, r(p), however, that both makes P better off and to which M would consent.  Therefore, 
policy remains at the original status quo, Q.  Finally, when v ≤ Q′, there will be regions in which 
L will propose b, but in which b will not pass.  Policy, then, will remain at Q′=x(p)=v, which is 
the closest P can get policy to his ideal point without prompting a successful revision, x(c).  (See 
Definition 8 in Appendix 1 for a full description of L’s proposal strategy for b.)  The equilibrium 
results when L > V and P ≤ V are depicted by the solid line in Figure 2.4; the dotted line 
represents, for reference, the values of Q that P does not change in the first stage of the game, 
waiting instead for the legislature to change the rules. 
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Figure 2.4: Policy Equilibrium with Creation of Majoritarian Exception 
 
 
In sum, we should expect to observe majoritarian exceptions successfully created only in the 
following circumstance: 
 
𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑄 ≤ 𝑝 and 𝐿 > 𝑉 
     
Under these conditions, waiting for the legislature to change the rules empowers the president to 
take unilateral actions on a set of policies that, under the existing procedures, he prefers to leave 
unchanged lest Congress respond with a regular, amendable piece of legislation.  All pivotal 
actors in Congress, meanwhile, also prefer the policies achievable under the new rules to the 
status quo. 
These results suggest several testable implications of the model.  First, we will observe 
rule change when the status quo is extreme on the same side of the policy space as P.  Second, 
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majoritarian exceptions should only be created when L is to the right of V.  In the period covered 
by the empirical tests below, this condition is always associated with divided government.  
Third, as P becomes more extreme in the policy space, the region in which P will be better off 
waiting to take a unilateral action until after a rule change has been enacted gets smaller, as is 
illustrated by the triangle on the left side of the policy space in Figure 2.4.  (A fourth 
implication—that V is more moderate than P—is always satisfied for the period under study 
here, making it difficult to test.) We can restate these predictions in the form of hypotheses as 
follows: 
 
Status Quo Hypothesis: Majoritarian exceptions will be created only if the status quo policy is 
extreme on the same side of the policy space as the president. 
 
Divided Government Hypothesis: Majoritarian exceptions will only be created under divided 
government. 
 
Presidential Preferences Hypothesis:  The probability that a majoritarian exception is created 
decreases as the president becomes more extreme in the policy space. 
 
The (Partisan) Issue Politics of Oversight Exceptions 
 
The model described above provides valuable insight into the arrangements of 
preferences, both within the Senate and between the Senate and the president, under which we 
should observe the creation of oversight exceptions.  By relying on the spatial distances between 
the relevant actors, however, the model’s predictions are all at the Congress level.  Clearly, 
however, even if preferences are arranged such that we would expect rule change, we do not 
observe new rules in every possible policy area.   
How might issue-level dynamics also affect whether an oversight exception is created?  
Here, it is helpful to recall my second fundamental claim about majoritarian exceptions: they are 
created and used in ways that further the goals of the majority party in the Senate—aims that 
exist on two levels.  The individual members that comprise the majority caucus are assumed to 
be seekers of re-election (Mayhew 1974), and collectively, they work to maintain that status in 
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future congresses (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Balla, et. al. 2002; 
Lee 2009).  Convincing voters to return majority party members to office requires both 
collaboration between co-partisans to enact a popular legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 
1993; Matthews and Stimson 1975) and opportunities for individual members to claim credit for 
accomplishments (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1989) and to avoid blame for negative events (Weaver 
1987).   
 In one sense, the pursuit of these goals is captured by the strategic interaction in the 
model described above.  The unique power of the majority leader (modeled as L, the median 
member of the majority party) to set the agenda means that he will never propose changing the 
rules when a majority of the majority caucus’s preferences would be better reflected in the policy 
produced by the chamber’s regular procedures.  At the same time, the stylized nature of the 
model does not capture the degree to which the majority leader must choose between many 
potential changes to the rules that would facilitate policy changes that help his party and its 
members achieve their electoral goals.   
For which issues, then, should the majority leader expend scarce floor time changing the 
rules (Adler and Wilkerson 2012)?  One possibility is that the public’s preferences on the issue 
matter.  The model predicts that, if an oversight exception is to have consequences for the 
ultimate outcome of the policymaking process, it will be to bring policy from an extreme status 
quo on the opposite side of the policy space from the Senate majority party to a location closer to 
their preferences.  Depending on the public’s attitudes, such a change may or may not be 
popular.  If moving policy closer to the preferences of the majority is popular, then we should be 
more likely to observe rule change.  If, however, the potential policy change is unpopular, the 
majority party has no electoral incentive to create procedures that make it easier to adopt a 
change that is out of favor with the public.  This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Public Preferences Hypothesis:  The probability that an oversight exception is created increases 
as public support for the underlying proposal increases. 
 
 Among these popular policy changes, the electoral value to the majority party of creating 
special rules is also likely to depend on the salience of the underlying issue to the public.  
Spending scarce agenda space enacting special procedures that facilitate a new policy about 
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which the public cares little will pay far fewer dividends than using that same floor time to pass 
new rules that apply to a salient issue area.  For unpopular policy changes, we should expect 
exactly the opposite.  The majority party, in its attempt to avoid blame for negative events, 
should be especially careful to avoid enabling unwelcome policy change when the public is 
paying substantial attention to an issue.  As a result, we would expect the following: 
 
Salience Hypothesis: If an oversight exception facilitates an unpopular policy change, the 
probability that it is enacted into law decreases when the issue is more salient.  If a proposed 
oversight exception facilitates a popular policy change, the probability that it is enacted into law 
increases when the issue is more salient. 
 
 Both the Public Preferences and Salience hypotheses assume that the audience of 
electoral value when choosing issues on which to pursue rule change is the overall set of voters 
who might vote in the next election, when the majority party is attempting to retain its status.  
Suppose, however, that the majority is better served by targeting the specific issues that matter to 
its loyalists, especially party activists, because it is those actors who play an outsized role in 
ensuring future electoral success for the majority’s candidates (e.g. Bawn et al. 2012; Bailey, 
Mummolo, and Noel 2012).  How might we define this set of issues important to these key 
supporters, which may or may not overlap with the set of policy changes that are popular and/or 
salient among the public as a whole?   Empirical evidence suggests that activists and loyal 
partisan voters expect action by their congressional co-partisans on the issues the party “owns”—
that is, issues on which there is a long-term positive association between voters and the party 
(Petrocik 1996; Egan 2013).  Under this logic, a Democratic Senate majority party should be 
more likely to introduce a change to the procedures for enacting pension rules than to those for 
reviewing military contracting procedures,8 as its core constituents care more about the former 
issue than the latter, and creating the oversight exception will increase the probability of 
successful policy change.  We can state this in the form of a hypothesis as follows: 
 
                                                     
8 See, for example, H.R. 2, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 93rd Congress, and H.R. 3899, 
the Contract Accountability for Taxpayers Act, 108th Congress.  
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Issue Ownership Hypothesis: The probability that an oversight exception is created increases 
when the issue with which the rule change deals is owned by the majority party. 
 
The preferences and attitudes of the voters and activists in front of which the Senate 
majority party must compete certainly play a role in how the caucus leadership selects among 
issues on which to pursue rule change.  At the same time, the process of actually changing policy 
under an oversight exception does not involve only the Senate, or even Congress.  Once the 
special rules are created, the president must take a subsequent unilateral action for Congress to 
review.  At any given point in time, the president will have topics he chooses to prioritize over 
others (e.g. Beckmann 2010; Rudalevige 2002).  If the executive is unlikely to actually take 
advantage of the new latitude afforded to him under the exception, it makes little sense to spend 
scarce agenda time creating special rules that will have no effect on the ultimate location of 
policy.  At the same time, if the president is prioritizing certain issues, the Senate majority party 
may infer that he is likely to exploit the new procedures—to the ultimate benefit, from a policy 
perspective, of all the actors involved.   
When the presidency and the Senate are controlled by opposite parties, moreover, the 
majority caucus may have an additional incentive to change the rules.  Lee (2009) documents 
empirically the way in which Senate majority parties opposite initiatives championed by oppose 
party presidents in an attempt to build their own brand.  Because delegation exceptions give the 
appearance of limiting the unilateral power of the presidency, it may be electorally useful to 
impose an additional legislative check on the conduct of an opposite party executive—even if the 
policy change made possible by the special rules makes actors in both branches better off.  The 
Senate majority party, in other words, can claim credit for both aggressively overseeing a 
counter-partisan president AND enabling a new policy it prefers.  This logic suggests the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Presidential Priority Hypothesis: Oversight exceptions are more likely to be created on issues 
prioritized by the president. 
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Data and Estimation 
 
To test these hypotheses, I turn to novel data on majoritarian procedural exceptions 
proposed and enacted from 1969 to 2012 (the 91st to 112th Congresses), and deploy it in two 
ways.  First, I analyze whether the factors outlined above predict which introduced proposals are 
passed and signed into law.  Second, because we may be concerned that the results of the first 
analysis are affected by examining only those rule changes that a legislator has formally 
proposed, I investigate whether each procedural change in each of a set of issue areas occurred in 
each Congress. 
 
Identifying Rule Change Proposals 
 
Previous work on procedural change in Congress that explores multiple instance across 
time tends to examine whether or not we observe new rules being created in a given Congress 
(Binder 1997; Dion 1997; Schickler 2000).  By comparing sessions in which procedures were 
altered to counterfactual observations in which the rules were left alone, these accounts test 
whether various Congress-level factors, such as the relative strength of the majority and minority 
parties, are the determinants of rule change. 
The unique status of majoritarian exceptions within the body of congressional procedure, 
however, allows us to identify an alternative set of counterfactual observations: changes to the 
rules that were actually introduced but that were not successfully enacted into law.  Unlike other 
procedural innovations, which often rely on rulings from the presiding officer that are 
subsequently sustained by a vote of the chamber (Koger 2010), majoritarian exceptions’ path to 
creation goes through the regular legislative process with an ordinary piece of legislation as the 
vehicle. 
 Within the set of all proposed bills, then, how might we determine which ones include 
these kinds of changes to the rules?  In general, the measures enacting them carry special 
language making clear the constitutional source of the authority used to change Congress’s 
internal procedures through the legislative process.  One clause signaling the existence of an 
exception in a bill states that a given provision in the bill is enacted “as an exercise of the 
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rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives.”9 A second clause indicates that 
the exception is adopted “with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to 
change the rules”—a right that comes from Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution, which states 
that “each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”10  Several slight variations of 
these phrases exist—i.e., reversing the order of the chambers in the first phrase or substituting 
“change its rules” in the second.  Using these as search terms in the ProQuest Congressional 
database of all full-text bills introduced in both the House and Senate dating back to 1789, I can 
identify legislation that is likely to contain a majoritarian exception. 
 To confirm that these two “legal status” clauses would identify the relevant universe of 
cases, I relied first on two sources delineating known, successful exceptions.  Chapter XXX of 
the House Manual contains a section entitled “Legislative Procedures Enacted Into Law,” many 
of which meet my definition of a majoritarian exception.  In addition, in their brief case study of 
enacted limitations on debate in the Senate, Binder and Smith (1997) provide a list of examples 
of these provisions.11  Neither source serves as a comprehensive list of successful enactments for 
our purposes.  The House list, for example, omits previously created procedures that are no 
longer in force.  Binder and Smith, moreover, note that their list is comprised of “selected laws.” 
Nonetheless, known cases serve as a useful benchmark for evaluating the success of the legal 
clauses as initial search terms.   
Using the legal status clauses as search terms located 83 percent of the laws containing 
Senate-related provisions included in the House Manual’s list.  While this coverage rate is 
reasonable, I improved it by leveraging the fact that many majoritarian exceptions refer to other, 
existing provisions.  In particular, rather than stating specifically the debate limit for a future, 
protected bill, new exceptions often cite the existing rules enacted in an entirely separate context.  
For example, rather than stating that debate on a protected bill is capped at 20 hours, a measure 
might say “the provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974” apply to the future 
resolution.12  To identify additional terms, then, I consulted the legislation located using the first-
stage, legal status clauses search, compiling a list of other bills to which they referred to establish 
                                                     
9 See, for example, Public Law 112-25, the Budget Control Act of 2011, Section 301A(g). 
10 See, for example, Public Law 94-265, Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Section 
203(c)(1)(B).   
11 See Binder and Smith (1997), Table 6-2. 
12 See, for example, §1103(b)(1)(A) of Public Law 100-418, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. 
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the particulars of a new set of procedures.  Both the variations on the legal status clauses and 
these additional, bill-referent search terms are listed in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Search Terms Used in ProQuest Congressional Database to Identify 
Majoritarian Exceptions 
 
“as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives” 
“as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate” 
“as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives” 
“as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and Senate” 
“as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate” 
“with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules” 
“with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change its rules” 
“with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change such rules” 
“with full recognition of the constitutional right of the Senate to change the rules” 
“with full recognition of the constitutional right of the Senate to change such rules” 
 
Other reference provisions: 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, Sections 305(b), 310(b), and 
1017 
Trade Act of 1974, Sections 151, 152, and 153 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Section 551 
Alaskan Natural Gas Transportation Act, Section 8 
Public Law 98-473/Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985, 
Section 8066(c) 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976/Public Law 94-329, Section 601(b) 
Title 5, Sections 909, 911, and 912 
National Emergencies Act, Section 202 
Reorganization Act of 1949, Title II 
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For each bill identified using these two search strategies, I next needed to clarify that the 
rule change contained in the bill actually imposed a limit on debate in the Senate; some 
procedural changes, for example, only provide a mechanism for forcing a bill out of committee.  
Because our fundamental question of interest here is about exceptions to the filibuster rule, 
imposing a limit on floor debate was the minimum requirement a bill must meet to be included in 
the dataset.  Finally, because our unit of interest is the rule change, measured at the Congress-
level, I identified duplicate observations—that is, identical sets of procedures included in 
multiple bills in a single Congress, including instances where the same change to the rules was 
included in both a House and Senate bill.  This pruning process ultimately yielded 531 
majoritarian exceptions proposed between the 91st and 112th Congresses.  Each of these 531 
exceptions was then categorized as either increasing Congress’s ability to oversee the executive 
branch (the focus of this chapter) or protecting a proposal generated by a special agenda setter 
(delegation exceptions, the focus of Chapter 3).34  Since the analysis below is concerned with 
predicting successful enactment, we can utilize Adler and Wilkerson’s Congressional Bills 
Project (2012) data to determine whether the bill containing each exception was ultimately 
enacted into law.35  Finally, because several of the key independent variables described below 
are measured at the level of the policy area, we need to be able categorize each proposed rule 
change by the topic with which it deals.  Adler and Wilkerson apply Baumgartner and Jones’s 
(2014) Policy Agendas Project coding scheme to accomplish this for each bill.36  Because the 
provisions creating special procedures are often contained in broader pieces of legislation, I 
examined each individual provision to ensure that the coding of the entire bill reflected the 
content of the specific rule change, making changes when appropriate.  In addition, to better 
reflect the variation in the substance of the exceptions and match the issue ownership data 
discussed below (Egan 2013), I break out several additional issues from within Baumgartner and 
                                                     
34 There were two additional, small residual categories: one for increasing Congress’s internal oversight capacity 
and one for observations that could not be otherwise categorized.  Together, these residual observations comprise 
only 7 percent of all proposed exceptions.  
35 E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson, Congressional Bills Project: 1969-2012, NSF 00880066 and 00880061. The 
views expressed are those of the authors and not the National Science Foundation. 
36 The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of 
National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and were distributed through the 
Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data 
bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here. 
66 
 
 
Jones’s macroeconomics major topic using the supplemental, minor topic codes: deficit/debt 
reduction; Social Security; inflation; and taxes.37   
 
Key Independent Variables 
 
 The independent variables needed to test the theoretical account offered above can be 
divided into two groups, the first of which comprises those items required to test the model’s 
predictions.  The Status Quo hypothesis requires an estimate of the current location of policy, 
which is difficult to obtain.  A reasonable proxy is the a Switch in Control variable, which takes 
on the value of 1 if party control of either the presidency or the Senate has switched from the 
previous Congress and 0 otherwise.  These switches in control should be associated with more 
extreme status quo points, and the Status Quo hypothesis predicts we will only observe rule 
change in the presence of an extreme status quo.  The second model-based hypothesis is more 
straightforward: oversight exceptions should only be created under divided government.  Thus, I 
use an indicator variable, Divided Government, equal to 1 if the Senate and the presidency are 
controlled by opposite political parties and 0 if the president and the Senate majority party are 
co-partisans.  Because both the Status Quo hypothesis and the Divided Government hypothesis 
concern necessary conditions generated by the model, I also interact the two measures.  Put 
differently, an extreme status quo should only increase the likelihood of rule change in the 
presence of divided government.  If the Senate and the presidency are controlled by the same 
party, on the other hand, the location of the status quo should not affect the probability that a 
proposal is successful.38 
                                                     
37 In general, the coding changes made to the Policy Agendas Project (PAP) data can be summarized as follows.  For 
approximately 60 percent of the observations, the original PAP coding was retained.  Of the changed observations, 
roughly 44 percent were changed in order to reflect the decomposition of the “macroeconomics” major topic to 
better reflect the issue ownership data.  Another approximately 32 percent of the changes were aimed at 
harmonizing coding across provisions included in bills in the defense, trade, and foreign affairs topics.  Take, for 
example, oversight exceptions related to international sanctions against countries like Cuba, South Africa, and Iran.  
Depending on the larger bill in which the exception was included, the native PAP coding might code very similar 
rule changes in any one of the three categories, so changes were needed to ensure similar observations received the 
same topic coding (in this case, as part of the foreign trade category).  Other examples of analogous issues involved 
nuclear non-proliferation and military assistance. 
38 Careful readers will note that an extreme status quo, divided government, and an extreme president are together 
necessary conditions for rule change.  One way to address this would be to include a three-way interaction term; 
given the relatively small number of observations, I choose instead to use two conventional interaction terms and 
estimate predicted effects and probabilities given that the third condition is satisfied.  For more on this, see the 
Results section below. 
67 
 
 
 The final testable prediction generated by the model concerns the extremity of the 
president within the policy space.  Under divided government and in the presence of an extreme 
status quo, a more extreme president has fewer policies on which he avoids taking unilateral 
action until Congress has created special rules.  Testing the Presidential Preferences hypothesis, 
then, requires first a measure of the president’s ideal point.  To measure Presidential Extremity, I 
use the absolute value of the president’s DW-NOMINATE score (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), 
which approaches 1 when the president is either extremely liberal or extremely conservative.  
Because the extremity of the president’s preferences only matter under divided government, 
moreover, I interact the Divided Government and Presidential Extremity variables. 
In addition to these model-based predictions, we also require variables to test the four 
issue-based hypotheses outlined above.  To investigate the Public Preferences hypothesis, I turn 
to the Policy Mood data, originally collected by Stimson and Coggins and made available by the 
Policy Agendas Project.  Using a wide range of survey data, the Policy Mood data captures the 
public’s overall mood about a given issue on a conservative-to-liberal spectrum, as well as what 
Stimson and Coggins refer to as the “global mood,” or how liberal the public is generally in a 
given year.  I use these two quantities to construct, in each congress, a relative measure, 
capturing the difference between the issue-specific mood and the global mood.  If the public’s 
mood in a particular policy area is more conservative than its overall mood, this variable takes on 
a positive value.  If the public’s issue-specific mood is more liberal than its global attitude, the 
value is negative.  Finally, if the public’s mood about a given policy is the same as its overall 
mood, the variable is zero.39   
This relative measurement allows me to better capture the majority party’s calculus in 
selecting among issues on which to pursue rule change than an absolute measure would for two 
reasons.  To illustrate the first, take two congresses, the 105th and 111th, with similar policy-
specific moods on a given issue, immigration (48.7 and 48.4, respectively).  The public’s global 
mood, meanwhile, became eight points more liberal over the period between those two 
congresses.  The public, then, was relatively more conservative on immigration in 2009 and 2010 
                                                     
39 To address periods for which policy-level data is not available, I take two steps.  If the issue-specific mood was 
measured in a previous congress, I assume that the issue-specific mood has evolved similarly to the global mood and 
use the last available value for the difference variable.  The results are robust to carrying forward the last 
measurement of the issue-specific mood and calculating the difference between that value and the current year’s 
global mood.  For policies in which no data is available, I assume that the public’s preferences on that specific issue 
are equivalent to the global mood. 
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than in 1997 and 1998—a meaningful distinction that is masked by the absolute level of the 
issue-specific mood.  An immigration policy change favored by Senate majority Democrats in 
the later period, then, would likely have been less popular with the public than a similar change 
proposed in the early period.  In addition, many of the questions used in calculating the Public 
Mood measures make reference to the current status quo, asking respondents whether they would 
prefer to increase, decrease, or keep about the same spending in a given policy area.  By 
anchoring each policy-specific observation to the overall mood in each congress, I address, at 
least partially, concerns about comparability over time.40 
This measure tells us how relatively conservative or liberal the public’s mood is on a 
specific issue, but for the purposes of testing the Public Preferences hypothesis, it also matters 
whether those liberal-conservative preferences are in line with the kind of policy change 
advocated by individual legislators seeking re-election.  Since we are only exploring delegation 
exceptions proposed by majority party members, we need a measure of whether the majority 
party’s preferences on the issue are likely to be similar to the public’s attitudes.  If the public and 
the majority party agree, a policy change offered by a member of the majority party is more 
likely to be popular and there is less incentive to minimize traceability.  If they disagree, 
however, the incentives on the part of re-election-minded legislators to obscure their actions are 
higher. 
To measure probable agreement, I first assume that Democratic legislators prefer more 
liberal policies and Republican representatives prefer more conservative policies.  Thus, for 
issues on which the public’s relative mood is negative, I assume their preferences are closer to 
those of the congressional Democrats.  For policies on which the relative mood is positive, 
conversely, I assume attitudes are closer to those of congressional Republicans.  By extension, 
when the Senate is controlled by Democrats, policy changes on issues with negative relative 
mood values would be more popular than policy changes on issues with positive relative mood 
values.  Take, for example, the 112th Congress.  On defense, the public’s mood was roughly 15 
percentage points more conservative than their overall mood.  On health issues, however, the 
public’s mood was roughly 13 percentage points more liberal.  Any policy changes advocated by 
Democrats on military issues, then, should be less popular than measures dealing with health 
care.   
                                                     
40 Thanks are due to Greg Wolf for this observation about the Policy Mood data. 
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The opposite holds true for Republicans: any policy change for which the mood is 
positive would be more popular than changes in policy areas with negative values.  To illustrate, 
consider again defense and health issues, this time in the 109th Congress, when Republicans held 
a majority in the Senate.  The public’s mood on military policy was roughly 28 percentage points 
more conservative than its overall mood, so Republican-sponsored policy proposals on defense 
issues should have been more popular than majority-offered measures on health issues, for which 
the policy-specific mood was 15 percentage points more liberal.  In sum, then, the public 
preferences variable takes on positive values when the public’s issue-specific mood is biased in 
favor of the Senate’s majority party and negative values when the public’s mood in a given 
policy area is biased away from the Senate’s majority party.  I rescale the Public Preferences 
variable to ease explication, assigning values of -1 to the policy-congress pairs when the public’s 
mood diverges most from that of the Senate’s majority party and +1 to the issue-congress pairs 
for which the public’s mood is most similar to that of the majority caucus.   
For the Salience hypothesis, I use another dataset made available by the Policy Agendas 
Project. Their compilation of the Gallup Most Important Problem data indicates, in each year, 
the proportion of respondents in the Gallup Poll who reported a given policy area as “the most 
important problem” facing the nation.  To get a measure for every policy area for each congress, 
I average across the two annual averages reported by Baumgartner and Jones.  Again, to ease 
exposition, I rescale the Salience variable from 0 to 1; a value of 0 corresponds to the least 
salient issue in the dataset while a 1 indicates the most. 
To test the Issue Ownership hypothesis, I turn to the results of Egan’s (2013) analysis of 
survey data since 1970 on which party respondents believe is better equipped to handle each of a 
set of consensus issues.  If respondents, in the aggregate, indicate a statistically significant 
preference for one party to address the issue, the policy is considered owned by that party; if 
neither party has an advantage, the issue is considered non-owned.  I then create an indicator 
variable, coded 1 if the Senate majority party owns the issue and zero if it does not.  Finally, to 
test the Presidential Priority hypothesis, I turn to yet another Policy Agendas Project data 
source, here on the composition of the president’s State of the Union address.  Each speech is 
decomposed into “quasi-statements,” which are, in turn, coded for their policy content.  To 
measure the degree to which the president prioritized a particular issue in a given congress, I 
count up the number of quasi-statements in that policy area in the two speeches delivered during 
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a congressional term and divide it by the total number of quasi-statements in the two speeches.  
This Presidential Priority variable ranges from 0, when the president did not discuss a given 
policy area in either of the State of the Union addresses given during a particular congress, to 
0.37, which occurred when the president spent over a third of the speeches he delivered during 
the 96th and 108th Congresses on foreign policy issues. 
 
Additional Control Variables 
  
 In addition to the independent variables required to test our theoretical predictions, I 
control for several other factors likely to affect the probability that a proposed oversight 
exception is enacted into law.  First, following previous work on the determinants of 
congressional rule changes that advantage the majority party (Binder 1997, Schickler 2000), I 
control for the majority party’s Capacity.  As the majority party becomes stronger relative to the 
minority party, we should observe more procedural innovation that makes it easier for the 
majority party to achieve its goals.  Following Schickler (2000), Capacity is measured by taking 
the difference between the strength of the majority party and the strength of the minority party.  
Each individual party strength measure has two components.  The first is the share of seats in the 
chamber held by the party.  The second is that party’s cohesion, calculated as 1/σ, where σ is the 
standard deviation of that party’s first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores.  Each party’s 
strength is the product of its seat share and its cohesion, and then Capacity is the difference 
between the two strength measures.   
 Second, I control for whether the rule change was proposed by a member of the Senate’s 
Majority party;41 we would expect the partisanship of the member who offered the legislation to 
affect its probability of enactment for several reasons.  Building a strong brand, argues Lee 
(2009), involves not only appearing effective and passing policy changes that a party expects 
will be popular, but also engaging in actions that make the minority party appear incompetent in 
the eyes of critical voters.  From the perspective of the majority party, both of these objectives 
are achieved when it considers and enacts legislation sponsored by its own members over bills 
advocated for by members of the minority party.  From a preference perspective, majority-
                                                     
41 For proposals that originated in the Senate, this measurement is straightforward.  For proposals that originated in 
the House during periods of divided congressional control, I include them as having been introduced by the majority 
if they were introduced by a member of the Senate’s majority party. 
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sponsored measures are more likely to embody the kinds of policy changes that are popular 
among the voters the majority party is courting.  Shepherding a bill sponsored by a co-partisan 
all the way to passage also makes the majority party appear more competent in an increasingly 
chaotic legislative process.  At the same time, denying these reputation-building benefits to the 
minority party by keeping its bills off the agenda should also help the majority party achieve its 
ultimate goal of remaining the majority party.  Indeed, the Senate’s majority party leadership 
enjoys a range of procedural advantages over its peers in the minority party that make this 
process easier.  These include a preferential right of recognition on the floor for the Majority 
Leader, as well as his ability to fill the amendment tree, restricting potential changes to the 
underlying bill.  These advantages translate, for example, into majority-sponsored bills being 
more likely to be scheduled for consideration and overcome filibusters; majority-sponsored 
amendments also have a higher probability of being adopted (Den Hartog and Monroe 2011).  
Finally, I control for whether the House is also controlled by the same party as the Senate.  
Because majoritarian exceptions are enacted as part of statutory law, they also need to gain the 
approval of the House of Representatives in order to be created successfully.   
To estimate the probability that a proposed oversight exception will be enacted into law, I 
use a logistic regression.  Because the proposal observations are clustered within congresses, I 
estimate random intercepts by year.  In addition, because most congresses feature multiple 
proposals of different kinds, we might expect the errors to be correlated across all bills in a given 
session, so I cluster the standard errors by congress. 
 
Results 
  
 Column 1 of Table 2.4 below presents the results of an estimation examining only the 
model-generated hypotheses; the three additional control variables (Majority Party Capacity, 
Majority Party Sponsorship, and House Control) are also included.  While the coefficient 
estimates are difficult to interpret directly because of both the binary dependent variable and the 
presence of an interaction term, an initial review suggests that the variables testing the models 
predictions are, at the very least, in the expected direction.  The coefficient on the Switch in 
Party Control variable—testing the Status Quo Hypothesis—is positive, though it does not 
achieve conventional levels of statistical significance.  Similarly, the coefficient on the Divided 
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Government measure is positive and statistically significant—though, because that measure is 
also interacted with the Presidential Extremity and Switch in Control variables, the main effect 
coefficient only indicates that rule change would be more likely under divided government when 
the president is moderate.  Finally, the effect of Presidential Extremity appears to be negative in 
the presence of divided government, since interaction between Presidential Extremity and 
Divided Government is negative and statistically significant—exactly as the model would 
predict.  
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Table 2.4: Probability of Oversight Exception Enactment, Proposal-Level Analysis, 91st to 
112th Congress 
 
  (1) (2) 
Switch in Control 0.288 0.092 
 (1.698) (1.851) 
Divided Government 31.380** 32.034** 
 (13.535) (15.084) 
Switch in Control*Divided Government 1.914 2.775 
 (2.398) (2.551) 
Presidential Extremity 31.247 29.809 
 (22.323) (26.551) 
Presidential Extremity*Divided Government -71.856** -73.549** 
 (28.729) (31.706) 
Public Preferences  -0.579 
  (1.247) 
Salience  -5.374*** 
  (1.610) 
Public Preferences*Salience  8.345* 
  (4.513) 
Issue Ownership  1.550** 
  (0.647) 
Presidential Priority  2.805 
  (3.905) 
Majority Party Sponsorship 1.872*** 2.127*** 
 (0.418) (0.469) 
Majority Party Capacity 0.656** 0.868*** 
 (0.304) (0.330) 
House Control -1.762 -2.245 
 (1.321) (1.517) 
Var (Year RE) 2.513 2.986 
 (1.982) (2.349) 
Constant -15.919 -15.616 
 (11.267) (13.407) 
   
Log Pseudolikelihood -108.852 -102.533 
Observations 249 249 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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 Given the difficulty of interpreting these coefficients directly, comparisons of predicted 
probabilities are more useful in examining how closely these results align with the model’s 
predictions.  To explore both the Status Quo and the Divided Government hypotheses generated 
by the model, it is helpful to remember that both involve necessary conditions for producing rule 
change.  This has consequences for selecting the right counterfactual condition against which to 
evaluate the effects of both the Switch in Party Control and Divided Government variables.  To 
determine if conditions that suggest an extreme status quo are more likely to produce rule 
change, we want to compare the predicted probability of a proposed change being enacted under 
divided government when a party switch has occurred to estimated probability when there has 
been no change in party control of either the Senate or presidency.  Similarly, to evaluate the 
effects of divided government, the appropriate comparison is between the predicted probability 
of a change when the Senate and presidency are controlled by opposite parties to the expected 
probability when the two institutions are controlled by co-partisans when there has been a switch 
in party control. 
 Figures 2.5 and 2.6 present these two comparisons graphically.  In Figure 2.5, we see the 
predicted probability of a proposed rule change being enacted under divided government when a 
switch in party control has occurred (on the right) versus when no switch in party control has 
occurred (on the left).  The increase in probability is clear.  When no switch in control has 
occurred, the chance that a proposed exception is successful is not statistically from zero under 
divided government.42  After a switch in party control, however, the probability increases to 
approximately 34 percent.  The p-value on a Wald test of whether these probabilities are equal is 
0.04, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis that they are equal.  The results, then, are 
consistent with the Status Quo hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
42 Here, and for all other predicted probabilities, all other covariates are held at their means.  I also assume that the 
mean value of the random component of the intercept is zero, its expected value (Bartels 2015). 
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Figure 2.5: Predicted Probability of Enactment by Status Quo Extremity, No Issue-Level 
Variables 
 
 
 In Figure 2.6, we see comparable predictions, with Divided Government status varied and 
holding constant that there has been a switch in party control.    Here, we see that when a switch 
in party control has occurred and the Senate and presidency are controlled by the same party, the 
predicted probability that a proposed rule change is successful is not statistically different from 
zero.  When a switch has occurred and party control is divided, the predicted probability is 
approximately 34 percent.  Unlike the comparison illuminating the effect of an extreme status 
quo, however, the difference between these two predictions is not statistically different from 
zero, as the p-value on a Wald test of equality carries a p-value of 0.57.  While we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that rule change is more likely under divided government, conditional on a 
change in party control, the direction of the effect is consistent with our expectations. 
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Figure 2.6: Predicted Probability of Enactment by Divided Government Status, No Issue-
Level Variables 
 
 
 
 Finally, to examine the effect of Presidential Extremity, Figure 2.7 displays the marginal 
effect of Presidential Extremity under both divided and unified government.  Here, we see that 
the model’s prediction about the relationship between the president’s preferences and the 
probability of enactment is borne out: under divided government, the more extreme the 
president, the less likely a given proposal is to be enacted into law.  We also observe that, when 
the presidency and the Senate are controlled by the same party, presidential extremity has a 
positive effect on the probability of passage.  Because these cases—successful rule change under 
unified government—are off the equilibrium path behavior in the model, we did not have any 
expectations about this relationship.  One possibility, however, involves the fact that, when the 
president is more extreme under unified government, members of the minority party might be 
more willing to support an oversight exception.  The model tells us that the ultimate policy 
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outcome will be the same regardless of the new rules, but minority members may want to appear 
to be opposing the president more aggressively, especially as he becomes more extreme.  
Empirical evidence suggests that the Senate minority party is more unified in opposition to 
presidential priorities (Lee 2009), and this positive effect of presidential extremity under unified 
government might indicate that a similar dynamic affects rule change decisions. 
 
Figure 2.7: Marginal Effect of Presidential Extremity, by Divided Government Status, No 
Issue-Level Variables 
 
 
 It is also worth noting that several of the control variables behave as expected.  Proposals 
made by the majority party are roughly seven times more likely to be enacted into law than 
procedural changes made by the minority party.  The Majority Party’s Capacity is also positively 
associated with success, indicating that as its caucus becomes stronger relative that of its 
minority opponents, rule change is more likely.  The coefficient on the variable measuring 
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whether the House is controlled by the same party as the Senate, meanwhile, is negative.  It does 
not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.18), but the unexpected direction 
of the coefficient is still notable.  One possible explanation is that when the Senate and House are 
controlled by the same party, their ability to oversee jointly the president’s actions through other 
avenues, such as regular legislation or limitation riders, is more robust, reducing the need to 
resort to rule change, even if new procedures will facilitate policy change the president is 
otherwise avoiding. 
 Having first explored the hypotheses generated by the model, I now introduce the 
variables necessary to test our additional, issue-level expectations about Public Preferences, 
Salience, and Presidential Priority.  The results for an estimation including these variables 
appear in Column 2 of Table 2.4.  The results on the model-based hypotheses are similar to those 
presented above.  When government is divided, the probability of rule change when there has 
been a Switch in Control is roughly 41 percent versus not distinguishable from zero otherwise; 
these predictions, as before, are statistically different from one another (p=0.01).  Also as before, 
when we hold fixed the expected extremity of the status quo and vary Divided Government, the 
rule change is more likely under divided than unified control, though, again, the difference in 
predictions does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.18).  The model’s 
predictions about Presidential Extremity are also borne out in the estimation controlling for 
issue-level factors and are displayed in Figure 2.8.  Holding all other variables at their means, the 
estimated effect of a one-unit change on the probability of enactment is negative and statistically 
significant under divided government.  Under unified government, the effect is statistically 
significant and positive, as before. 
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Figure 2.8: Marginal Effect of Presidential Extremity, by Divided Government Status, 
Including Issue-Level Variables 
 
 
 Moving next to the first of the issue-specific hypotheses, Public Preferences do not 
appear to be a statistically significant predictor of rule change success.  Holding all other 
variables at their means, the average marginal effect of the Public Preferences variable is not 
statistically significant (0.004, with a p-value of 0.991).  Comparing the predicted probabilities 
of passage at various values of the Public Preferences measure, moreover, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the expected chance of enactment for unpopular and popular 
policies.43  The effects for the Salience hypothesis are similarly null.  While the average marginal 
effect of Salience is negative for unpopular policies and positive for popular ones, the two 
quantities are not statistically different from one another (p=0.34).  While a failure to reject the 
                                                     
43 Holding the public preferences variable at two standard deviations above and below zero, neither predicted 
probability is statistically different from zero (unpopular=.14, p=0.21; popular=.14, p=0.18). 
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null does not confirm that an explanation is false, taken together, these two findings do little to 
suggest that voters’ preferences are playing a role in determining rule change. 
 For the Issue Ownership hypothesis, which tests whether the majority party is appealing 
to its core activist constituents with its selection of issues on which to pursue procedural change, 
the results are more promising.  The coefficient on the Issue Ownership variable in Table 4 is 
statistically significant.  Holding all other variables at their means, an exception proposed on an 
owned issue has a roughly 33 percent chance of being enacted, as compared to a 10 percent 
chance for non-owned issues.44  Our final issue-based hypothesis, meanwhile, concerns the role 
of the presidential agenda.  For policy consequences to be realized from creating an oversight 
exception, the president must take subsequent action once the new rules are created.  The 
coefficient on the Presidential Priority variable, while in the expected direction, is not 
statistically significant, providing little evidence that expectations about whether the new rules 
will actually be deployed affects the probability of enactment. 
 As in the estimation exploring only the model-generated hypotheses, we see that the 
control variables behave as expected.  Stronger majority parties, as measured by the Majority 
Party Capacity variable, appear to produce more rule changes, and new procedures proposed by 
the majority party are roughly 8.5 times as likely to be enacted into law as those offered by 
members of minority party.  Both of these effects are in the anticipated direction.  The 
relationship between the partisan control of the House and the probability of success, meanwhile, 
is negative.  While it does not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.14), it 
does suggest that perhaps Congress is less likely to turn to new rules when its capacity to oversee 
the executive is enhanced in other ways, like unified partisan control of both chambers. 
 
Accounting for Potential Selection Bias 
 
 The empirical results presented in Table 2.4, then, suggest that the strategic dynamics 
presented in the model, coupled with a desire on the party of the majority party to please its core, 
engaged supporters, affects which proposed oversight exceptions are successfully enacted into 
law.  The data used in these analyses, however, represents only part of the universe of possible 
exceptions; they leave unaccounted for the rules changes that members of Congress could have 
                                                     
44 This difference is significant (p=0.09). 
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proposed but did not.  To address this potential selection issue, I conduct a second analysis, 
where each observation is a policy area in a given congress.  This approach is an adaptation of 
earlier work on procedural change (Binder 1997, Dion 1997, Schickler 2000), which takes as its 
unit of analysis each congressional term.  Because I am also interested in the issue-level 
dynamics of rule change, I create a dataset of issue-congress pairs. 
The issues are taken from the Policy Agendas Project, with the inclusion of the additional 
issues from Egan (2013) described above.  The dependent variable is still dichotomous, but now 
takes on the value of 1 if an oversight exception was created in that policy area in a given session 
and zero otherwise.  The independent variables are measured as described above, with one 
exception.  The measure of whether a rule change was proposed by a member of the Majority 
party, previously measured at the bill level, is now captured at the congress level as an indicator 
variable where 1 indicates that the majority party proposed new procedures in the policy area 
during that term and 0 otherwise.45  The estimation is again carried out by logistic regression 
with both random intercepts and standard errors clustered by congress. 
 The results of this analysis at the level of the issue-congress pair are presented in Table 
2.5.  Moving first through the model-generated hypotheses, we see that, when the conditions 
favor an extreme status quo and the Senate and presidency are controlled by opposite parties, the 
probability of creating an oversight exception in a particular policy area is roughly 1.5 percent; 
given the relative rarity of these rule changes, this small probability is not unexpected.  Under 
Divided Government without a Switch in Control, however, the expected probability of 
procedural innovation is not statistically different from zero.  This positive effect of a Switch in 
Control is the same as in the proposal-level analysis discussed above; it is also statistically 
different from zero and depicted in Figure 2.9.  The results for the Divided Government 
hypothesis are similarly consistent with the earlier results; they are in the expected direction (that 
is, positive) but not statistically significant.  The predicted probability of creating an oversight 
exception after a switch in party control under Divided Government is roughly 2 percent, but not 
different from zero under unified government.46   
 
 
                                                     
45 Of the 528 observations analyzed below, approximately 15 percent (81) take on a value of 1 for this variable. 
46 The p-value on a Wald test of whether these quantities are equal is 0.26. 
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Table 2.5: Probability of Oversight Exception Enactment, Issue-Level Analysis, 91st to 112th 
Congress 
 
Switch in Control 0.727 
 (1.589) 
Divided Government 26.796** 
 (12.224) 
Switch in Control*Divided Government 1.966 
 (2.110) 
Presidential Extremity 30.118 
 (23.487) 
Presidential Extremity*Divided Government -61.211** 
 (26.700) 
Public Preferences 0.063 
 (0.812) 
Salience -5.616*** 
 (1.519) 
Public Preferences*Salience 11.954** 
 (5.345) 
Issue Ownership 1.539** 
 (0.6) 
Presidential Priority 7.817 
 (5.695) 
Majority Party Sponsorship 5.646*** 
 (0.903) 
Majority Party Capacity 0.607** 
 (0.276) 
House Control -2.490* 
 (1.470) 
Var (RE) 2.080 
 (1.792) 
Constant -18.939 
 (11.917) 
  
Log Pseudolikelihood -70.978 
Observations 528 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
83 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Predicted Probability of Enactment by Status Quo Extremity, Issue-Level 
Analysis 
 
Figure 2.10, meanwhile, displays the effect of Presidential Extremity.  Under Divided 
Government, the average marginal effect of the variable is negative and statistically significant, 
just as before.  Here, however, the effect under unified government is not statistically different 
from zero, and the p-value on a Wald test of whether these average marginal effects are equal is 
0.21.   Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect of Presidential Extremity is 
different under divided and unified government.  Taken together with the results from the 
proposal-based analysis—where the effect under unified government is positive and statistically 
significant—these estimates suggest that, while part of the process that generates rule changes is 
captured by the strategic logic of the model, other factors involving presidential extremity are 
also at play. 
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Figure 2.10: Marginal Effect of Presidential Extremity, by Divided Government Status, 
Issue-Level Analysis 
 
 
 Continuing to the issue-based hypotheses, there is suggestive evidence that issues matter 
for the likelihood of creating special rules.  Here, when we examine the incidence of rule change 
at the level of the congress-issue pair, we see that the average marginal effect of Public 
Preferences is positive (0.007), and while the p-value does not allow us to reject the null 
hypothesis (p=0.13), it is substantially smaller than the equivalent statistic for the Public 
Preferences measure in Table 2.4.  For Issue Ownership, we see that the coefficient is also 
positive and statistically significant; it indicates that, holding all else equal, special rules are 
about 4.5 times more likely for issues owned by the majority party than other policies.  Recall 
that in the proposal-level analysis, both estimated effects were positive, but only for Issue 
Ownership could we reject the null hypothesis.  How might we make sense of this difference 
between the two sets of results?  One possibility is that the influence of the popularity of the 
policy change ushered in by an oversight exception is felt more as rule change proposals are 
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developed, whereas the demands of a party’s core constituencies play a larger role in 
determining which new procedures make it through the entire legislative process to enactment.47   
The results for our other issue-based hypotheses, meanwhile, are the largely the same as 
in the proposal-level analysis.  Though the relationship is in the expected direction, we cannot 
reject the null for the Salience hypothesis, as the p-value on a Wald test of whether the marginal 
effect of Salience is equal when Public Preferences are at their minimum and maximum is 0.27.  
Similarly, while the effect of the Presidential Priority of an issue in a given congress is in 
expected direction (positive), it is not statistically different from zero (p=0.17).  The control 
variables also behave identically as they do in the proposal-level analysis above.  If the majority 
party proposed at least one oversight exception in a given policy area, the chance of enacting 
new rules is roughly 33 percent, as compared to virtually zero when the majority does not make 
such a proposal.  In addition, as the majority’s Capacity increases, so does the likelihood of new 
rules.  The effect of co-partisan control of the House and Senate, finally, is again negative, but is 
now statistically significant at the 0.10 level, adding some suggestive evidence to our earlier 
supposition that the creation of oversight exceptions are best understood in a broader context of 
the Senate majority party’s capacity to oversee the president.  Rule changes—even ones that ease 
the passage of policies and that benefit the majority party—still represent a reasonably drastic 
measure, and if the House and Senate are able to cooperate on overseeing the president, they may 
prefer to use existing legislative procedures, such as regular legislation or limitation riders, to do 
so. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 How do these findings, both at the proposal- and issue-level, help us make sense of the 
new Democratic majority’s attempt to influence the president’s conduct of the Iraq War in 2007?  
Recall that the model yields several necessary conditions for the creation of an oversight 
exception.  One of these—divided government—was present.  While another—an extreme status 
quo on the same side of the policy space as the president—is much more difficult to measure, a 
                                                     
47 One way to test this directly would be to estimate a Heckman selection model with some covariates predicting 
proposals, and another set predicting enactment.  Here, however, we lack strong theoretical expectations about 
which covariates are relevant at each stage and without exclusion restrictions, Heckman results are very sensitive to 
distributional assumptions. 
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vote in the Senate on the prior year’s defense authorization bill suggests that the status quo on 
the Iraq War was not extreme enough to satisfy this condition.  In June 2006, 38 of the 44 
members of the Democratic caucus voted for a provision that urged President Bush to begin 
withdrawing troops by the end of 2006.  The most conservative member of the Senate to support 
the proposal was Senator Lincoln Chafee (R-RI), who, in the NOMINATE space, was just 
slightly to the right of the chamber median with a DW-NOMINATE score of -0.052.  President 
Bush, meanwhile, had an estimated DW-NOMINATE score of 0.52.  Any proposal to change a 
status quo to his right—which is where it would have needed to be located for the model to 
predict successful passage—would have likely garnered the support of many additional senators. 
 Though we find some evidence that partisan issue politics can influence when we observe 
the creation of oversight exceptions, the Democrats’ experience in in 2007 also illustrates how 
the spatial constraints can trump issue-based factors.  President Bush’s conduct of the Iraq War 
was both salient and unpopular by 2007 and, indeed, the new 2007 majority had ridden to victory 
the previous November on the back of intense opposition to it (Jacobson 2007).  If there was an 
occasion on which the Senate majority was motivated to create special rules that would facilitate 
policy change to please both the voters overall, and its activist base, this was it.  At the end of the 
day, however, the party’s issue-based incentives could not overcome the fact that in only limited 
circumstances will key actors’ preferences and the status quo be arranged to favor rule change.  
Put in the language of my two central claims, the desire of the majority party to create rules that 
would benefit it was undermined by the fact that members of the minority party, knowing that 
the new procedures would make it easier to pass the underlying policy change, were not willing 
to go along. 
 When the spatial stars align, however, we can expect Congress and the president to work 
together to institute special procedures that enable policy change that is otherwise difficult to 
enact.  Take, for example, Congress’s experience with arms sales in the mid-1970s.  In 1968, 
Congress had delegated wide discretion over arms sales to the president—power of which 
President Nixon took substantial advantage to sell sophisticated weapons to Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and Iran.  Concerned about this conservative drift in arms policy, congressional 
Democrats, led by Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), began to seek legislative mechanisms to 
ensure packages that better reflected their preferences (Tompa 1986).  The conflict between the 
executive branch and Congress came to a head in 1975, when President Ford was forced to put 
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restrictions on the deployment of Hawk missile batteries being sold to Jordan in the face of 
threats to block the sale in Congress (CQ Almanac 1975).  The following year, however, 
Congress and President Ford agreed on an oversight exception, enacted as part of the 
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA), which allowed 
Congress to disapprove of government-to-government arms sales of “major defense equipment.”  
Under this new power-sharing arrangement, Ford was able to propose a $6 billion package that 
sent arms to Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and eight other countries.  The House did not challenge 
the proposal, and a disapproval resolution was withdrawn from the Senate calendar before floor 
debate (CQ Almanac 1976).  While we cannot draw definitive conclusions from a single case, 
Ford’s ability to sell weapons more easily following the creation of the new rules as part of the 
AECA is consistent with our central claim that majoritarian exceptions facilitate the enactment 
of new policies.  For further evidence on the other dynamic at play—that the procedures are 
developed consistent with the goals of the majority party—we turn, in Chapter 3, to an analysis 
of delegation exceptions.
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Appendix 2.1 
 
Baseline Model Solution 
Following Howell (2003), I begin by defining a set of proposals for which each legislative actor 
(M, F, and V) will not obstruct further progress on the measure at hand.  For the floor median 
(M), I define the set of proposals that he will approve in a floor vote.  For the filibuster pivot (F), 
I define the set of proposals he will not filibuster.  Finally, for the veto pivot (V), I define the set 
of proposals on which he will approve an override of the president’s (P) veto.   
 
Beginning in the final stage of the baseline game, we first consider when V will override P’s veto 
of x(c), a measure introduced by L that revises a unilateral action, x(p), taken by P: 
 
Definition 1: Let V’s veto-override set for x(c) be: 
 
𝑂[𝑥(𝑝), 𝑣] = {
[𝑥(𝑝), 2𝑣 − 𝑥(𝑝)] if 𝑥(𝑝) < 𝑣
[2𝑣 − 𝑥(𝑝), 𝑥(𝑝)] if 𝑥(𝑝) ≥ 𝑣
} 
 
V will only have the option of overriding the veto of x(c) if P actually vetoes it: 
 
Definition 2: Let P’s sign (no-veto) set for x(c) be: 
 
𝑆[𝑥(𝑝), 𝑝] =  {
[𝑥(𝑝), 2𝑝 − 𝑥(𝑝)] if 𝑥(𝑝) < 𝑝
[2𝑝 − 𝑥(𝑝), 𝑥(𝑝)] if 𝑥(𝑝) ≥ 𝑝
} 
 
P will only have the option of signing or vetoing x(c) if F chooses not to filibuster x(c): 
 
Definition 3: Let F’s no-filibuster set for x(c) be: 
𝑁[𝑥(𝑝), 𝑓] = {
[𝑥(𝑝), 2𝑓 − 𝑥(𝑝)] if 𝑥(𝑝) < 𝑓
[2𝑓 − 𝑥(𝑝), 𝑥(𝑝)] if 𝑥(𝑝) ≥ 𝑓
}  
 
With his knowledge of these subsequent actions by F, P, and V, L will do the following: 
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Proposition 1: In equilibrium, L will make the following proposal to revise the prior unilateral 
action, x(p), taken by P: 
 
𝑥(𝑐)∗ =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∅ if 𝑥(𝑝) < 𝑓 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝑉
2𝑓 − 𝑥(𝑝) if 𝑓 < 𝑥(𝑝) ≤ 2𝑓 −𝑚 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝑉
𝑚 if 𝑥(𝑝) > 2𝑓 −𝑚 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝑉
𝑚 if 𝑥(𝑝) ≤ 2𝑣 −𝑚 and  𝑉 < 𝐿 ≤ 𝐹
2𝑣 − 𝑥(𝑝) if 2𝑣 − 𝑚 < 𝑥(𝑝) ≤ 𝑣 and 𝑉 < 𝐿 ≤ 𝐹
∅ if 𝑣 < 𝑥(𝑝) ≤ 𝑓 and 𝑉 < 𝐿 ≤ 𝐹
2𝑓 − 𝑥(𝑝) if 𝑓 < 𝑥(𝑝) ≤ 2𝑓 − 𝑚 and 𝑉 < 𝐿 ≤ 𝐹
𝑚 if 𝑥(𝑝) > 2𝑓 −𝑚 and 𝑉 < 𝐿 ≤ 𝐹
𝑚 if 𝑥(𝑝) ≤ 2𝑣 −𝑚 and  𝐹 < 𝐿
2𝑣 − 𝑥(𝑝) if 2𝑣 − 𝑚 < 𝑥(𝑝) ≤ 𝑣 and 𝐹 < 𝐿
∅ if 𝑣 < 𝑥(𝑝) ≤ 𝑙 and 𝐹 < 𝐿
2𝑙 − 𝑥(𝑝) if 𝑙 < 𝑥(𝑝) ≤ 2𝑙 − 𝑚 and 𝐹 < 𝐿
𝑚 if 𝑥(𝑝) > 2𝑙 − 𝑚 and 𝐹 < 𝐿 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each proposal x(c)* represents the outcome that moves policy as close to L’s ideal point as 
possible, subject to the constraints of V and F.  Consider first Case 1, where L is on the extreme 
left side of the policy space.  For most values of x(p), he will be worse off if he introduces x(c) 
since it comes to the floor under an open rule and can be amended by the floor to a point far from 
l, L’s ideal point.  If, however, x(p) is to the right of F, L will be better off with a new policy.  He 
will propose either the policy closest to l that F will not filibuster (2f – x(p)), or for very extreme 
values of x(p), he will propose policy at M.   
 
Next, consider Case 2, where L is moderate in the policy space, between V and F.  Here, his 
proposals x(c)* will follow the predictions of Krehbiel (1998): propose policy at M when x(p) is 
extreme on either side of the policy space; propose policy as close to M as possible when x(p) is 
less extreme but not yet in the gridlock interval; and make no proposal when x(p) is in the 
gridlock interval (between V and F).   
 
Finally, in Case 3, L is on the extreme right side of the policy space.  Here, L will behave the 
same as his moderate counterpart for much of the policy space.  The gridlock interval, however, 
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extends all the way to l, rather than stopping at f.  For values of x(p) to the right of L, however, L 
will propose a value of x(c)* of which V and F approve but that makes L no worse off. 
 
Empirically, P is almost always more extreme than V.  If V is more extreme than P, however, L’s 
proposal behavior for x(c) is nearly identical.  In Cases 2 and 3, p is the left bound of the 
gridlock interval, rather than v.  
 
Finally, with knowledge of where L will propose x(c)*, P will make the following choices about 
where to set x(p) with his initial move of the game: 
 
Proposition 2: In equilibrium, in the first stage of the game, P will take the following unilateral 
action, x(p)*: 
 
 
𝑥(𝑝)∗ = {
∅ if 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑄 ≤ 𝑣 and 𝐿 > 𝑉
𝑣 if 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑄 > 𝑣 and 𝐿 > 𝑉
𝑝 if 𝑃 > 𝑉 or 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝑉 
} 
 
When P is to the right of V, he is able to set x(p) at his ideal point, p, without concern for a 
successful challenge from the legislature; any x(c) that would make L better off would be vetoed 
by P, and V would not override that veto.  When P and L are both to the left of V, the same is 
true.  L would not introduce x(c), since it could be amended away from l, L’s ideal point, with 
the support of both V and F. 
 
If P is to the left of V but L is to V’s right, x(p)* depends on the location of Q, the original status 
quo.  If Q is to the right of V, P will set x(p)* at V’s ideal point, v.  This represents the closest P 
can get to p without invoking a challenge from the legislature that both F and V would support.  
If, however, Q is to the left of V—that is, extreme in the policy space—P is better off not 
proposing x(p)*.  Doing so would provoke a congressional response, and given the preferences 
of L, V, and F, that response would place x(c)* farther from p than Q. 
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Proposition 3 summarizes the expected location of policy, Q′, at the conclusion of the baseline 
game: 
 
Proposition 3: In equilibrium, policy will be located at: 
 
𝑝∗ = {
𝑝 if 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝑉 
𝑝 if 𝑃 > 𝑉
𝑄 if 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑄 ≤ 𝑣 and 𝐿 > 𝑉
 𝑣 if 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑄 ≤ 𝑣 and 𝐿 > 𝑉
} 
 
The first line of Proposition 3 corresponds to Case 1, the second to Case 2, and the third and 
fourth to Case 3.  These outcomes are depicted graphically in Appendix Figure A2.1.  (Note that 
the predictions are the same for Cases 1 and 2.) 
 
Rule Change Alternative Solution 
 
The rule change alternative solution is also solved using backwards induction, so beginning in its 
final stage: 
 
Definition 4: Let M’s approval set for r(p) be: 
𝐴[𝑟(𝑝),𝑚] = {
[𝑄′, 2𝑚 − 𝑄′] if 𝑄′ < 𝑚
[2𝑚 − 𝑄′, 𝑄′] if 𝑚 ≥ 𝑄′
} 
 
Here, M will approve any proposal that comes to the floor under a majoritarian exception if it 
makes him at least as well off as the current policy, Q′.  Knowing this set of proposals of which 
the median will approve, the president will engage in the following equilibrium behavior: 
 
Proposition 4:  In equilibrium, in the third stage, P will take the following unilateral action, 
subject to congressional approval under a majoritarian exception: 
 
𝑟(𝑝)∗ = {
𝑝 if 𝑄′ < 𝑝 or 𝑄′ > 2𝑚 − 𝑝
2𝑚 − 𝑄′ if 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄′ ≤ 2𝑚 − 𝑝
∅ if 𝑝 ≤ 𝑄′ < 𝑚
} 
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The majoritarian exception allows P to move policy all the way to his ideal point if the status 
quo, Q′, is extreme on either side of the policy spectrum.  If Q′ is to the left of P, P can set r(p)* 
at his ideal point and M, unable to amend the proposal further, will approve the change.  If Q′ is 
beyond the point at which M is indifferent between Q′ and P (that is, beyond 2m – p), P is also 
able to set r(p)* at his ideal point.  For all intermediate points to the right of M, P is able to move 
policy towards his ideal point, but only as far as the point at which M is indifferent between Q′ 
and r(p)*.  For all intermediate points to the left of M, there is no proposal to which M will 
consent that also makes P better off.  Thus, P will not introduce r(p)*.   
 
P is only presented with the option of proposing r(p) if the L has proposed, and the legislature 
and P have enacted, b, the bill containing the majoritarian exception.  Suppose first that the 
legislature has passed b, but P has vetoed it.  In this situation, V will override a veto of b if his 
expectations about how a new proposal r(p) would alter Q′ make him no worse off than 
remaining at Q′.  Knowing how M and P will behave in the final stage of the game, V’s 
preferences are as follows: 
 
Definition 5: Let V’s override set for b be: 
 
𝑂[𝑄′, 𝑣] = {
[−∞, 2𝑣 − 𝑝]or [3𝑣 − 2𝑝,∞] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 
[−∞, 𝑝]or [2𝑚 − 𝑝,∞] if 𝑃 > 𝑉
[−∞, 𝑣] if 𝐿 > 𝑉 and 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉
} 
 
 
Here, V compares the eventual outcome until the existing rules and the potential outcome under 
b’s new rules when choosing whether or not to override.  In Case 1, where L and P are both to 
the left of V, the only area for which V is better off leaving policy at Q′ is between 2v – p and 3v 
– 2p in the middle of the policy space.  In Case 2, when P is to the right of V, V will override a 
veto for values of Q′ in the extremes of the policy space, where the eventual policy outcome is 
not affected by whether it is enacted under the old or new rules.  Finally, in Case 3, when L is to 
the right of V but P to the left of V, V is only better off under b’s new rules for values of Q′ that 
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are also to its left; otherwise, V is better off with the outcome produced by policymaking in the 
first period.   
 
V is only presented with the option to override if P was presented with b and chose to veto it.  
P’s preferences over whether to sign b are as follows: 
 
Definition 6: Let P’s sign set for b be: 
 
𝑆[𝑄′, 𝑝] =  {
[−∞, 𝑝] or [2𝑚 − 𝑝,∞] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉
[−∞, 𝑝] or [2𝑚 − 𝑝,∞] if 𝑃 > 𝑉
[−∞, 𝑣] or [2𝑚 − 𝑣,∞] if 𝐿 > 𝑉 and 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉
} 
 
As with V, P compares the outcomes of subsequent policymaking via r(p) current policy at Q′.  
In Cases 1 and 2, P is no worse off under the new rules values of Q′ to the left of p and to the 
right 2m – p.  In Case 3, the region where P is no worse off is similar, but slightly larger, 
bounded by v on the left and 2m – v on the right. 
 
For b to reach the president for his signature or veto, F must first choose not to filibuster.  F will 
avoid filibustering b if his expectations about how r(p) would alter Q′ make him no worse off 
than remaining at Q′: 
 
Definition 7: Let F’s no-filibuster set for b be: 
 
𝑁[𝑄′, 𝑓] = {
𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 if 𝐿 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 
𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 if 𝑃 > 𝑉
[−∞, 2𝑣 −𝑚] if  𝐿 > 𝑉 and 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉
} 
 
 
F will only filibuster in Case 3, when L is to the right of V but P is to the left of V.  Here, F is 
only better off with policies chosen using the new rules under b for values Q′ to the left of 2v – 
m.  For all other arrangements of L, V, and P, F would also be better off under new policies 
enacted under b, so he will never filibuster 
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F’s choice to filibuster or not will only materialize if L chooses to introduce b.  L will introduce 
b if a new policy enacted under b, r(p), makes him better off than Q′: 
 
Definition 8: Let L’s proposal set for b be: 
 
𝐼[𝑄′, 𝑙] =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[−∞, 𝑝] or [2𝑚 − 𝑝,∞] if 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝐿 < 𝑃
[−∞, 2𝑙 − 𝑝] or [2(𝑚 − 𝑙) + 𝑝,∞] if 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑃 ≤ 𝐿 < 𝑉
[−∞, 2𝑙 − 𝑣] if 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑉 ≤ 𝐿 < 𝑀
[−∞, 2𝑚 − 𝑣] if 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐿
[−∞, 𝑝] or [2𝑚 − 𝑝,∞] if 𝑃 > 𝑉 and 𝐿 < 𝑃
[−∞, 2𝑙 − 𝑝] or [2𝑚 − 𝑝,∞] if 𝑃 > 𝑉 and 𝑃 ≤ 𝐿 < 𝑀
𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 if 𝑃 > 𝑉 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐿 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that L’s proposal set depends not only on the relationship between P and V, but also 
between L, P, and M.  First, we will consider situations where P is to the left of V.  Here, if L is 
also to the left of P, L is no worse off in the extremes of the policy space under the new rules.  If 
L is between P and V, he is no worse off in the extreme areas, and better off in some 
intermediate regions—those where policy under the new rules will be no further from his ideal 
point, l, than the president’s ideal point, p.  If L is between V and M, meanwhile, he is better off 
under the new rules for all values of Q′ to the left of 2l – v.  This proposal region expands to all 
values to the left of 2m – v if L is instead to the right of M. 
 
Now we will consider situations where P is to the right of V.  If L is to the left of P, L is no 
worse off under the new rules in the extremes of the policy space.  When L is between P and M, 
the proposal region is the same on the right end of the policy space, but slightly smaller on the 
left end of the policy space.  Finally, if L is to the right of M, L is either better off or no worse 
off under the new rules for all values of Q′, so he will always propose b.   
 
Given Proposition 4, then, we should expect to see the successful passage of b in the following 
situations, and the following final policy outcomes: 
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Proposition 5a: In equilibrium, a bill (b) creating a majoritarian exception will be enacted if: 
 
𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑄 ≤ 𝑝 and 𝐿 > 𝑉 
 
 
Proposition 5b: In equilibrium, the actors will be indifferent about enacting a bill (b) creating a 
majoritarian exception if: 
 
𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑝 < 𝑄 ≤ 𝑣 and 𝐿 > 𝑉 
 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑄 < 𝑝 
 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝑄 > 2𝑚 − 𝑝  
𝑉 < 𝑃 and 𝑄 < 𝑝 and 𝐿 ≥ 𝑀  
𝑉 < 𝑃 and 𝑄 < 𝑝 and 𝐿 < 𝑃 
𝑉 < 𝑃 and 𝑄 > 2𝑚 − 𝑝 
 
 
Proposition 6: In equilibrium, policy will be located at: 
 
𝑝∗ =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑝 if 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝑉
𝑝 if 𝑃 > 𝑉
𝑝 if 𝑄 ≤ 𝑝 and 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝐿 > 𝑉
𝑄 if  𝑝 < 𝑄 ≤ 𝑣 and  𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝐿 > 𝑉
𝑣 if 𝑣 < 𝑄 and   𝑃 ≤ 𝑉 and 𝐿 > 𝑉 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first line of Proposition 6 corresponds to Case 1.  Line 2 corresponds to Case 2.  Lines 3, 4, 
and 5 correspond to Case 3.  See Figure A2.2 for a depiction of this equilibria.  For Q ≤ p, the 
outcome is the same in all three cases.  In Cases 1 and 2, the outcome is the same for all values 
of Q. 
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Figure A2.1: Equilibrium Policy Outcomes, Baseline Game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
 
Figure A2.2: Equilibrium Policy Outcomes, Rule Change Alternative 
 
 
98 
 
 
Appendix 2.2 
 
As described in footnote 6 on page 55, the model outlined in this chapter ignores the 
existence of two additional dynamics that affect the strategic interaction between the president 
and the legislature in the decision to create a majoritarian exception.  In this Appendix, I provide 
additional detail on both features and illustrate how, in a one-period, complete information 
environment, neither affects the equilibrium outcomes described above. 
 
Disapproval Resolutions 
 
The resolutions in the Senate that receive procedural protections under an oversight 
exception may either approve the unilateral action taken by president—as modeled above—or 
disapprove of it.  In the period covered by the empirical tests above, roughly half of the oversight 
exceptions fall into each category.  Indeed, the two examples provide in the chapter’s conclusion 
typify this distinction.  The Iraq War exception would have required affirmative congressional 
approval of the president’s report on various benchmarks before additional funds could be 
expended, while the provisions of the AECA provide an opportunity for Congress to pass a 
resolution disapproving of an arms sale. 
 How does the presence of a disapproval resolution affect the strategic interaction in the 
model?  In the face of a resolution disapproving r(p), the president is still faced with the task of 
bringing policy as close as possible to his ideal point without prompting a congressional 
response.  Recall also that L cannot obstruct r(p) from coming to the floor—it does so 
automatically.48  Under a simple majority voting rule, then, the constraint on this location is 
identical whether the vote in the legislature is on either approval or disapproval.  If p ≤ Q < m, 
any r(p) that P prefers to Q would garner a majority of votes on a question of disapproval.  For m 
≤ Q < 2m - v, meanwhile, P would be able to move Q closer to p without a vote of disapproval 
from M, but P is better off with the outcome he was able to achieve before the rules were 
changed (which is either at p or v, depending on which case applies).  Finally, if 2m – v ≤ Q, P 
would again be able to move Q closer to p without a vote of disapproval from M, but now F is 
                                                     
48 Chapter 1 discusses the various specific ways in which the bill covered by a majoritarian exception reaches the 
floor is protected from pre-floor obstruction. 
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better off under the policy outcome without rule change, so he will obstruct b and no 
majoritarian exception will be created.  In sum, then, if the oversight exception includes 
provisions for a disapproval resolution rather than a question of affirmation, our expectations 
about exception creation are the same in equilibrium. 
 
Presidential Approval of Congressional Action 
  
In the model outlined above, once the legislature has taken action on r(p), the game ends.  
If the legislature approves of r(p), it takes effect.  Under the extension discussed in the previous 
section, meanwhile, r(p) would take effect as long as the legislature did not pass a resolution of 
disapproval. 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), however, 
there has been an additional step that follows r(p) for some majoritarian exceptions.  In the 
Chadha case, the Supreme Court declared the legislative veto, defined as a provision requiring 
“congressional review, deferral, approval, or disapproval of proposed executive actions” (Norton 
1976, p. 1), unconstitutional.  The universe of legislative vetoes is substantially larger than that 
of majoritarian exceptions, as it includes actions by both congressional committees acting alone 
and resolutions not protected by expedited procedures in the Senate (Berry 2008, 2009).  Some 
exceptions enacted pre-Chadha, however, did fall into this category, as they took the form of 
simple or concurrent resolutions of disapproval that did not need to be signed by the president 
and/or required action by only one chamber.  Since Chadha, oversight exceptions that would 
prevent an executive action have generally involved a joint resolution of disapproval, which must 
be signed by the president (Fisher 2005). 
How does this requirement affect the model’s predictions?  For the kind of r(p) explicitly 
modeled above, where the legislature must approve a presidential action, there is no effect; since 
r(p) cannot be amended, the president would never propose a version of r(p) for which he would 
subsequently veto an approval resolution sent to him by Congress.   
For disapproval resolutions, however, Chadha’s requirement changes the outcomes 
achievable by the president in the presence of an oversight exception.  This difference is 
illustrated in Figure A2.3.  The solid line represents the policy outcomes the president can obtain 
without Chadha’s requirement, while the dark grey dotted line depicts those possible when the 
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president must sign a resolution of disapproval; the light grey dashed line, meanwhile, is the 
policy outcome without creating an oversight exception.  Note that these are not equilibrium 
outcomes of a version of the model that embodies Chadha.  Rather, the figure allows us to 
determine whether the situations in which all pivotal actors are better off under the new rules are 
different pre- and post-Chadha. 
We can see that for extreme status quo points on the same side of the policy space (Q ≤ 
v), the outcome is the same pre- and post-Chadha, and it is Pareto superior to the outcome under 
regular order.  For extreme status quo points on the opposite side of the policy space from the 
president (2m – p ≤ Q), the outcomes are identical pre- and post-Chadha, but they are Pareto 
inferior to the outcome under regular order. 
For status quo points v ≤ Q < 2m – p, the outcomes are different.  Post-Chadha, the 
president is able to bring policy substantially closer to his ideal point in the presence of a 
disapproval resolution than prior to the decision.  Throughout this region, however, M and F—
pivotal actors for creating the exception—are better off under the regular rules, so they would not 
support enacting b in the first place.  While, then, Chadha’s requirements may affect the ultimate 
location of policy once an oversight exception is in place, we should not expect the restrictions 
of legislative vetoes to alter the equilibrium outcomes described above. 
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Figure A2.3: Outcomes Under Regular Order and Oversight Exceptions, Pre- and Post-
Chadha 
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Chapter 3: Obscuring the Causal Chain: Creating Delegation Exceptions 
 
From the start, it appeared that 2014 would be, legislatively, like the year before, which 
had set the record as Congress’s least productive year in recent history (DeSilver 2013).  
President Obama began the year highlighting the ways he would attempt to make policy without 
congressional cooperation, pledging to use his “pen and…[his] phone” during his first Cabinet 
meeting.1   Early on, however, one bright spot for potential bipartisanship emerged: the possible 
renewal of the president’s lapsed fast-track trade authority, allowing him to negotiate trade deals 
that, once completed, would come to the Senate floor for approval ineligible for amendment and 
exempt from the possibility of a filibuster.  Obama had repeatedly articulated his support for the 
renewal, and Senate Finance Committee chairman Max Baucus (D-MT) was among the 
measure’s original sponsors.  It was hugely popular with the business community, and House 
Republican Whip Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) even suggested that Obama’s first call with his 
aforementioned phone should be to Congress to talk about trade (Lowrey 2014).  But barely four 
weeks into the year, the legislation was dead on arrival, thanks in large part to opposition from 
the president’s own congressional co-partisans, especially Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid 
(D-NV).  Following a mention of the proposal by Obama in his State of the Union address, Reid 
announced that he would prevent the legislation from coming to the floor of the Senate, saying 
“‘everyone would be well-advised to not push this right now’” (Bradner and Raju 2014).  His 
House Democratic leadership counterpart, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) expressed 
similar opposition, saying the plan was “‘out of the question’” (Babington 2014). 
Given its swift failure, why did Obama request that Congress create special procedures 
for handling new trade legislation?  An extensive political economy literature emphasizes the 
inherent collective action problems present in trade policymaking.  The benefits of protectionist 
policies are concentrated in the hands of a few firms while the costs are widely dispersed across 
                                                     
1 “Remarks by the President Before Cabinet Meeting,” 14 January 2014 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/01/14/remarks-president-cabinet-meeting>. 
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the consumer population (e.g. Alt and Gilligan 1994).  Relaxing these protectionist policies 
through the kinds of free trade agreements that fast track authority promotes, then, has the 
opposite effect: the benefits are diffuse but the costs are felt deeply by those companies now 
competing with cheaper imported goods.  Put differently, the gains from freer trade are general 
while the losses are focused on specific individuals (Arnold 1990).  Because electorally-minded 
legislators from the areas in which costs accrue will attempt to undo any bargain reached to 
deliver the broad-based benefits, the regular legislative process is ill-equipped to address these 
kinds of issues. 
Indeed, the renewal of fast track trade authority is but one example of the second kind of 
majoritarian exception.  I refer to these special procedures as “delegation exceptions,” and they 
represent instances in which the chamber uses procedural change to resolve collective action 
problems for which the regular legislative process is ill-equipped.2  Previous work on the 
creation of delegation exceptions, while deeply descriptive, has not offered and tested a cross-
policy area account of when we should observe this kind of rule change.  Beginning from the two 
basic premises about majoritarian exceptions laid out in the Chapter 1, I begin to close that gap 
here.  First, I document the set of delegation exceptions proposed in Congress since the late 
1960s, emphasizing the near-universal existence of concentrated costs and diffuse benefits within 
the policy questions they address.  Next, I offer an account of how, in situations characterized by 
these kinds of collective action problems, the electoral needs of the Senate’s majority party 
affects the success of proposals to create a delegation exception.   Because the potential electoral 
benefits of the underlying policy change are diffuse, and the possible electoral costs 
concentrated, the enactment of special rules only occurs when the majority party’s need to 
minimize traceability (Arnold 1990) is extremely high.  This need to obscure its actions, I argue, 
is determined by voters’ preferences about a given issue; the salience of that issue among the 
public; and the overall electoral landscape facing the majority party.  Using a novel dataset on 
                                                     
2 It is important to note that fast track trade authority illustrates an important dynamic in the creation of majoritarian 
exceptions: the nature of the rule change is highly contingent on the current rules for handling the policy area.  The 
initial creation of fast track in 1974 represented an oversight exception: the President had exerted substantial 
unilateral authority to negotiate agreements concerning both tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  In response, Congress 
wished to exert more influence in that policy area by increasing its oversight over behavior in which the president 
was already engaging.  Subsequent renewals of fast track authority, however, represent delegation exceptions.  
Absent active congressional action to renew fast track authority, the president may continue to engage in 
negotiations, but the proposal has no special status on the floor of either chamber; it is merely considered like any 
other piece of legislation.   
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proposed and enacted majoritarian exceptions, I then test these theoretical expectations at the 
aggregate level.  I conclude by exploring how the Senate majority party’s changing electoral 
needs can also affect when it proposes delegation exceptions using a particular case—military 
base closings—where procedural change has been attempted repeatedly throughout the past 
quarter-century. 
 
The Landscape of Delegation Exceptions 
 
 In the Chapter 1, I outlined our operational definition of a majoritarian exception: a 
provision, enacted as part of statutory law, that designates some future piece of legislation as 
exempt from a filibuster (as the result of a specified limit on debate).  In addition, majoritarian 
exceptions also may include provisions related to committee consideration, to allowable 
amendments, and to other aspects of floor consideration. 
 Delegation exceptions are distinguished by one additional, important feature: they 
reallocate agenda setting power by explicitly granting new power to an actor or actors who do 
not already have it to develop the proposal that receives procedural protections.  This special 
agenda setter can take a variety of forms.  Within the institution, it may be a new committee, the 
Senate Budget Committee, created and charged with developing the yearly budget resolution by 
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.  Existing committees may also be empowered by 
delegation exceptions, as is the case with the budget reconciliation process, where individual 
standing committees are given the authority to develop proposals making changes to mandatory 
spending programs that come to the floor protected from a filibuster.3  
Outside of the institution, the new agenda setter may be entirely in the executive branch.  
As part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, for 
example, the president was granted the power to develop a proposal to address pending Medicare 
shortfalls.4  Presidents may, however, be required to consult with Congress during the 
development of the proposal, as is the case with fast-track trade authority.  Finally, the specific 
identity of the actor may be jointly determined by the president and Congress.  The Independent 
                                                     
3 The use and consequences of the reconciliation rules are explored at length in Chapters 4 and 5. 
4 Specifically, if general revenue funding for Medicare is expected to exceed 45 percent of Medicare outlays for the 
current fiscal year or any of the next six fiscal years, the president is required to submit a legislative proposal to 
Congress to lower that ratio to 45 percent. 
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Payment Advisory Board, created by the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and 
empowered to make changes to Medicare, has fifteen members nominated by the president and 
confirmed by the Senate.  In particular, the president is required to consult on the selection of 
three members with each of the Senate Majority Leader, the Speaker of the House, and the 
Senate and House Minority Leaders.  Regardless of the identity of the special agenda setter, 
however, their power is largely the same across all delegation exceptions: develop a proposal to 
make a specified kind of policy change, and then watch that measure come to the floor of the 
Senate under procedural protections from amendment and filibuster.5   
 Most existing work on when Congress creates this kind of procedural change tends to 
focus on one specific policy area, be it military base closures (Mayer 1995), trade (O’Halloran 
1994), or both (Becker 2005).6  As Table 3.1 makes clear, however, delegation exceptions have 
been proposed in a wide range of policy areas since 1969.7  Roughly 40 percent fall into just two 
categories: proposals to address the deficit or national debt and plans to reform government 
operations.  In the case of deficit reduction, the collective action problem that a delegation 
exception might solve is well-documented.  A conflict arises between the macroeconomically 
beneficial goal of balancing the budget and shrinking the national debt and the steps necessary to 
achieve that end—that is, cutting or eliminating individual federal programs.  While programs 
will vary in the political engagement of their beneficiaries and the quality of their representation 
by organized interests, Congress has repeatedly struggled to enact meaningful deficit reduction 
as individual legislators seek to avoid reductions in programs that benefit their constituents 
(Gilmour 1990; LeLoup 1980; Schick 1981). 
 
                                                     
5 Readers may be curious as to why I consider all types of delegation exceptions under one heading; put differently, 
why group together delegation exceptions that delegate power inside the chamber with those that send it outside?  I 
consider the precise decision of where to locate the special agenda setter as part of the overall political calculus, 
described in detail below, of choosing to use a delegation exception to maximize the electoral party’s electoral 
chances.  In some situations, such as the creation of the congressional budget process, a simultaneous institutional 
desire to keep power within the chamber meant that delegating to a new committee was optimal.  In the case of 
military base closings, however, the best electoral strategy requires maximum distance between lawmakers and the 
individuals developing the unamendable proposal.  Because the choice of where to locate the special agenda setter is 
driven by the same political calculations, I consider all kinds of delegation exceptions together. 
6 Two notable exceptions to this trend are limited in other ways, either in that it examines only one kind of special 
agenda setter, such as commissions (Campbell 1998), or offers a broad set of theoretical expectations without 
accompanying empirical tests (Garrett 2004; 2005).   
7 The categories here are drawn from Baumgartner and Jones’s (2014) Policy Agendas Project classification scheme, 
subject to the changes described in Chapter 2. 
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Proposed Delegation Exceptions Across Policy Areas, 1969-20128 
 
Policy Area Number of Proposed 
Exceptions 
Share of All Exceptions 
Deficit/Debt 47 23% 
Government Operations 40 19% 
Health 24 12% 
Foreign Trade 24 12% 
Taxes 14 7% 
Energy 12 6% 
Defense 11 5% 
Social Security 11 5% 
Transportation 8 4% 
Banking, Finance, and Domestic 
Commerce 
5 2% 
Macroeconomics 4 2% 
Immigration 3 1% 
Labor and Employment 2 1% 
Public Lands and Water 
Management 
2 1% 
Law, Crime, and Family Issues 1 0.5% 
 
 
The collective action problems present in reforming federal operations is less intuitive, 
but an example of a typical delegation exception from that policy area is illustrative of how 
improving the government’s ability to function is similarly hampered by a tension between 
collective benefits and individualized costs.  Efforts to improve and reorganize the process by 
which the federal government implements its programs date to the early 20th century, and by the 
late 1970s, these efforts became increasingly imbued with a distrust of government (Light 1997, 
2006).  The answer, reorganization proponents argued, was to eliminate “unnecessary” 
government functions, and, beginning in the early 1990s, delegation exceptions represented a 
part of this overall strategy.  Taking names such as the Commission to Eliminate Waste, Fraud, 
and Abuse, the Federal Government Streamlining Commission, and the Commission on the 
Accountability and Review of Federal Agencies, the proposals, none of which were ultimately 
                                                     
8 The coding in Table 3.1 is based on the Policy Agendas Project, subject to the changes described in Chapter 2, 
footnote 37. 
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successful, varied in their specifics but shared a general framework.  Each would delegate power 
to an independent commission that would identify agencies or programs that could be eliminated, 
based on criteria such as whether an initiative was “‘duplicative…wasteful…inefficient… 
outdated…irrelevant…or failed’” (Brass 2006).  As with deficit reduction, using a delegation 
exception would allow the proponents of the overall goal of reducing the size of the federal 
government to achieve the broad benefits associated with smaller, more efficient operations 
while also preventing individual legislators whose constituents relied on the “wasteful and 
inefficient” programs from derailing the reform effort. 
Continuing to move through Table 3.1 further, we observe, across the next six rows, that 
nearly half of the proposals involve health, trade, energy, taxes, defense, and Social Security.  As 
before, for some of these issues, the underlying collective action problem is readily apparent.  In 
the case of trade policy, for example, reducing barriers to trade delivers benefits to consumers in 
the form of lower prices, and to exporters through increased access to markets abroad, but 
potentially imposes steep costs on specific domestic firms who have to compete with cheaper 
imports.  The proposed delegation exceptions dealing with trade would help resolve this tension 
by easing ratification of free trade agreements and other pacts negotiated by the president; by 
granting procedural protections to these proposals, it becomes more difficult for individual 
legislators with constituents who would feel the downstream effects of suffering firms to defeat 
the package.  Similarly, experts have long observed the need to reform Social Security to prevent 
outlays from exceeding payments into the current system (e.g. Soneji and King 2012), but 
individual members of Congress have a history of opposing vigorously any cuts to the program 
in order to protect their constituents.  In 2014, for example, congressional Democrats even 
persuaded President Obama to remove a proposal limiting cost-of-living increases from his non-
binding, annual budget request (Sink and Wasson 2014). 
In other policy areas, meanwhile, a closer examination of these proposals reveals that, 
while we might not associate overall policy area with the presence of collective action problems, 
delegation exceptions are being proposed to address specific aspects of the issue where any 
negative consequences of policy change are likely to be felt keenly by individual constituents of 
specific senators.  Even in the case of defense—which is usually considered to be among the 
most collective of goods—delegation exceptions have been proposed, and occasionally enacted, 
in order to close unneeded military installations.  For the senators representing the states in 
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which bases had the potential to be shuttered, then, even generally collective policy areas have 
particularistic components. 
Similar dynamics are present in the energy proposals.  Between 1993 and 2001, eight 
separate bills were introduced that would create a special commission to make recommendations 
on restructuring the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Laboratories; the proposal would 
be subject to congressional approval, but it could not be amended and could not be filibustered in 
the Senate.9  Originally created as part of the large federal investment in basic science prior to 
World War II, the Labs were the sites of important nuclear weapons research during the Cold 
War but subsequently expanded to also cover work in all of DOE’s mission areas (science and 
technology, national security, energy resources, and environmental quality).  Beginning in the 
early 1990s, DOE generally, and the National Labs specifically, came under increasing criticism 
for mismanagement, misplaced focus, and performing functions that could be better handled by 
other federal research and development programs or in the private sector (Boesman 2000).   
There were 22 facilities in the National Labs system in 1993, and any regular legislative 
proposal to close them would have been met with strong opposition from members in places 
where they were located, including like California, Illinois, New Mexico, and New York.  In 
1996, for example, the member representing California’s 10th district, home to the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, took to the floor of the chamber to defend the facility.  “These 
workers,” argued Representative William P. Baker (R-CA), “are truly national assets…[and] 
while budgetary bottom lines may sometimes seem cold, a responsible government treats its 
workers as national assets to be valued and esteemed.”10  None of the eight proposals to create a 
delegation exception for restructuring the National Labs were ultimately enacted, and an attempt 
in 2003 to consolidate the operations of the Idaho National Laboratory and the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory was unsuccessful, thanks to ongoing lobbying by Idaho’s all-Republican 
congressional delegation, Representative Mike Simpson and Senators Larry Craig and Mike 
Crapo (Swanson and Reed 2012). 
                                                     
9 In 2014, Congress created the Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the National Energy Laboratories, 
which is meant to accomplish this same underlying goal, but the proposal generated by the Commission is not 
subject to a procedural exception, so it may be amended or filibustered in the Senate.  See Public Law 113-76, 
section 319. 
10 142 Congressional Record 46, 29 March 1996, pp. E500-E501. 
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Delegation exceptions, then, are clearly targeted at policy areas, or specific components 
thereof, where a tension between broad-based benefits and narrowly-imposed costs makes the 
regular legislative process ill-equipped for enacting changes to the status quo.  This descriptive 
evidence only tells part of the story, however.  Collective action problems appear to affect the 
generation of proposed delegation exceptions, but once a rule change is proposed, the tension 
between costs and benefits does not necessarily explain whether it is successfully enacted into 
law.  To make predictions about whether a given rule change is likely to be approved once 
proposed, we need to explore other features of the underlying policy change that it would 
shepherd to passage in the future. 
 
Obscuring the Causal Chain through Procedural Change 
 
To generate expectations about which proposed delegation exceptions will actually be 
enacted into law, recall first my central claim that exceptions benefit the majority party.  Recall 
also my two basic assumptions about legislators’ goals, each of which will have consequences 
for whether a proposal is successful.  First, we will assume that legislators are, individually, 
single-minded seekers of re-election (Mayhew 1974).  Second, let us assume that the primary 
shared goal of co-partisan legislators is for their party to attain or retain the majority in their 
chamber (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 2000). 
Before outlining how these goals affect the chances that a delegation exception is enacted 
into law, it is worth explaining why the formal model described in Chapter 2 does not also 
generate predictions that apply here in Chapter 3.  While the procedures under study in the two 
chapters are the same in how they reallocate power within the chamber, and in how they help the 
majority party and its members achieve electoral goals, there are important substantive 
differences between the two.  Oversight exceptions address Congress’s desire to maintain 
influence in a separation of powers system, while delegation exceptions help Congress solve 
internal collective action problems.  In both cases, patterns of creation should be in line with our 
expectations about the majority’s electoral goals, but the relevance of different actors in the 
different situations for which procedural solutions are being sought necessitates two separate 
theoretical accounts. 
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Here, in the case of delegation exceptions, it is helpful to turn to Arnold’s (1990) work on 
how voters reward or punish incumbents for previous actions in office.  For a given policy 
choice to affect an electoral outcome, voters must be able to “plausibly trace an observed effect 
first back to a governmental action and then back to a representative’s individual contribution” 
(47).  Arnold argues that for something to be traceable, three conditions must hold: voters must 
perceive the effect of a policy; they must attribute those results to an identifiable action; and their 
legislator must have made visible contribution to that decision.  If voters recognize positive 
effects of a specific governmental action to which a representative clearly contributed, the 
account goes, they can reward the incumbent with re-election; if the traceable consequences are 
negative, however, the incumbent is apt to be punished. 
For the kinds of issues covered by delegation exceptions—where the costs of policy 
change are noticeable and the benefits negligible—any perceptible effects are, on average, 
negative.  “Wasteful” government programs, for example, have beneficiaries who will feel the 
effects of their elimination.  Along the same lines, when military bases are shuttered, the 
communities in which they are located may experience less overall economic activity, spillover 
job losses, and/or decreased government revenue (Cowan 2012).  It is in the interest of 
individual, re-election-minded members, then, to minimize the traceability of the kinds of policy 
changes with which delegation exceptions generally deal.  These incentives, argues Arnold, are 
exactly what motivates coalition leaders to use procedural strategies—like granting the ability to 
make a protected proposal to a special agenda setter—in pursuit of the underlying policy change.   
Delegation exceptions reduce the visibility of individual contributions to the decision in 
several ways.  First, by giving a special agenda setter the ability to develop the proposal that 
changes the status quo, the delegation exception reduces the number of legislators that can be 
identified as having had a hand in the development of the proposal, either as the original sponsor, 
as co-sponsors, or as members of the committee that worked on the measure.  This is especially 
true if, as is often the case, the agenda setter is outside the chamber.  Second, by protecting the 
proposal from amendments and filibusters on the floor of the Senate, delegation exceptions 
eliminate the expectation that individual members will exploit their various procedural rights to 
the benefit of their constituents—a presumption that has only grown in the Senate over the 
course of the 20th century (Binder and Smith 1997; Smith 2014)—because their ability to do so 
has been severely curtailed.  If legislators are limited in their ability to change or obstruct the 
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proposal, they cannot make visible contributions to its passage or its defeat.  At their most 
extreme, some delegation exceptions dictate that the underlying policy change will take effect 
unless Congress disapproves, thus reducing even further the possibility that constituents detect 
individual contributions by their representatives.  The special procedures for closing military 
bases, for example, dictate that the proposal developed by the Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) Commission will be implemented by the Department of Defense unless Congress enacts 
a joint resolution vetoing the recommendations in total.11  
If delegation exceptions minimize traceability, then, we should expect the probability of a 
proposed rule change being enacted to be increasing as the desire for traceability on the part of 
individual members also decreases.  Put differently, we should observe successful delegation 
exceptions when individual legislators’ desire to hide their actions, or avoid blame (Weaver 
1987), is highest.  Certainly, the existence of an issue for which the solution requires specific 
costs in pursuit of diffuse benefits is part of this calculation, but the existence of such collective 
problems defines nearly all proposed delegation exceptions.   
At a given point in time, however, the preferences of voters about these underlying policy 
issues are likely to vary in multiple ways.  As I argued in Chapter 2, the substantive content of 
citizens’ attitudes may matter.  If a policy change facilitated by the delegation exception is 
unpopular with voters, then incumbent representatives will want to minimize the traceability of 
their actions.  Conversely, if the underlying measure is popular, members of Congress will want 
to claim credit for their actions on it.  To make that subsequent credit claim credible, legislators 
will want to have as many opportunities to put their fingerprints on the decision.  Thus, for 
popular policy changes, they will want to use the regular legislative process; there is no reason to 
minimize traceability.  This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Public Preferences Hypothesis: The probability that a proposed delegation exception is enacted 
into law decreases as public support for the proposal increases. 
 
 In addition to voters’ preferences, the salience of an issue is likely to affect the 
probability that a proposed rule change is successful—but only conditional on the public’s 
underlying preferences.  The role of issue salience in legislators’ decision-making has been 
                                                     
11 See, for example, Public Law 101-510, §2908. 
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explored widely, with an emphasis on how member behavior on highly salient issues increases 
the probability that constituents reward or punish the representative for his contributions to a 
given decision (e.g. Kingdon 1984).  Fiorina (1974) argues that issue salience is especially 
important when some or all of a legislator’s constituents are likely to oppose his action on an 
issue—just as we would expect here, where the perceptible effects of solving a collective action 
problem are, on average, negative. 
How might this play out in the case of delegation exceptions?  Take, for example, the 
procedures, created in December 2001, that facilitated an additional round of military base 
closings.  Enacted shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, defense issues were 
highly salient among the public; between October and November 2001, the average share of 
respondents in the monthly Gallup poll rating “defense” issues as the most important problem 
facing the country stood at 43 percent.  In addition, reducing expenditures on the military was an 
unpopular policy position.  In one October 2001 survey, only 7 percent of respondents indicated 
that spending on national defense should be cut back (Pew Research Center 2001).  Embedding 
an unpopular policy choice in a highly salient issue domain within a delegation exception, then, 
was especially attractive in terms of minimizing the traceability of the action.  For popular 
reforms, however, the opposite should be true.  If a decision is both highly salient AND highly 
popular, legislators will prefer to make their actions more, not less, public in order to lay the 
groundwork for future credit-claiming.  We can summarize these two observations as follows: 
 
Salience Hypothesis: If a proposed delegation exception facilitates an unpopular policy change, 
the probability that it is enacted into law increases when the issue is more salient.  If a proposed 
delegation exception facilitates a popular policy change, the probability that it is enacted into law 
decreases when the issue is more salient.  
   
 These two features of an issue—the content of the public’s preferences about it and the 
salience among those voters of it—help us understand when individual, re-election-minded 
legislators will prefer to see proposed delegation exceptions enacted into law.  Recall, however, 
that we also expect the shared interests of congressional parties to affect the success of these 
prospective changes to the rules.  Both parties are attempting to gain or maintain majority 
status—the benefits of which are well-documented (Albouy 2013; Cox and Magar 1999).  To 
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achieve this goal, each must balance two considerations: building a strong, positive party brand 
(Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Lee 2009) and ensuring the individual re-election of its 
incumbent members. 
First, let us consider how procedural change, in the form of delegation exceptions, might 
build a party’s reputation.  Building a strong brand, argues Lee (2009), involves not only 
appearing effective and passing policy changes that a party expects will be popular, but also 
engaging in actions that make the minority party appear incompetent in the eyes of critical 
voters.  From the perspective of the majority party, both of these objectives are achieved when it 
considers and enacts legislation sponsored by its own members over bills advocated for by 
members of the minority party.  From a preference perspective, majority-sponsored measures are 
more likely to embody the kinds of policy changes that are popular among the voters the 
majority party is courting.  Shepherding a bill sponsored by a co-partisan all the way to passage 
also makes the majority party appear more competent in an increasingly chaotic legislative 
process.  At the same time, denying these reputation-building benefits to the minority party by 
keeping its bills off the agenda should also help the majority party achieve its ultimate goal of 
remaining the majority party.  Indeed, the Senate’s majority party leadership enjoys a range of 
procedural advantages over its peers in the minority party that this process easier.  These include 
a preferential right of recognition on the floor for the Majority Leader, as well as his ability to fill 
the amendment tree, restricting potential changes to the underlying bill.  These advantages 
translate, for example, into majority-sponsored bills being more likely to be scheduled for 
consideration and overcome filibusters; majority-sponsored amendments also have a higher 
probability of being adopted (Den Hartog and Monroe 2011).  Together, this suggests the 
following: 
 
Majority Proposal Hypothesis: A proposed delegation exception is more likely to be enacted 
into law if it is proposed by a member of the majority party. 
  
 An additional partisan concern arises if we think that the audience of concern in terms of 
minimizing traceability is not voters, as assumed by the Public Preferences and Salience 
hypotheses, but rather interest groups or party elites.  In Chapter 2, we saw that those latter 
actors’ preferences about which issues on which the congressional majority should be active 
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affected the probability that a proposed oversight exception was successful.  Oversight 
exceptions on issues owned by the majority party were more likely to be enacted into law, and 
policy areas owned by the majority party had a higher probability of being the target of 
successful rule change.   
How might these elite-level issue concerns manifest in the creation of delegation 
exceptions?  If activists and interest groups allied with the majority party oppose the underlying 
policy change covered by the delegation exception, the party leadership should want to minimize 
traceability—just as they would in front of voters.  In this case, using special procedures reduces 
the chance that the party members are confronted with an individual vote on which they must 
choose either to solve a collective action problem or side with important group allies.  If, on the 
other hand, activists and organized interests support the policy change, the fact that they are 
already engaged in the process lessens the need for creating credible credit claiming 
opportunities by using the regular legislative process.  Put differently, active supporters who are 
already paying attention are likely to know that their partisan allies have accomplished a 
particular policy change regardless of which legislative procedures are used.  Indeed, some have 
argued that organized interests expect their congressional allies to engage in procedural 
innovation in order to accomplish their preferred policy change (Binder and Smith 1997).  
Together, this logic suggests: 
 
Issue Ownership Hypothesis:  A proposed delegation exception is more likely to be enacted 
into law if it deals with an issue owned by the majority party. 
 
Finally, if the majority party is also working to ensure the electoral success of its 
incumbents, it must consider the aggregate electoral situation facing that set of members.  In the 
Senate—where the procedural deck is reshuffled most significantly by delegation exceptions—
this aggregation from the electoral incentives faced by individual members to those confronting 
the party as a whole is shaped by the chamber’s staggered, six-year terms.  In a given session of 
Congress, some members—those whose seats are being contested in the next election year—feel 
electoral pressures more acutely.  Other work finds that this electoral structure has important 
consequences for the distribution of earmarks (Shepsle, van Houweling, Abrams, and Hansen 
2009) and the timing of programmatic policy changes (see Chapter 4), and we should expect the 
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same in the case of rule change—especially of the kind that aims to help individual legislators 
avoid blame for potentially unpopular policy choices.  The more seats the majority party has to 
defend in the next election, the more important minimizing traceability is for the caucus’s share 
goal of retaining its status.  In addition, previous work on the use of delegation exceptions 
suggests that electoral considerations can affect the actual content of the policy change 
subsequently considered by Congress under the new, expedited procedures.  In the case of both 
trade policy and base closings, for example, Kriner and Reeves (2015) find that the special 
agenda setter develops proposals that serve the president’s electoral needs.  The majority leader, 
then, may also be cognizant of the possible electoral consequences of the actual policy change 
covered by the exception, and the more seats his caucus is defending, the more acute these 
concerns should be.  As a result, we should expect the following: 
 
Majority Electoral Need Hypothesis: The probability that a proposed delegation exception is 
enacted into law increases as the share of the seats held by the majority party that are up for re-
election also increases. 
 
Data and Estimation 
 
To evaluate these possible explanations, I return to the data on the universe of proposed 
majoritarian exceptions described in Chapter 2.  Here, I use only the data on proposed rule 
changes that would delegate authority to a special agenda setter and grant that proposal 
privileged procedural rights.  First, I code each observation for whether or not it was enacted into 
law.  Between 1969 and 2012 (the 91st-112th Congresses), 208 such proposals were introduced, 
with 27 being successfully enacted into law; a full list of these enacted rule changes in appears in 
Appendix Table A3.1.  To determine which proposals were enacted into law, I use Adler and 
Wilkerson’s (2012) Congressional Bills Project dataset. It is worth noting that this success rate of 
just over 10 percent indicates that a proposed delegation exception is less likely to be enacted 
into law than an oversight exception; the latter category of exceptions have a success rate of 
roughly 30 percent.  Senators, in other words, are quite unwilling to give up some of their power 
over developing, amending, and ultimately passing a proposal even when the solving the 
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underlying policy problem involves confronting distributional issues that make it unlikely that 
the regular procedures are sufficient. 
An initial survey of these 208 proposals sheds immediate insight into one of four 
expectations outlined above: the Majority Proposal Hypothesis.  Of the 27 successful delegation 
exceptions, 26 had, as their lead sponsor, a member of the Senate’s majority party.12  (The only 
enacted exception with a member of the Senate’s minority as its lead proponent was the 
reauthorization of fast track authority contained in the Trade Act of 2002, which was considered 
during the 18-month period between mid-2001 and late 2002 when the Democrats briefly 
controlled the chamber.)  Given the overwhelming bias towards the majority party sponsorship 
within the set of successful exceptions, the empirical test outlined below is restricted to those 
rule changes offered by members of the majority party only.  Put differently, because majority 
party sponsorship appears to be a near-necessary condition for success, we will instead rely only 
on variation within that set of proposals to explore our other expectations. 
Of the four remaining hypotheses, two—the ones involving public preferences and issue 
salience—require measurement at the level of the issue with which the exception deals.  I use the 
same measurement, involving the Policy Agendas Project Most Important Problem and Public 
Mood data, discussed in Chapter 2.  The Most Important Problem variable measures Salience 
and is scaled from 0 to 1; a value of 0 corresponds to the least salient issue in the dataset while a 
1 indicates the most.  The Policy Mood data, meanwhile, ranges from -1 for the policy-congress 
pairs where the public’s mood diverges most from that of the Senate’s majority party and +1 to 
the issue-congress pairs for which the public’s mood is most similar to that of the majority 
caucus.   
 For the Issue Ownership hypothesis, I return to Egan’s (2013) analysis of survey data 
since 1970 on which party respondents believe is better equipped to handle each of a set of 
consensus issues.  If respondents, in the aggregate, indicate a statistically significant preference 
for one party to address the issue, the policy is considered owned by that party; if neither party 
has an advantage, the issue is considered non-owned.  I then create an indicator variable, coded 1 
if the Senate majority party owns the issue and zero if it does not.   
                                                     
12 For proposals that originated in the Senate, this measurement is straightforward.  For proposals that originated in 
the House during periods of divided congressional control, I include them as having been introduced by the majority 
if they were introduced by a member of the Senate’s majority party. 
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Finally, to test the Majority Electoral Need hypothesis, I simply calculate the share of the 
seats held by the majority party that are up for re-election in the next election.  In some years, 
this proportion is relatively small; during the 110th Congress, for example, the majority 
Democrats were preparing to defend only 12 of their 51 seats in the 2008 election.  Just four 
years later, however, this share was much larger, as the Democrats spent the 112th Congress in 
anticipation of defending 23 of their 53 seats in the 2012 election. 
In addition to the independent variables required to test the theoretical predictions, I 
control for two other factors—both also discussed in Chapter 2—likely to affect the probability 
that a proposed delegation exception is enacted into law.  First, I control for the Majority Party 
Capacity.  As the majority party becomes stronger relative to the minority party, we should 
observe more procedural innovation that makes it easier for the majority party to achieve its 
goals.  Following Schickler (2000), Majority Party Capacity is measured by taking the 
difference between the strength of the majority party and the strength of the minority party.  
Each individual party strength measure has two components.  The first is the share of seats in the 
chamber held by the party.  The second is that party’s cohesion, calculated as 1/σ, where σ is the 
standard deviation of that party’s first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores.  Each party’s 
strength is the product of its seat share and its cohesion, and then Majority Party Capacity is the 
difference between the two strength measures.   Finally, I control for House Control, that is, 
whether the House is also controlled by the same party as the Senate.  Because majoritarian 
exceptions are enacted as part of statutory law, they also need to gain the approval of the House 
of Representatives in order to be created successfully.   
Because the dependent variable—whether a proposed delegation exception was enacted 
into law—is dichotomous, I estimate a logistic regression model.  Because the proposal 
observations are clustered within congresses, I estimate random intercepts by year.  In addition, 
because most congresses feature multiple proposals of different kinds, we might expect the errors 
to be correlated across all bills in a given session, so I cluster the standard errors by congress.  
Lastly, since the Salience hypothesis is conditional, with the expectations about the effect of an 
issue’s salience depending on the underlying popularity of the proposal, I interact the Gallup 
Most Important Problem variable with the measure based on the public’s relative mood in the 
policy area.   
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Results 
 
 The results of this estimation appear in Table 3.2.  At first glance, the results for the 
Public Preferences variable appear contrary to our expectations; the coefficient is positive, while 
the hypothesis outlined above anticipated a negative effect.  To get an accurate picture of the 
relationship between the popularity of a majority party proposal and the probability that a 
delegation exception is successfully enacted into law, we must also take into account the 
interaction between Public Preferences and Salience.  To ease this interpretation, Figure 3.1 
depicts the predicted probability of passage for a proposed delegation exception in policy areas 
where majority party proposals are likely to be less versus more popular.  As we move from left 
to right on the x-axis, policies go from less to more popular vis-à-vis the Senate majority party; 
the values on the x-axis range from two standard deviations below zero to two standard 
deviations above zero.  The y-axis, meanwhile, displays the predicted probability of passage for 
a proposed delegation exception at each level of public preferences, holding all other 
independent variables at their means.13  The negative slope of the line is consistent with the 
Public Preferences hypothesis, as it indicates that less popular policies—those for which the 
incentive to minimize traceability is greater—are more likely to be the subject of successful 
delegation exceptions.  The difference in the predicted probabilities across the values, however, 
is not statistically significant at conventional levels; a Wald test of whether the predicted 
probabilities at -0.75 and 0.75 are equal carries a p-value of 0.16.  While this means we are 
unable to reject the null for the Public Preferences hypothesis, Figure 3.1 indicates that the 
relationship between the public’s relative mood on a given issue and the probability of a 
delegated exception dealing with that issue being enacted is at least in the expected direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 I also assume that the mean value of the random component of the intercept is zero, its expected value (Bartels 
2015). 
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Table 3.2: Probability of Enactment, Delegation Exceptions Proposed by Majority Party, 
Proposal Level Analysis, 91st to 112th Congresses 
 
Public Preferences 1.067 
 (1.975) 
Salience 0.954 
 (1.912) 
Preferences*Salience -16.022** 
 (8.703) 
Share of Seats Majority Party is Defending in Next Election 22.044** 
 (12.876) 
Issue Ownership -0.474 
 (0.788) 
Majority Party Capacity 0.506 
 (0.341) 
House Control -1.221 
 (1.634) 
Constant -8.494* 
 (4.176) 
Var (Year RE) 4.080 
 (2.731) 
  
Log Pseudolikelihood -47.636 
Observations 135 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Figure 3.1: Predicted Probability of Enactment by Public Preferences 
 
 
 On the other hand, the estimated effect of public salience, conditional on public 
preferences, provides much stronger support for the Salience hypothesis.  In Figure 3.2, the x-
axis indicates various levels of the relative public mood measure, and the y-axis displays the 
marginal effects of the salience variable at each of value of the popularity variable.  The strong 
negative slope of the line suggests that, for policy areas where public preferences are biased 
away from the Senate majority party, delegation exceptions dealing with more salient issues are 
more likely to be enacted into law than those concerning less salient issues.14   
 
 
                                                     
14 The kink in the confidence intervals at 0 in Figure 3.2 is likely due to the fact that roughly of a quarter of the 
observations have values of zero for the Public Preferences measure, indicating that the public’s preferences on the 
issue are roughly equivalent to their overall mood. 
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Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of Issue Salience on Probability of Enactment, by Public 
Preferences 
 
 
At a value of -0.75 (roughly two standard deviations below zero), for example, the 
probability of a rule change that concerns a minimally-salient issue is not statistically different 
from zero.  For a delegation exception dealing with a similarly unpopular issue that is maximally 
salient, however, the chance of success is nearly 100 percent; the p-value on a Wald test of 
whether these predictions are equal is p=0.000.  On the other side of the popularity spectrum—a 
relative mood variable of 0.75—the effect is in the opposite direction, though the difference is 
not statistically significant.  These probabilities of passage are consistent with the predictions of 
the Salience hypothesis.  When the majority party’s members have the incentive to make its 
actions as minimally traceable as possible—that is, when an issue is salient AND the party’s 
position is likely to be unpopular—a proposed delegation exception is very likely to be enacted 
into law.  If, on other hand, the individual legislators in the majority caucus want to be able to 
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claim credit for their actions in the future because they are popular and important to voters, the 
chance that a delegation exception is created is quite low. 
 Next, note the coefficient on the Issue Ownership measure.  Not only can we not reject 
the null hypothesis at a conventional level of statistical significance (p=0.55), but the coefficient 
is in the opposite direction than anticipated by the Issue Ownership hypothesis.  While it is 
impossible to draw affirmative conclusions from null results, the absence of a relationship here is 
less surprising when we consider the nature of the problems being solved by delegation 
exceptions.  Even if we expect voters to be paying little attention to congressional activity 
generally (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Bartels 2002), a policy change that imposes 
concentrated costs in exchange for diffuse benefits is perhaps the exception to that trend.  Put 
differently, if legislators are ever going to be concerned about punishment from constituents for 
policy decisions, it will be when those voters are facing perceptible negative consequences—
whether it be in the case of a closed military base, fewer jobs because of a free trade agreement, 
or less generous social programs because of deficit reduction.  Interest groups and other elite 
allies, however, are likely to be aware of lawmaking behavior regardless of the procedures used; 
attempts to minimize traceability may simply be less successful in front of those audiences.  The 
null results for the Issue Ownership measure, then, may suggest that constituency-level concerns 
are trumping the concerns of activists in this particular case. 
Finally, let us consider the Majority Electoral Need hypothesis, comparing an issue 
typical in terms of popularity and salience at the minimum and maximum values of electoral 
need.  Holding the relative mood and salience variables at their means, if the majority party is 
defending 24 percent of its seats in the next election (the minimum observed value in the data), 
the chance that special rules are created is not statistically different from zero.  If, however, 44 
percent of the majority party’s seats (the maximum observed value) will be contested in the next 
cycle, the probability that a given delegation exception is successful is roughly 59 percent.  
While the p-value on a Wald-type test of whether these predicted probabilities are equal does not 
achieve conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.13), the trend is clearly in the 
expected direction.  This suggests that the majority party turns to procedural change more often 
when it must defend more seats in the next election in order to maintain its majority, requiring 
minimized traceability. 
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While our primary interest is in the variables testing the hypotheses outlined in the 
theoretical section, the effects of the control variables—or lack thereof—are also worth noting.  
The coefficient on the majority party Capacity variable is positive, but not statistically significant 
(p=0.14).  The variable measuring co-partisan control of the House, meanwhile, is negative, 
though not statistically significant (p=0.46).  On one hand, this is surprising; we would expect it 
to be easier to create a delegation exception when both houses are controlled by the same party.  
At the same time, the effects of shared House control were also negative in Chapter 2.  There, I 
argued that shared control makes regular order more attractive, reducing the need to resort to rule 
change; that is also a possibility here. 
 In conclusion, while we are only able to reject the null hypothesis for two of the four sets 
of expectations tested in Table 3.2 at a conventional level of statistical significance, some results 
are broadly consistent with the theoretical account outlined above.  Indeed, because majority 
party authorship appears to be a nearly-necessary but not sufficient condition for proposal 
enactment, we are left with a relatively small number of observations—only 135.  In addition, in 
order to provide an over-time, cross-issue analysis of when Congress creates delegation 
exceptions—a major gap in the existing literature on this kind of procedural change—we are 
forced to use relatively coarse measurement, at the level of the general topic being handled by 
the delegation exception.  For some issues, the fact that only some aspects of the policy area are 
afflicted by the kind of collective action problems that these special rules aim to solve may 
attenuate some of the effects anticipated above.  Minimizing traceability is far more important 
when the anticipated, perceptible effects of governmental action impose specific costs on a 
defined population.  This condition is more likely to hold for any policy change in, for example, 
the trade arena than in military affairs.  If only some components of an issue require minimized 
traceability, that should work against us finding evidence consistent with the theoretical account 
outlined above.   
 Another concern about the results presented in Table 3.2 is the possibility of selection 
bias.  As in Chapter 2, we might be concerned about the fact the data analyzed here represents 
only part of the universe of possible exceptions; they leave unaccounted for the rules changes 
that members of Congress could have proposed but did not.  On one hand, many would argue 
that the cost of introducing legislation is non-existent or so minimal as to not be prohibitive (e.g. 
Balla 2000); if there are no hurdles to proposing delegation exceptions, then the universe of 
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observed cases should be roughly equivalent to the universe of all possible cases.  Others have 
argued, meanwhile, that a legislator who chooses to sponsor a bill incurs a variety of costs 
(Krehbiel 1995), including the resource costs of developing the proposal, the opportunity costs of 
spending time on the measure in lieu of other activities, and the political costs of potential 
opposition to the legislation (Schiller 1995).  In the case of delegation exceptions, however, 
because many of the proposals analyzed above are identical to unsuccessful measures from 
previous congresses, the resource costs of their development is quite small.  If opportunity and 
political costs exist, moreover, they should work against the prospect of finding the effects 
anticipated above.  The same impulse that leads legislators to use delegation exceptions—a 
desire to minimize traceability—may persuade them not to introduce the legislation at all.  If 
anything, then, the sample may be missing some hypothetical proposals that enact unpopular 
policy changes on salient issue—exactly the kind of measures we expect to be successful.   
Even if our concerns about selection bias are minimal, it is worth exploring an issue-level 
analysis similar to the one in Chapter 2.  In Table 3.3, I present the results of a second analysis, 
where each observation is a policy area in a given congress.  The dependent variable is still 
dichotomous, but now takes on the value of 1 if a delegation exception was created in that policy 
area in a given session and zero otherwise.  The independent variables are measured as described 
above, with one exception.  The measure of whether a rule change was proposed by a member of 
the Majority party, previously measured at the bill level, is now captured at the congress level as 
an indicator variable where 1 indicates that the majority party proposed new procedures in the 
policy area during that term and 0 otherwise.  The estimation is again carried out by logistic 
regression with both random intercepts and standard errors clustered by congress. 
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Table 3.3: Probability of Delegation Exception Enactment, Issue-Level Analysis, 91st to 
112th Congress 
 
Public Preferences 0.686 
 (1.668) 
Salience 0.058 
 (1.326) 
Preferences*Salience -13.257** 
 (4.890) 
Share of Seats Majority Party is Defending in Next Election 10.367 
 (8.103) 
Majority Party Proposal 6.657*** 
 (2.036) 
Issue Ownership -0.669 
 (0.717) 
Majority Party Capacity 0.466* 
 (0.244) 
House Control -1.397 
 (0.962) 
Constant -10.297** 
 (4.200) 
Var (Year RE) 1.169 
 (1.276) 
  
Log Pseudolikelihood -42.524 
Observations 528 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 The results are largely similar to those presented in Table 3.2, though they are attenuated 
by addressing possible selection bias.  As before, there is no evidence of an independent effect of 
Public Preferences on the likelihood that a delegation exception is created in a given policy area.  
Conditional on Public Preferences, Salience continues to predict rule change, but the effect is 
now smaller. For example, for unpopular policies, the average marginal effect of Salience is 0.19 
here, as opposed to 1.32 in the proposal-level analysis.  For popular policies, meanwhile, the 
average marginal effect is now indistinguishable from zero.  The coefficient on the Majority 
Electoral Need hypothesis is still in the expected direction (positive) but now fails to meet 
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conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.20).  The presence of a proposal offered by a 
member of the majority party is a statistically significant predictor of success—as we would 
expect, given that all but one of the successful proposals explored above were offered by 
members of the majority party.  There is still no evidence that Issue Ownership or co-partisan 
control of the House are related to a greater probability of rule change.  Finally, Senate Majority 
Party Capacity is again a statistically significant predictor of the creation of a delegation 
exception in a given issue area. 
 Accounting for possible selection concerns, then, tempers the evidence in support of our 
theoretical account here to a greater degree than it did in Chapter 2.  How might we explain this 
difference?  One possibility is simply the rarity of delegation exceptions as compared to 
oversight exceptions.  Recall that there have nearly three times as many oversight exceptions 
successfully created (72) as compared to delegation exceptions (27).  Because several congresses 
saw multiple delegation exceptions created in the same issue area, moreover, there are only 22 
non-zero observations (out of 528) in the issue-level analysis for delegation exceptions.   
 A second possible explanation is substantive, rather than statistical.  The evidence 
presented above suggests that constituency-level issue concerns are more relevant in the creation 
of delegation exceptions than in the development of oversight exceptions, where elite-level 
policy considerations (as captured by issue ownership) are more relevant.15  When coupled with 
the realities of the Senate’s electoral structure, this difference may help us understand the 
different role of proposal selection across the two kinds of rule changes.  As the set of seats that 
the Senate majority party must defend in a given cycle changes, so will the set of issues on which 
minimizing traceability is most important.  We should not, however, expect the same to be true 
when the majority party is responding to elite-level issue concerns; the variance across elections 
in the issues about which interest group allies, for example, care should be much more 
consistent.  The need to be strategic about when to pursue a given rule change is more acute, 
then, for delegation exceptions than for oversight exceptions.  For evidence of how these 
calculations might play out, we turn to the case of a particular delegation exception: the 
procedures for closing military bases. 
                                                     
15 Further evidence of this difference is presented in Appendix Table A3.2, where I present the main, proposal-level 
analysis from Chapter 2, now including the Majority Electoral Need variable described above.  We had no 
theoretical reason for including this variable in the estimation in Chapter 2, and we see here that it is not a 
statistically significant predictor of oversight exception success. 
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Anticipating Electoral Effects: The Case of Closing Military Bases 
 
The history of military base closings has been explored at length elsewhere (e.g. Becker 
2005; Mayer 1995, 2007; Twight 1979), but a brief summary of the basic details is useful here.  
Beginning in the early 1960s, the Department of Defense’s efforts to close military bases were 
met with substantial resistance in Congress, but attempts to act on those frustrations were largely 
unsuccessful.  A 1965 announcement that the Pentagon intended to close 149 bases, for example, 
led both houses of Congress to pass restrictions on the closure process, including a one-house 
legislative veto.  President Johnson subsequently vetoed the measure, however, and the 
Department of Defense managed to execute many of its plans.   
By the early 1970s, Congress began to gain more influence on the issue, thanks to a 
deteriorating public reputation for the Pentagon; an increasing ability by Congress to invest in 
the expertise needed to stand up to the defense bureaucracy; evidence that the Defense 
Department was actively deceiving members of Congress about closure plans; and declining 
economic conditions that made members even more concerned about possible effects in their 
districts.  Conflict between the Pentagon and congressional leadership came to a head in 1976, 
when Congress passed, and President Ford ultimately signed, a measure vastly limiting the 
Department’s ability to close bases unilaterally, effective for one year.  In 1977, these procedures 
were made permanent, and in 1978, they were extended to cover all military installations 
employing over three hundred people (Becker 2005). 
The consequences of these new restrictions were stark: between 1977 and 1991, not a 
single military installation was closed.  Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, momentum began 
to build around using an alternative system to reduce the military’s footprint.  In February 1984, 
however, the report of the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (also known as the 
Grace Commission) recommended that an alternative mechanism—a special commission—be 
used to select bases for closure, as improving relations with the Soviet Union made some 
installations unnecessary, and shuttering them appeared to be an attractive option for reducing a 
growing budget deficit (President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control 1984).  By 1987, the 
idea had made its way to a group of congressional Republicans, led by Representative Richard 
Armey (R-TX); that year, Armey came within seven votes in the House of passing an 
amendment to the 1988 defense authorization bill that would create a special, congressionally-
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appointed commission to develop a list of bases to be closed.  Those changes would take effect 
automatically, without subsequent review by Congress.   
By the following year, momentum around the idea of a special base closing commission 
had continued to grow, with support from House Armed Services Chairman Les Aspin (D-WI), 
Senate Armed Services Chairman Sam Nunn (D-GA), and Secretary of Defense James Carlucci.  
In October 1988, both chambers passed a conference report on the following year’s defense 
authorization bill that would create a twelve-member commission, appointed by Carlucci, which 
would have until December 31, 1988 to develop a proposed list of closures and realignments.  
The Secretary could accept or reject the proposal in its entirety by January 16, 1989, and then 
Congress would have until March 1 to do the same; any vote on rejecting the changes would be 
exempt from a filibuster in the Senate. 
The results of the 1988 round were sweeping: 86 bases were closed, saving 
approximately $693.6 million a year (CQ Almanac 1988).   The commission’s authorization 
expired once its process was complete, so when a new Defense Secretary, Richard Cheney, 
wanted to pursue base closures in 1990, he was forced to use the 1978 congressional notification 
and review procedures.  Aspin, arguing that Cheney’s list disproportionately affected Democratic 
districts, called for another commission-based effort.  Congress responded by enacting the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, which authorized three subsequent rounds 
of closures, in 1991, 1993, and 1995.  The commission would be smaller, with eight members 
selected jointly by Congress and the president, rather than by the Secretary of Defense.  The 
process would begin with the Secretary of Defense, whose suggestions would be reviewed by the 
commission.  The commission would then pass its proposal along to the president for approval, 
who would forward it on to Congress; both actors could only accept or reject the package in toto.  
As before, a resolution to reject the proposal in the Senate could not be filibustered. 
As with the 1988 round, the 1991, 1993, and 1995 iterations made major changes to the 
military base landscape, affecting 82, 175, and 132 installations, respectively (Lockwood and 
Siehl 2004).  Following the completion of the third round in 1995, the Department of Defense 
continued to seek authorization to close bases.  Secretary of Defense William Cohen lobbied 
Congress for new commissions throughout the Clinton administration and while proposals were 
introduced in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000, they were ultimately unsuccessful (Schlossberg 
2012).  In 2001, Donald Rumsfeld, after assuming the position when President George W. Bush 
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took office, finally convinced the House and Senate to authorize an additional round, completed 
in 2005 and operating under the same procedures as the 1991-1995 iterations.  Between 2001 and 
2009, despite the fact that a surplus in domestic military infrastructure remained even following 
the implementation of the reductions authorized in 2001 (Government Accountability Office 
2013), no additional special procedures were proposed by members of the Senate’s majority 
party.16 
 Clearly, while the issue of closing military bases has been on the agenda consistently 
since the mid-1980s, only periodically has the Senate majority party attempted to actually enact 
the associated delegation exception.17   Are these choices about when to attempt rule change 
consistent with the idea that the majority party is attempting not only to minimize traceability, 
but to do so in electorally optimal years?  If the majority party is defending many seats from 
states with large military populations in the next election, then majority party members should 
avoid proposing rule change on the issue.  Even with the minimized traceability that comes with 
a delegation exception, the party’s current electoral landscape suggests that deferring the 
proposal until a year in the future when the negative, perceptible consequences of the policy 
change will do less to jeopardize the majority’s chances to retain its status.  Because individual 
members of the majority party have a shared interest in this collective goal, moreover, any given 
majority party legislator has an incentive to avoid making the proposal even if he himself is not 
facing re-election and/or does not have a large military population in his district.  All majority 
party legislators, then, are better off waiting to pursue the creation of special procedures in a 
different, and less electorally damaging, year. 
Using data from the United States Census Bureau and the Department of Defense,18 we 
are able to document the share of each state’s population in a given year that is comprised of 
                                                     
16 Since 2012, three additional rounds of base closings, to be reviewed using expedited procedures in the Senate, 
have been proposed by members of the Senate’s majority party.  In each case, Senate Armed Services Chair Carl 
Levin (D-MI) included the provision in the yearly defense authorization bill (S. 2467 in 2012, S. 1034 in 2013, and 
S. 2289 in 2014).  The data on the distribution of military populations by state, however, is only available through 
2009, so I omit these bills from the analysis below. 
17 In each case, the provision was included as part of the annual Department of Defense authorization bill, which in 
each applicable year, had a member of the majority party as its lead sponsor (Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) in 1988 
and 1990; Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) in 1997 and 1998; Senator John Warner (R-VA) in 1999 and 2000; and 
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) in 2001),  In addition, important amendments supportive of the proposal were 
spearheaded by Senator John McCain (R-AZ) in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. 
18 For 1988, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996-2006, and 2009, the data is from the “National Security and Veterans Affairs” 
section of the Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau).  For 1990, 1991, 
1993, 1995, 2007, and 2008, the data is from the Atlas/Data Abstract for the United States and Selected Areas 
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either active duty soldiers or civilian military employees.  Figure 3.3 presents, for each year 
between 1984 and 2009, the average value of this measure for the states in which the Senate 
majority party was defending seats in the next election, with the years in which a rule change 
was proposed indicated with labels.   The higher the average military-connected population, the 
greater the incentive for both the typical majority party senator to avoid having military bases 
closed, and for the majority caucus as a whole to keep the issue off the agenda in order to protect 
its status.   
 
Figure 3.3: Mean Military Population in States Where Majority Party is Defending Seats in 
Next Election, 1984-2009 
 
 
 
                                                     
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports). 
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In those years in which a member of the majority party proposed new, expedited 
procedures for closing military bases (noted in Figure 3.3), the average share of the population in 
the states in which the party was defending seats in the next election was 0.75 percent.  For the 
years in which no member of the majority party offered a rule change, the mean value is 0.95 
percent; the p-value on a difference of means test of whether these quantities are equal is 0.07.  
The majority party in the Senate, then, appears to have been at least somewhat strategic, avoiding 
not only enacting, but also proposing, the creation of special procedures in the years when doing 
so would have been electorally sub-optimal.   
Figure 3.3 and the accompanying difference of means test are not evidence that a desire 
to time these proposals when they would do the least electoral damage was the only factor that 
determined when they were offered.  Indeed, the fact that the actual policy changes authorized by 
each successful measure occurred one or more years after the enactment of measure meant that 
Congress may have considered the problem at least temporarily “solved” and turned its attention 
to other matters.  In addition, the current Senate majority’s uncertainty about whether it will still 
be in the majority in the next session may affect its ability to defer action until a future, 
hypothetical congress when its electoral situation is more favorable.  Despite the fact that Figure 
3.3 does not establish a causal effect, it does offer some illustrative evidence of how strategic 
timing concerns might play a role in the creation of delegation exceptions; this, in turn, helps us 
understand why accounting for possible selection effects had a larger effect on the analysis 
presented in this chapter than in Chapter 2. 
When the most recent set of special procedures for closing military bases were enacted as 
part of the Fiscal Year 2002 defense authorization bill, the Senate ushered in yet another 
sweeping policy change enabled by a delegation exception.  When the BRAC Commission’s list 
of base closures under that act were promulgated in 2005, they closed 22 major military 
installations, accompanied by an estimated 18,000 lost civilian jobs (CQ Almanac 2005).  This 
was but one example of the large policy changes that have been facilitated by the creation of 
delegation exceptions by Congress.  Congress continues, moreover, to enact these special rules, 
suggesting continued significant effects in the future.  The Independent Payment Advisory 
Board—created by the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act—is, for example, 
projected to save $3.1 billion by 2022 (Congressional Budget Office 2012).  By vesting a special 
agenda setter with the power to make an unamendable proposal, and then granting that proposal 
132 
 
 
protection from a filibuster on the floor of the Senate, this kind of procedural change—like the 
oversight exceptions discussed in Chapter 2—creates opportunities for majority rule in a non-
majoritarian body. 
 The results presented above, moreover, suggest that these majority rule situations arise in 
a systematic way—one that benefits the majority party in the Senate, the chamber where the 
procedural deck is most profoundly reshuffled by delegation exceptions.  As previous literature 
suggests, the presence of collective action problems may plant the seeds for this kind of 
procedural change, but the aggregate analysis of the factors predicting whether a proposed rule 
change is enacted into law indicates that conflict between group policy goals and individual 
legislator motivations is not a sufficient condition for special procedures to be created.  Indeed, 
the relative rarity with which the proposals are successful suggests that senators are generally 
quite unwilling to give up some of their influence to ease the coalition-building task of their 
party leadership.  Rather, it appears that the Senate majority party turns to these special 
procedures only in the most pressing of circumstances—when it is facing an unpopular policy 
choice in an issue area that is salient with the public.  By changing the rules, the majority caucus 
is able to minimize the traceability of its actions on issues where the perceptible effects of policy 
change are likely to do electoral damage.   
 How does this account help us understand fast track’s failure in 2014?  Conventional 
wisdom might suggest that the kinds of free trade agreements shepherded to passage by those 
special procedures are unpopular with the core constituencies of the Senate’s Democratic 
majority party—and certainly, such concerns may have played a role.  At the same time, the 
public was largely inattentive to trade policy issues: in 2012, trade policy ranked 16th out of 20 
policy areas in terms of issue salience on the Gallup poll.  There is also little evidence that free 
trade agreements were unpopular among the electorate as a whole; in a February 2014 Pew 
Research Center poll, for example, a majority of respondents (55 percent) indicated they thought 
the very pact for which President Obama was seeking fast track authority (the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership) would be a “good thing for [the] country” (Pew Research Center 2014).  The issue 
was not salient, and the underlying policy change was not unpopular, so it satisfied neither of the 
conditions outlined above for minimizing traceability.    By placing this failure to renew fast-
track in a broader context, across both issues and time, then, we are able to see forcing individual 
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senators to give up some of their influence over the policy process simply may not have been 
worth the majority party’s trouble.  
 Here, and in Chapter 2, we have explored patterns in the creation of two kinds of 
majoritarian exceptions, arguing that they are enacted in order to ease the passage of policies that 
benefit the majority party.    Once they are created, however, are they actually deployed for these 
intended purposes?  I explore that question beginning in Chapter 4.
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Appendix 3.1 
 
Table A3.1: List of Delegation Exceptions Enacted into Law, 1970-2012 
 
Congress Bill 
Number 
Bill Name Measure Receiving Procedural 
Protections 
91 HR 13000 Federal Pay 
Comparability Act of 
1970 
Resolution approving alternative 
recommendations about federal pay 
93 HR 7130 Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act 
of 1974 
Reconciliation bills 
93 HR 7130 Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act 
of 1974 
Budget resolution 
93 S 1435 District of Columbia Self-
Government and 
Governmental 
Reorganization Act 
Bills passed by DC City Council 
96 HR 4537 Trade Agreements Act of 
1979 
Agreements on tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
96 S 932 Energy Security Act Resolution approving energy targets 
98 HR 3398 Trade and Tariff Act of 
1984 
Agreements on tariff modifications 
99 H J Res 372 Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 
Resolution suspending deficit reduction 
provisions 
99 H J Res 372 Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 
Resolution approving proposed sequester if 
sequester process is invalidated by federal 
court 
100 HR 1414 Price-Anderson 
Amendments Act of 1988 
Resolution approving a compensation plan 
following nuclear accident 
100 HR 4848 Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 
1988 
Trade agreements 
100 S 2749  Defense Authorization 
Amendments and Base 
Closure and Realignment 
Act 
Resolution disapproving of base closing 
recommendations 
100 H J Res 324 Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit 
Control Reaffirmation Act 
of 1987 
Alternative sequester proposal 
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Congress Bill 
Number 
Bill Name Measure Receiving Procedural 
Protections 
100 H J Res 324 Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit 
Control Reaffirmation Act 
of 1987 
Resolution approving proposed sequester if 
sequester process is invalidated by federal 
court 
100 H J Res 324 Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit 
Control Reaffirmation Act 
of 1987 
Alternative sequester proposal for 
Department of Defense generated by 
president 
101 HR 4739 National Defense 
Authorization for Fiscal 
Year 1991 
Resolution disapproving of base closing 
recommendations 
102 HR 2950 Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency 
Act of 1991 
Resolution disapproving of action by the 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority 
103 HR 1876 To provide authority for 
the President to enter into 
trade agreements to 
conclude the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations 
Trade agreements (temporary extension of 
power delegated as part of Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988) 
104 S 4 Line Item Veto Act Resolution disapproving of rescission 
105 S 738 Amtrak Reform and 
Accountability Act of 
1997 
Resolution disapproving of 
recommendations to liquidate Amtrak from 
Amtrak Reform Council 
107 HR 3009 Trade Act of 2002  Trade agreements 
107 S 1438 National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 
2002 
Resolution disapproving of action by the 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority 
111 HR 3590 Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act 
Resolution discontinuing the Independent 
Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) 
111 HR 3590 Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act 
Resolution implementing IPAB 
recommendations 
111 HR 4173 Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act 
of 2009 
Resolution approving emergency plan to 
ensure bank solvency 
112 S 365 Budget Control Act of 
2011 
Recommendations of Joint Committee on 
Deficit Reduction 
112 S 365 Budget Control Act of 
2011 
Installment increases to debt ceiling 
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Table A3.2: Results from Chapter 2 (Oversight Exceptions Analysis) Controlling for 
Majority Party Electoral Need 
Presidential Extremity 29.012 
 (26.743) 
Divided Government 31.888** 
 (15.108) 
Presidential Extremity*Divided Government -73.402** 
 (31.729) 
Switch in Control -0.011 
 (1.900) 
Switch in Control*Divided Government 2.874 
 (2.478) 
Majority Party Sponsorship 2.130*** 
 (0.462) 
Public Preferences -0.587 
 (1.252) 
Salience -5.374*** 
 (1.604) 
Public Preferences*Salience 8.315* 
 (4.599) 
Issue Ownership 1.553** 
 (0.644) 
Majority Party Capacity 0.873*** 
 (0.331) 
House Control -2.256 
 (1.497) 
Presidential Priority 2.769 
 (3.897) 
Share of Seats Majority Party is Defending in Next 
Election -1.280 
 (8.391) 
Var (Year RE) 2.966 
 (2.404) 
Constant -14.753 
 (14.300) 
  
Observations 249 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Chapter 4: Employing the Exceptions: The Case of Budget Reconciliation 
 
 Dating to President John Adams’s famous “midnight judges,” outgoing presidents have a 
long tradition of attempting to squeeze a range of executive policymaking activity in between the 
election of their successor and their own departure from office (Howell and Mayer 2005).  
Promulgating regulations represents one tool in this arsenal (O’Connell 2008), and in late 2000, 
President Bill Clinton took full advantage of that option, overseeing the publication of nearly 
26,000 pages’ worth of new regulations in the Federal Register (Kolbert 2008).  When President 
George W. Bush and congressional Republicans assumed office in January 2001, however, they 
had a response option not available to their predecessors after an opposite-party presidential 
transition: the Congressional Review Act.   
Enacted in 1996, the CRA provided Congress with 60 days of continuous session to 
introduce a joint resolution disapproving of an agency rule, with the measure subsequently 
protected from a filibuster in the Senate.1  This resolution requires a presidential signature, 
making the CRA an unlikely tool for addressing policy disagreement between the president and 
Congress, except in the periods after a presidential transition.  Indeed, Congress’s ability to 
overturn regulations is slightly enhanced in these periods, as the CRA resets the 60-day clock in 
a new session of Congress if the rule in question was received in Congress within 60 days of 
adjournment sine die (Carey 2012).  In March 2001, Congress successfully exercised its CRA 
power for the first—and, to date, only—time, overturning ergonomics regulations promulgated 
by the Department of Labor.2 
Eight years later, in early 2009, a Democratic Congress and a new Democratic president, 
Barack Obama, faced a variant of the same situation.  The Bush administration had issued a 
number of late-term regulations, but had issued them early enough in 2008 that they had already 
taken effect by the time Obama assumed office, preventing Obama from simply freezing them by 
executive action.  Notable among these was a regulation allowing concealed weapons in national 
                                                     
1 See Public Law 104-121 § 251. 
2 See Public Law 107-5. 
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parks (Savage 2009).  Despite their large majorities in both houses of Congress, the CRA 
represented a potentially appealing way to overturn the concealed carry rule.  Instead, the Obama 
administration pursued a legal challenge, and a federal judge blocked the regulation in March 
2009 (Eilperin and Wilber 2009).3 
 Why did Congress and the president use one strategy in 2001 and a different approach in 
2009?  Evidence in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that the majority party in the Senate will create 
majoritarian exceptions, like the CRA, when doing so facilitates policy changes that are not 
otherwise achievable and that benefit the majority party.  Creating new rules, it appears, is 
largely driven by short-term political calculations.   
 The results discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 shed little light, however, on when Congress 
chooses to use the majoritarian exceptions it has already created.  Even if their initial creation is 
the result of near-sighted concerns, the rules remain as procedural tactics on which future 
Congresses to draw to accomplish policy and political goals.  To determine whether the use of 
majoritarian exceptions is dictated by a similar pursuit of its goals by the majority party in the 
Senate, I turn to a case study of one particular exception: the budget reconciliation process. 
   
A Brief History of Reconciliation 
  
The reconciliation process was originally created as part of the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act (hereafter, CBA) in 1974.  The CBA itself sought to solve a 
particularly pernicious collective action problem: both parties in Congress agreed that the overall 
federal budget was too large, but no coalition of individual members was willing to support the 
combination of tax increases and cuts to popular programs necessary to achieve deficit reduction.   
This issue was not new in 1974.  In 1921, Congress, after nearly doubling annual federal 
expenditures between 1899 and 1912, created the modern budget process with the Budget and 
Accounting Act, which created the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and 
Budget) and required the president to submit a budget proposal to Congress by the beginning of 
February each year (Shuman 1988).  Following World War II, Congress sought to roll back some 
budget authority asserted by the executive branch during the war by creating its own Joint 
                                                     
3 Subsequent legislative action by Congress in May 2009 authorized concealed carry in national parks for 
individuals otherwise licensed to carry them (Hulse 2009a). 
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Committee on the Budget as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which was to 
respond to the president’s request with a concurrent resolution specifying a ceiling on 
expenditures and on the size of the deficit.  Congress attempts to use this new institution to 
respond to the president’s submission failed four times between 1947 and 1950, ensuring that 
most of the action in congressional budgeting continued to be carried out through the 
appropriations process (LeLoup 2005).   
Now-classic works by Fenno (1966) and Wildavsky (1964) describe the congressional 
Appropriations Committees in this mid-twentieth century period as responsible guardians of 
public resources.  New committee members, especially in the House, were socialized by their 
more senior colleagues into a norm of reducing agency requests.  Subcommittee chairs were 
often from safe districts, and markups were usually closed to avoid public scrutiny.  The 
committees were certainly not single-minded seekers of cuts—often they would approve 
spending increases over the previous year, just at a lower level than the president’s request, 
especially in the Senate—and were undoubtedly aided in their ability to keep deficits low by 
robust economic growth, but they kept the appropriations process relatively smooth until the 
mid-1960s. 
Beginning in 1966, however, as unemployment and inflation grew along with the cost of 
the Vietnam War, Congress began to confront more acute budget pressures.  Reforms to the 
House Appropriations Committee meant the panel featured more liberal, younger members, a 
less powerful chairman, and self-selected subcommittees—all of which eroded the norms that 
had made the panel effective in the previous decade (LeLoup 2005).  Also contributing to the 
situation—and particularly relevant for the eventual creation of the reconciliation process—was 
the growth in mandatory expenditures; between 1968 and 1972, the share of the federal budget 
consumed by these kinds of expenditures grew from 60 percent to 72 percent (Schick 1980).  
Mandatory spending programs differ from discretionary programs in that the funding for the 
latter is handled through the annual appropriations process, while spending on the former is not; 
funding for mandatory programs is usually provided through multi-year authorization bills and 
thus does not depend on annual congressional action.   Entitlement programs in which 
individuals meeting certain eligibility criteria are guaranteed benefits, such as Social Security 
and Medicare, comprise a majority of mandatory spending by expenditures at present, but other 
non-entitlement mandatory programs include Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 
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unemployment insurance, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program.  Mandatory programs 
made it more difficult for congressional budgeteers to control overall spending levels for two 
reasons.  First, because their funding is outside the purview of the Appropriations Committees, it 
was not subject to the processes those panels used to rein in deficits in the preceding decade 
(Gilmour 1990).  Second, in many cases, the benefits associated with mandatory programs are 
indexed to the Consumer Price Index or a similar benchmark.  As a result, total expenditures on 
these programs will increase as the number of beneficiaries grows unless Congress wants to 
make the difficult choice to cut benefits (Schick 1980). 
 The budget issues of the late 1960s and early 1970s were not only the result of 
Congress’s internal difficulties in dealing with growing deficits.  In 1972, President Richard 
Nixon made the federal budget a centerpiece of his campaign, and after winning re-election, he 
attempted to cancel several programs for which Congress had already appropriated funds.  In 
previous years, he had successfully deferred the release of appropriated funds until certain 
requirements were met, but his impoundments in late 1972 and 1973 sought to impound funds 
permanently for several programs, including programs providing rural environmental assistance, 
rural water and sewer grants, rural electrification, and subsidizing housing (Schick 1980). 
 Concerned about this exercise of unilateral power by the president, Congress responded 
by creating a Joint Study Committee on Budget Control (JSC) comprised of members of the 
House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the 
Senate Finance Committee to develop a coordinating mechanism between the spending and 
revenue sides of the process.  The representatives from each panel were particularly concerned 
about maintain their current jurisdictions, which led to the superimposition of new budget 
committees over the existing structure in each chamber.4  Under the new budget process, each 
Budget Committee would receive information from the authorizing committees in its chamber 
describing the expected outlays and revenues from that committee’s programs for the coming 
year by March 1.5   
By April 15, the Budget Committees were required to report a first concurrent resolution 
on the budget to their floors of their respective houses.  Committees would respond to this 
resolution by reporting all legislation authorizing new budget authority by May 15.  May 15 
                                                     
4 For a thorough description of the development of and debate over the CBA, see Schick 1980, chapter 3. 
5 The newly created Congressional Budget Office would also provide analysis of these estimates. 
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would also serve as the deadline for enacting that first budget resolution, which would provide 
allocations to the various Appropriations subcommittees.  Action on each of these spending 
measures was to be completed by seven days after Labor Day, followed by a second budget 
resolution, with a passage deadline of September 15, reiterating or changing the totals from the 
first budget resolution.  If any discrepancies remained between the second budget resolution and 
the annual spending bills or other statutory law, Congress had until September 25 to adopt 
legislation “reconciling” the various components before the new fiscal year begins October 1 
(LeLoup 2005).  In the years since 1974, the process has been streamlined somewhat, featuring 
only a single budget resolution with an enactment deadline of April 15 (which Congress 
regularly misses), but the basic parameters of the process remain in place today. 
Reconciliation, however, has evolved significantly since its initial inclusion in the CBA.  
The process is described in detail below, but it is modeled after a procedure used at the time by 
OMB to ensure that executive branch agencies have complied with the overall, agreed-upon 
spending totals before the president’s budget is submitted to Congress (Shuman 1988).  Its initial 
inclusion in the CBA was as a way to address the fact that the first resolution was intended to be 
a target for spending and revenue.  The CBA’s drafters were cognizant of the fact that 
circumstances and priorities might change between the adoption of the first and second 
resolutions.  They also knew that if their colleagues were likely to miss the target of the first 
resolution, it would be by spending too much and not too little.  This was especially true in the 
context of mandatory spending, where the first resolution often assumed that Congress would 
make changes to entitlement programs during the course of the year.  The authorizing 
committees were wary of making cuts to the programs they oversaw, so the hope was that a 
delegation exception, in the form of reconciliation, could be used to force them to do so (Schick 
1981). 
 In reconciliation’s early years, the tool went unused, largely because of its timing.  As 
outlined in the CBA, the reconciliation process would be initiated by a set of instructions, 
delineating a set of committees and the size of budgetary changes those committees needed to 
make to bring statutory law in line with intended outlays and revenues.6  These instructions, 
however, were included in the second resolution, meaning that Congress had but five days for 
committees to respond to instructions, have each chamber consider an omnibus measure 
                                                     
6 The reconciliation instructions are described in greater detail in the next section. 
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aggregating all committees’ proposals, and resolve the differences between the House and 
Senate.  In 1979, Democrats attempted to include reconciliation instruction in the second budget 
resolution, but the resistance with which the effort was met delayed the enactment of the 
resolution enough that the directives were pulled from the measure (Shuman 1988).  In 1980, 
responding to recommendations made to a special panel formed after the 1979 failure, Congress 
addressed this issue by moving the reconciliation instructions to the first budget resolution.  In 
December 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed the first budget reconciliation bill, making 
changes to a range of programs, including child nutrition, student loans, Medicare, and Medicaid, 
that totaled roughly $8.2 billion in savings in 1981 (CQ Almanac 1980). 
 While this 1980 legislation was notable—especially in that it established future precedent 
for a reconciliation bill in tandem with the first budget resolution rather than the second 
(Gilmour 1990)—it was a reconciliation bill enacted the following year that cemented the role of 
the procedures in development of the budget specifically and the legislative process more 
generally.  Ronald Reagan had made balancing the federal budget a component of his 1980 
platform, and when he assumed office accompanied by the first Republican-controlled chamber 
of Congress since 1957 (the Senate), he intended to make good on the promise.  His economic 
team, headed by Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman, was committed 
not only to a large tax cut expected to have positive supply-side effects on the economy, but also 
to major spending cuts, especially in entitlement programs (LeLoup 2005).  In the development 
of Reagan’s fiscal year 1981 budget, for example, Stockman pushed for eliminating Social 
Security minimum benefits, restricting eligibility for food stamps, and cutting both 
unemployment benefits and trade adjustment assistance for industrial workers (Greider 1981).   
While Reagan’s Republican allies in the Senate agreed in principle with his desire for 
sweeping budget cuts, they were faced with the prospect of getting them over the filibuster 
hurdle and through the Democratically-controlled House.  For Senate Budget Committee 
staffers, the key to success appeared to be minimizing the number of votes that a package would 
have to face, given that it would certainly contain changes to programs under the jurisdiction of 
many committees.  Put in the language of my argument laid out in the introduction, then, a 
decision about the use of an exception was clearly affected by the rule’s ability to ease the 
passage of the underlying measure.  In a memo dated February 13, 1981—approximately a week 
before the first public mention of the possibility of using reconciliation in the Washington Post 
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(Dewar 1981)—Budget Minority Staff Director Steve Bell offered reconciliation as “option 1” 
for solving this problem.  Using reconciliation, he wrote, “limits the number of floor votes, in 
each House to two.  One vote would be necessary on the reconciliation instructions, and one on 
the reconciliation bill.”7  The advantages of reconciliation, Bell wrote, included the ability to 
maintain a singular focus on the president’s initiatives through a process well-specified by the 
CBA that did not represent an incursion into the jurisdictions of various standing committees.  
The previous year’s experience with reconciliation, moreover, could be pointed to as “the most 
significant success we have had in enforcing reductions in direct spending.”8  While Bell also 
offered several additional options, including a temporary committee charged with reporting an 
omnibus bill by a given deadline; having the Budget Committees report reconciliation bills 
without having gone through the instructions process; or expanding the president’s rescission 
powers, he ultimately recommended the reconciliation route.  All options would require at least 
two floor votes, and “reconciliation, at least, has the advantage that the process has been agreed 
to…and, we know from experience, that through this process it is possible to get one vote on the 
question: shall we save, or shall we not save?”9   
 On February 24, Senate Budget Committee Chairman Pete Domenici (R-NM) initiated 
the reconciliation process by introducing a resolution that included instructions to 13 Senate 
committees.  By the time the measure was reported out of the Senate Budget Committee on 
March 19, the size of the reductions had been set at $36.4 billion (LeLoup 2005).  The full 
Senate passed the resolution including the instructions 80-10 on April 2; Republicans 
successfully defeated a range of Democratic amendments to lessen the proposed cuts, and lost 
only one member, Lowell Weicker (R-CT), on the final vote (Shuman 1988).  The vote on the 
                                                     
7 “Alternative Legislative Process for Reducing Federal Spending,” Steve Bell, Majority Staff Director, Senate 
Committee on the Budget, to Carol Cox, Majority Legislative Director, Senate Committee on the Budget, February 
13, 1981; Box No. 7; Senate Budget Committee Republicans, Constitutional Convention, Beilenson’s Budget Act 
Reconciliation 1981-82; Records of the United States Senate, 98th Congress, Record Group 46; National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC, p. 1. 
8 “Alternative Legislative Process for Reducing Federal Spending,” Steve Bell, Majority Staff Director, Senate 
Committee on the Budget, to Carol Cox, Majority Legislative Director, Senate Committee on the Budget, February 
13, 1981; Box No. 7; Senate Budget Committee Republicans, Constitutional Convention, Beilenson’s Budget Act 
Reconciliation 1981-82; Records of the United States Senate, 98th Congress, Record Group 46; National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC, p. 2. 
9 “Alternative Legislative Process for Reducing Federal Spending,” Steve Bell, Majority Staff Director, Senate 
Committee on the Budget, to Carol Cox, Majority Legislative Director, Senate Committee on the Budget, February 
13, 1981; Box No. 7; Senate Budget Committee Republicans, Constitutional Convention, Beilenson’s Budget Act 
Reconciliation 1981-82; Records of the United States Senate, 98th Congress, Record Group 46; National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC, p. 5. 
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instructions was, of course, only the first of Bell’s two necessary votes.  The process of 
generating the actual reconciliation package faced several hurdles, most notably in the House, 
where it took a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats to overrule the Rules 
Committee’s plan to consider that chamber’s reconciliation package in six separate pieces 
(LeLoup 2005).  Ultimately, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 was signed into 
law by President Reagan on August 13, 1981, making roughly $130.6 billion in cuts over three 
years to major domestic discretionary programs, including welfare and food stamps and ushering 
in the use of a new legislative tool that, as Table 4.1 indicates, has been used consistently since.   
 
Table 4.1: Reconciliation Measures Enacted Into Law, 1980-2010 
Bill Major Purposes 
Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 
1980 
First use of reconciliation process.  
Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 
1981 
Made significant cuts to discretionary programs, including welfare 
and food stamps. 
Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 
1982 
Reauthorized and made changes to food stamp program. Made 
changes to federal employee pay formula and to the farm support 
program. 
Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 
1982 (TEFRA) 
Rescinded some provisions of the previous year’s Kemp-Roth tax 
cuts.  
Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 
1983 
Made changes to federal employee pay and retirement formulas. 
Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 
1985 
Mandated an insurance program giving some employees the ability to 
continue health insurance coverage after leaving employment 
(COBRA) and amended the Internal Revenue Code to deny income 
tax deductions to employers for contributions to a group health plan 
unless such plan meets certain continuing coverage requirements. 
Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 
1986 
Ordered the sale of Conrail. Made minor changes to Medicare 
hospital provisions. 
Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 
1987 
Created federal standards for nursing homes under Medicare and 
expanded Medicaid eligibility 
Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 
1989 
Made approximately $10 billion in spending cuts 
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Bill Major Purposes 
Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 
1990 
Established Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) rules for the first time and 
implemented a range of tax increases 
Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 
1993 
Created two new personal income tax rates and a new tax rate for 
corporations. The cap on Medicare taxes was repealed, and gas taxes 
were raised. The taxable portion of Social Security benefits was 
increased. The phase-out of the personal exemption and limit on 
itemized deductions were permanently extended, and the earned 
income tax credit was expanded. 
Personal 
Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act 
(1996) 
Clinton’s welfare reform bill 
Balanced Budget Act 
of 1997 
Contained first portion of Clinton’s plan to balance the federal budget 
by FY 2002. Created the Children’s Health Insurance Program. Made 
changes to Medicare hospital payment policy. 
Taxpayer Relief Act 
of 1997 
Clinton’s tax cut package 
Economic Growth and 
Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 
2001 
First Bush 43 tax cuts 
Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2003 
Second Bush 43 tax cuts 
Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005 
Reduced Medicare and Medicaid spending, changed student loan 
formulas, and reauthorized the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families program. 
Tax Increase 
Prevention and 
Reconciliation Act of 
2005 
Extended several of the earlier Bush tax cuts, including the reduced 
tax rates on capital gains and dividends and the alternative minimum 
tax (AMT) tax reduction. 
College Cost 
Reduction and Access 
Act of 2007 
$20 billion student aid reform package. Included grant increases, loan 
rate reductions, and created public service loan forgiveness program. 
Health Care and 
Education 
Reconciliation Act of 
2010 
Major pieces of Obama’s health care reform, as well as ending 
subsidies to private lenders as part of the federal student aid program. 
Source: Thomas E. Mann, Norman J. Ornstein, Raffaela Wakeman, and Fogelson-Lubliner, “Reconciling with the 
Past,” New York Times 6 March 2010.  Additional reconciliation bills were vetoed in 1995, 1999, and 2000. 
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The Nuts and Bolts of the Reconciliation Procedures 
 
 Today, budget reconciliation remains an optional component of the congressional budget 
process.  Since 1982, Congress has considered only a single budget resolution that sets out broad 
guidelines for the amounts of revenue and spending in which Congress should engage for the 
coming fiscal year.  Because much of the actual raising of this revenue and outlay of these funds 
is carried out through other statutes, changes may need to be made to existing law in order to 
bring it into line with the budget resolution.  If, for example, the budget resolution specifies 
higher levels of revenue for a given year, changes may be needed to the tax code to actually raise 
that revenue.  If such changes need to be made, Congress has two options.  One, it can leave the 
changes to be made through the normal legislative process.  Alternatively, Congress may 
delineate the size (in dollars) of the necessary changes to existing law are as part of the budget 
resolution, and then grant the measures making those changes advantaged procedural rights on 
the floor of both the House and Senate; these rights resemble closing those described in earlier 
chapters.  Floor debate on a reconciliation bill is capped at 20 hours and thus the measure is 
protected from a filibuster; rather than needing 60 votes to end debate and proceed to final 
passage, only 51 are required.  There are also limitations—described in detail below—on 
allowable amendments and motions that can be made during debate. 
Use of the procedures involves a series of distinct decisions.  Before choices are made 
about which programs to change using the procedures, the House and Senate Budget 
Committees, as part of the development of the yearly budget resolution, draft reconciliation 
instructions; these take the form of list of committees in each chamber and accompanying dollar 
figures.10  These directives outline the magnitude of budgetary changes that a committee or set of 
committees must make—i.e., “the Senate Committee on Finance shall report changes in laws 
within its jurisdiction to reduce the deficit by $1,000,000,000 for the period of fiscal years 2009 
                                                     
10 It is theoretically possible for the House Budget Committee to influence the selection of Senate committees in the 
instructions by including Senate committees in the House version of the budget resolution.  In practice, however, the 
House panel leaves the drafting of the Senate instructions to its Senate counterpart.  Of the years since 1980 in 
which reconciliation instructions were ultimately included in the final budget resolution, only twice did the House 
Budget Committee include Senate committees (1981 and 1989) and in neither case did the House committee include 
Senate committees that the Senate had not also chosen to include in its own draft budget resolution.  The House 
Budget Committee occasionally goes as far as formalizing this deference.  In 2009, for example, the House draft 
budget resolution included language specifically stating “Senate reconciliation instructions to be supplied by the 
Senate” (see Section 202, H. Con. Res 85, 111th Congress, 1st session). 
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through 2014.”11   At times, the instructions are specific as to whether the stipulated changes 
should be achieved through revenue-side or expenditure-side reforms.  In 2005, for example, the 
Finance Committee was directed to reduce outlays by $10 billion and to reduce revenues by $70 
billion, each over five years.12  For revenue increases and spending cuts, the prescribed amount is 
considered a floor on changes, while for revenue reductions and spending increases, it is a 
ceiling.  In addition, compliance with these levels is judged on a net basis, meaning that even if it 
is under a directive to reduce the deficit, a given committee may still use reconciliation to expand 
existing programs in its jurisdiction—or even to create new initiatives—as long as it also makes 
offsetting adjustments elsewhere.    
Once a budget resolution including a set of committees passes both houses of Congress, 
the process shifts to determining exactly which programmatic changes will be contained within a 
reconciliation bill.  A committee may choose to authorize a new program, or it may make 
changes to the existing programs that it oversees.  For these existing initiatives, the committee 
can either increase or decrease spending.  Revenue adjustments are generally made through 
changes to the tax code, though they can also be made through changing fees.  While the CBA 
does not prohibit changes to discretionary programs in a reconciliation bill, the procedures have, 
since the early 1980s, generally been applied only to direct or mandatory spending (Keith and 
Heniff 2005).    
In directing committees to make difficult policy changes and then protecting the 
legislation implementing those reforms from amendment and obstruction on the floor of the 
Senate, the reconciliation process reflects well the underlying logic of delegation exceptions 
presented in Chapter 3.  Individual committees do not have the incentive to make cuts to the 
programs in their jurisdictions.  Motivating them to do so, then, requires the kind of special 
agenda-setting powers associated with delegation exceptions.  At the same time, the instructions 
mechanism ensures that the majority party does not abdicate all control over how the collective 
dilemma of deficit reduction is solved.  The instructions take power that generally rests with 
committee chairs—selecting the issues on which their committees will be active (Evans 1991; 
Gold 2004; Oleszek 2007)—and opens it up to formal input from the full Senate via the budget 
resolution.  Because the budget resolution is itself exempt from a filibuster, in principle, the 
                                                     
11 S. Con. Res. 13, 111th Congress. 
12 H. Con. Res. 95, 109th Congress. 
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pivotal actor in approving it is the floor median.  The reconciliation instructions, then, give a 
simple majority of senators the ability to tell committees what to do, rather than leaving the 
committees the discretion to set their own agendas.   
While the drafters of the original CBA were careful to avoid a process by which 
committees were told explicitly to which programs they should recommend changes (Gilmour 
1990; Schick 1981), there are several specific mechanisms by which a simple majority on the 
floor can direct committee behavior.  In some cases, the instructions will mention particular 
policy areas—i.e., “health care reform” and “investing in education” in 2009—without 
delineating specific programs (i.e., “Medicare” or “the Direct Loan Program”).  In addition, 
revenue-side directions to the Finance Committee in the Senate and the Ways and Means 
Committee in the House are almost always intended to initiate tax cuts, such as Finance’s $1.25 
trillion instruction in 2001 that produced the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act, better known as the first round of Bush tax cuts.13 Finally, a given committee may have 
jurisdiction only one or two programs large enough to yield the changes required by the 
instructions (Gilmour 1990).   
 This allocation of power—committees get to make protected proposals, but only subject 
to the underlying goals of the majority party—suggests that the actual use of reconciliation, as 
initiated by the reconciliation instructions, will be constrained by the preferences of the various 
actors involved.  To derive more precise predictions about when we should observe this 
particular majoritarian exception being used, then, I offer the following spatial model of the 
reconciliation instructions. 
 
A Spatial Model of the Reconciliation Instructions 
 
 The game involves the following actors.  First, the median member of the Senate is 
denoted M.  Second, the filibuster pivot (Krehbiel 1998) is represented by F.14  Third, the Senate 
                                                     
13 H. Con. Res. 83, 107th Congress. 
14 In Krehbiel’s original model, F is defined as being on the opposite side of the floor median from the president.  
Because the president is not part of the spatial model described here, we are left to define the filibuster pivot relative 
to the actor with positive agenda power—the majority party leader, operationalized here as the majority party 
median.  For a discussion of the measurement of the filibuster pivot in a world of negative agenda control, see 
Gailmard and Jenkins (2007). 
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has one standing committee (c) with a median member, denoted C. Finally, I indicate the leader 
of the Senate’s majority party as L.   
 I make several assumptions about these actors and their procedural rights in the Senate.   
First, I assume all actors have continuous, single-peaked preferences in a one-dimensional policy 
space with liberal policies and preferences on the left and conservative policies and preferences 
on the right.  Second, in the version presented here, I assume that M < F; substantively, this 
means the results describe a Senate controlled by the Democrats.  Second, when considering a 
bill outside of the reconciliation procedures—a condition I refer to as “regular order”—a 
filibuster is permitted.  On the other hand, when a measure is considered under the reconciliation 
rules, I assume it cannot be filibustered; again, the Congressional Budget Act caps debate on 
reconciliation legislation at twenty hours, eliminating the possibility of unlimited debate.  Third, 
per Senate Rule XXVI, I assume that c’s decision to report out a measure (reconciliation or 
otherwise) requires the votes of a simple majority on that committee.15 
Fourth, I make three assumptions about the Senate majority leader.  First, I assume that 
he is located spatially at the median of his party.16  This assumption is common in theoretical 
models of Congress that examine the effects of parties (e.g. Chiou and Rothenberg 2003; 
Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith 2006).  In addition, in the specific context of the Senate, it has 
been documented empirically that majority leaders are generally located in the ideological 
middle of their party caucus, if not the exact median of the party (Hatcher 2010).  In the version 
of the model presented here, assuming that L is at the median of the majority party also means 
that, by definition, L < M.  Second, I assume he has gatekeeping powers over which legislation 
comes to the floor.  This assumption is justified by the assignment to the majority leader of wide-
ranging procedural rights, including scheduling power, a preferential right of recognition, and the 
ability to fill the amendment tree (Heitshusen 2013).   Finally, I assume that he has the power to 
decide which committees are named in the reconciliation instructions.  While it is technically the 
Budget Committee that drafts the budget resolution, which contains the instructions, the 
procedures used by both parties to select members of that committee suggest that its members 
are likely to behave as agents of the majority party leader. If the Republicans are in the majority, 
the Republican Conference’s rules explicitly state that Budget Committee members are selected 
                                                     
15 See Senate Rule XXVI, clause 7(a)(3). 
16 Indeed, I use “majority leader” and “majority party median” interchangeably in discussing the model and its 
results. 
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by the majority leader, rather than the Conference’s committee on committees.  On the 
Democratic side, all committee assignments are left to the Democratic Steering and Outreach 
Committee of the Democratic Conference, but that group focuses its energy on appointment to 
the “A” committees, of which the Budget Committee is not one (Schneider 2006), leaving the 
majority leader substantial discretion over its membership.  In addition, the budget resolution 
increasingly functions as a statement of the majority party’s priorities that is negotiated on 
increasingly partisan terms (Garrett 2000; LeLoup 2005), suggesting that the majority leader is 
likely to have significant influence over its content. 
Finally, I make an important assumption about the ability of senators to amend bills on 
the floor of the chamber.  If a measure is brought to the floor under regular order, I assume that it 
is considered under an open rule.  The Senate lacks an equivalent to the House’s Rules 
Committee, and Senate Rule XVI outlines the limited circumstances under which amendments 
must be germane; these conditions do not include general debate on typical measures.  Among 
the situations in which germaneness is required, however, is reconciliation; per Section 310(e)(1) 
of the Congressional Budget Act, all amendments to a reconciliation measure must be germane.  
This requirement dramatically limits the scope of possible amendments and thus substantially 
increases the ability of the committee to ensure that the final bill reflects its preferences.  Thus, I 
assume that reconciliation bills that are generated by committees responding to their directives 
come to the floor under a closed rule. 
Strictly speaking, this is not true in practice.  Committee-produced reconciliation 
measures can be amended, but the specific definition of germaneness suggests that the 
committee’s preferences are likely to rule the day, even in the context of amendments.  The 
Senate’s precedent on the question of germaneness to reconciliation bills indicate that 
“amendments reported by or offered by the authority of the committee of jurisdiction are 
germane per se, and such amendments form part of the basis for determining germaneness.”17  
Guidance from the Parliamentarian before reconciliation’s first use in 1981, moreover, indicates 
that amendments “interject[ing] new subject matter not included” in a committee’s reported 
legislation would be out of order,18 with “new subject matter” including programs not originally 
                                                     
17 See Riddick’s Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices, S. Doc. 101-28, p. 626. 
18 “Procedure for Consideration of Reconciliation,” Carol Cox, Majority Legislative Director, and Andrew Ellis, 
Majority Counsel, Senate Committee on the Budget, to Steve Bell, Majority Staff Director, Senate Committee on the 
Budget, and Robert Fulton, Chief Majority Counsel, Senate Committee on the Budget, June 8, 1981; Box No. 7; 
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addressed in a committee submission.19  Even the Budget Committee, in the process of 
aggregating the committees’ proposals, cannot amend them without running afoul of Senate Rule 
XV, which “prohibits committee amendments containing significant subject matter within the 
jurisdiction of another committee…[and] cannot be waived.”20 
The addition of the Byrd Rule to the reconciliation process in 1985 further restricted the 
permissible amendments to a reconciliation bill on the floor.  Originally offered as an 
amendment during consideration of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1985, the rule is meant to prevent the inclusion of “extraneous matter”—that is, substance 
unrelated to the budget process—in a reconciliation bill (Heniff 2010a).21  In its current form, the 
rule specifies six conditions under which a provision may be declared extraneous and thus 
stricken from the bill (unless a supermajority votes to retain the item), including that it “does not 
produce a change in outlays or revenues,” is “outside of the jurisdiction of the committee that 
submitted the title or provision for inclusion in the reconciliation measure,” “produces a change 
in outlays or revenues which is merely incidental to the non-budgetary components of the 
provision,” and “it would increase the deficit for a fiscal year beyond the ‘budget window’ 
covered by the reconciliation measure.”22  Because these provisions apply not only to the 
proposal generated by the various committees included in the instructions, but also to any 
amendments proposed to the bill, the Byrd Rule makes it even more difficult to expand the scope 
of a reconciliation bill once it reaches the floor of the Senate. 
What does the application of the Byrd Rule to the amendment process for reconciliation 
bills in the Senate look like in practice?  An example from the 2010 consideration of the Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 is illustrative.  Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) 
                                                     
Senate Budget Committee Republicans, Constitutional Convention, Beilenson’s Budget Act Reconciliation 1981-82; 
Records of the United States Senate, 98th Congress, Record Group 46; National Archives Building, Washington, 
DC, p. 2. 
19 Andrew Ellis, Majority Counsel, Senate Committee on the Budget, to Steve Bell, Majority Staff Director, Senate 
Committee on the Budget, and Robert Fulton, Chief Majority Counsel, Senate Committee on the Budget, June 1, 
1981; Box No. 7; Senate Budget Committee Republicans, Constitutional Convention, Beilenson’s Budget Act 
Reconciliation 1981-82; Records of the United States Senate, 98th Congress, Record Group 46; National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC. 
20“Reconciliation Bill Procedure,” Martin B. Gold, Counsel to the Senate Republican Leader, to Howard Baker, 
Senate Majority Leader, June 3, 1981; Box No. 7; Senate Budget Committee Republicans, Constitutional 
Convention, Beilenson’s Budget Act Reconciliation 1981-82; Records of the United States Senate, 98th Congress, 
Record Group 46; National Archives Building, Washington, DC, p. 1. 
21 The rule was initially set to expire in 1987 and was extended twice (in 1986 and 1987) before being incorporated 
into statutory law as part of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (Heniff 2010a). 
22 See Section 313(b)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended. 
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sought to offer an amendment to the measure that would have changed the process for 
determining whether a veteran is mentally unfit to purchase firearms, making it more difficult to 
classify a veteran as such.23  Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), who, as Senate Finance Committee 
chair, was managing debate on the bill, raised a point of order in response, claiming the 
amendment was prohibited because it was outside the jurisdiction of the committee that reported 
the measure.  A vote of the full chamber sustained Baucus’s point of order, and Coburn was 
prohibited from offering his amendment.24  By comparison, in December 2012, without the Byrd 
Rule’s germaneness restriction limiting him, Coburn was able to use the same amendment to 
successfully obstruct consideration of the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act 
(Cox 2012). 
This amendment regime—germaneness plus the Byrd Rule—applies when a 
reconciliation bill is generated by the committees named in the instructions reporting out 
proposals that are aggregated by the Budget Committee and sent to the floor.  Recall, however, 
that if a committee fails to comply with its reconciliation directive, a reconciliation bill 
addressing programs in that committee’s jurisdiction can still be considered.  A senator may 
offer a motion to recommit the overall reconciliation legislation with instructions to the non-
compliant committee.  The proposed policy changes to that committee’s programs would be the 
content of the instructions, and if the motion directed the committee to return the bill to the floor 
“forthwith,” the additional provisions, developed by the floor, would be brought up for 
immediate consideration (Lynch 2013).  If this motion to recommit approach is used, however, 
the proposal need not satisfy the germaneness requirement, which has the effect of reducing the 
influence of the named committee over the content of the proposal (Garrett, Graddy, and Jackson 
2008).  This understanding of the germaneness requirement has existed for reconciliation’s entire 
history.  In 1981, in preparation for the first major use of the reconciliation rules, the Republican 
majority staff of the Senate Committee on the Budget sought the advice of the Parliamentarian 
on what would happen if a committee did not report out a proposal that satisfied its instructions.  
The Parliamentarian, the staff was told, “is prepared to rule that, where a committee is not in 
                                                     
23 The amendment was based on S. 669, the Veterans’ 2nd Amendment Protection Act.  See Senate Report 111-27 
for a full discussion of the measure. 
24 See 156 Congressional Record S2069, 25 March 2010. 
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compliance, a motion that would have the ultimate effect of placing the committee in compliance 
would not be subject to the germaneness point of order.”25 
While it is rare for Senate committees to ignore reconciliation directives, and even rarer 
for the Senate to consider a reconciliation bill that has not been generated by one of its 
committees,26 this difference in the treatment of amendments between the committee-initiated 
approach and the motion to recommit tactic does have consequences for the model outlined 
below.  If a committee has been named in the instructions and does not report out a reconciliation 
proposal, I assume that a reconciliation bill in that committee’s jurisdiction is considered on the 
floor under an open rule.  While the results suggest that this difference in the treatment of 
amendments does not appear to have consequences for which committees are named, it remains 
a sufficiently important feature of the procedures that I incorporate it into the model. 
 Game play proceeds as follows, as depicted in Figure 4.1.  The notation used is 
summarized in Table 4.2.  The game has two parts, or phases.  The reconciliation phase appears 
in the left panel of Figure 1.  The first move is made by L, who chooses whether or not to 
introduce a budget resolution (b) that contains reconciliation instructions directing the committee 
(c) to report out a reconciliation bill.  If L introduces such a resolution, the floor considers that 
resolution with a simple majority voting rule.  If the floor passes b, then c chooses whether or not 
to comply with its directives.  If c reports out a reconciliation bill, r(p), L chooses whether or not 
to schedule it on the floor.  If L schedules r(p), the Senate chooses whether or not to pass r(p) 
                                                     
25 Andrew Ellis, Majority Counsel, Senate Committee on the Budget, to Steve Bell, Majority Staff Director, Senate 
Committee on the Budget, and Robert Fulton, Chief Majority Counsel, Senate Committee on the Budget, June 1, 
1981; Box No. 7; Senate Budget Committee Republicans, Constitutional Convention, Beilenson’s Budget Act 
Reconciliation 1981-82; Records of the United States Senate, 98th Congress, Record Group 46; National Archives 
Building, Washington, DC. 
26 In the case of the former, in three instances since 1989 (the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in 
1989 and the Finance and Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committees in 2009) have Senate committees 
ignored reconciliation directives in such a way that would have clearly allowed the Senate floor to use the motion to 
recommit approach.  In 1996, a number of committees did not report out reconciliation proposals, but the Senate had 
enacted a full reconciliation bill before the deadline provided to those committees.  Because the deadline provided in 
the instructions must have elapsed before a committee can be considered out of compliance, the motion to recommit 
approach could not have been used to incorporate proposals regarding those committees’ programs in the July 1996 
reconciliation bill (Lynch 2013).  In that year, the Republican leadership intended to handle multiple reconciliation 
bills (CQ Almanac 1996a), but it is unclear if such a move would have been permitted by the Parliamentarian 
(Heniff 2010b).  In the case of the latter, meanwhile, only once has the Senate actually considered a reconciliation 
bill not generated by one of its committees.  The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 was 
generated by House committees.  During debate over the measure, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-
KY) inquired as to whether “this [was] the first time in history the Senate will consider a reconciliation even though 
no Senate committee has reported a bill to the Senate?”  In his capacity as Acting President Pro Tempore, Senator 
Tom Udall (D-NM) replied, “It is the first time that the Chair is aware of it.” See 156 Congressional Record S1821. 
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using a simple majority voting rule.  If the Senate passes r(p), the game ends, with policy being 
moved from Q to r(p). 
 If c has been named in the reconciliation instructions but elects not to comply with that 
directive, then L has the option of using the motion to recommit approach to introduce its own 
reconciliation proposal, r(o).  If L introduces r(o), then the Senate chooses whether or not to pass 
r(o) using a simple majority voting rule.  If the Senate passes r(o), the game ends and policy 
moves from Q to r(o). 
 There is a separate phase of the game, the regular order phase, in which the Senate may 
consider a measure, o, under regular order; this phase is triggered if any of the following occur: 
 
1. L has chosen not to draft b OR 
2. The Senate chooses not to pass b OR 
3. c chooses not to report out r(p) AND L chooses not to introduce r(o) OR 
4. c reports r(p) but L does not schedule it OR 
5. L introduces r(o) but the Senate does not pass r(o). 
 
Under any of these scenarios, F chooses whether or not to filibuster the proposal.  If F filibusters 
the proposal, the game ends with policy remaining at Q.  If F does not filibuster the proposal, 
policy is shifted to the proposal’s location and the game ends. 
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Table 4.2: Model Notation 
 
L: Senate Majority Leader/median member of the Senate majority party; l: Majority Leader’s 
ideal point 
C: Median member of Senate committee; t: committee’s ideal point; c: Senate committee 
M: Floor median in the Senate; m: floor median’s ideal point 
F: Filibuster pivot; f: filibuster pivot’s ideal point 
Q: status quo policy 
Q*: policy outcome at the conclusion of the game 
b: Budget resolution 
r(p): Reconciliation proposal generated by c 
r(o): Reconciliation proposal generated by L via a motion to recommit 
o: Bill considered under regular order 
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Figure 4.1: Model Extended Form 
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Given the sequential nature of the game, I solve it using subgame perfection.  The full 
solution to the game is presented in the Appendix.  Here, I provide the basic intuition of the 
model and sketch out the circumstances under which we should expect to observe two different 
procedural conditions: first, when we should see a committee named in the reconciliation 
instructions and second, when we should anticipate a committee that has been named in the 
instructions responding to that directive by reporting out a reconciliation bill. 
First, it is helpful to establish what outcomes we would expect under regular order in the 
presence of a gatekeeper (L, the majority leader) and the option of a filibuster.  The outcome of 
the regular order phase of the game is displayed in Figure 4.2.  In the panel on the left (Case 1), 
L < 2M – F, while in the panel on the right (Case 2), L > 2M – F.  In practice, which case is 
observed depends on both the size of the majority party coalition, as well as the distribution of 
actors through the policy space.  In both Case 1 and Case 2, the ultimate policy outcome is the 
same for all values of Q > 2M – F.  Values 2M – F < Q < F comprise the familiar gridlock 
interval.  When Q > F, meanwhile, L will always introduce o, knowing that it will be amended to 
either M or as close to M as F will allow; L is better off with these outcomes, since they are 
closer to his ideal point. 
The difference between the two cases occurs for values Q < 2M – F.  In Case 1, for many 
of these status quo points (2L – M < Q < 2M – F), L exercises his gatekeeping power.  If L were 
to introduce o, it would be amended (under the open rule) away from L’s ideal point.  For very 
extreme values of Q (Q < 2L – M), the eventual outcome at M makes L better off than he is 
under Q, so he is willing to introduce o. 
In Case 2, meanwhile, L will always introduce o, since the ultimate policy outcome will 
bring policy closer to L’s ideal point.  The constraint here, however, is 2M – F; since any change 
to Q requires 60 votes, o can only be amended such that the actor at 2M – F is indifferent 
between Q and o.  Finally, for extreme values of Q (Q < 3M – 2F), all pivotal actors will accept 
policy at M.  
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Figure 4.2: Outcomes Under Regular Order 
 
 
Given these two cases, we can now compare these regular order outcomes to those 
achievable if c is named in the reconciliation instructions.  We should observe committees being 
named when the pivotal actors for that decision—L, due to his unique proposal power, and M, 
because of the simple majority voting rule—are made better off by a reconciliation bill reported 
out by c than by a measure handled under regular order changing the same status quo.  Because 
c’s decision rule for reporting a bill is majority rule, C is the pivotal actor for that decision.  F’s 
preferences are relevant only for the comparison version of the legislation that would be 
generated under regular order, since he cannot filibuster either the budget resolution naming c or 
the reconciliation measure itself. 
To provide this overview of the results, it is helpful to first define three “regimes,” each 
capturing the location of C relative to L, M, and F.  First, if C < L < M < F—that is, if the 
median member of the committee is more liberal than all three other actors—I denote it as the 
Extreme Regime.  Second, I refer to committees whose medians are located between the majority 
party median and the floor median (L < C < M < F) as being in the Typical Regime.  Finally, I 
designate L < M < C < F as the Centrist Regime.27  Each of these regimes is displayed visually in 
Figure 4.3. 
                                                     
27 In the presence of an extremely large majority coalition, it is possible for L < M < F < C.  Because this condition 
is not observed in any of the Congresses under study here, I do not consider that possibility here. 
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Figure 4.3: Committee Regimes 
 
Extreme Regime 
 
 
Typical Regime 
 
 
Centrist Regime 
 
 
 For each regime, we will compare the outcomes under reconciliation to those under each 
case of regular order; in each case, the solid black line will indicate the outcome under regular 
order and the grey dotted line will indicate the outcome under reconciliation.  In text, I illustrate 
the basic logic of the model assuming that L < 2M – F (Case 1 above); in the period of time 
under study, the committee-year observations are spread roughly evenly across the two cases.  
Equivalent figures for Case 2 appear in the Appendix. 
We begin in Figure 4.4 with the Extreme Regime.  There are two regions of status quo 
points where the reconciliation-pivotal actors (C, L, and M) are at least no worse off under 
reconciliation than under regular order; these regions are shaded.  The first of these is bounded 
on the left by 2L – M.  For values of Q < 2L – M, while L and C are better off under 
reconciliation, M is not.  This is because, for very extreme status quo points under regular order, 
L will not exercise his gatekeeping power, since the final outcome under an open rule makes him 
better off than Q.  Because M is better off under regular order, he will not approve b, and we will 
not observe instructions. 
 For values 2L – M ≤ Q < C, however, L would avoid introducing o under regular order 
because the open rule that would govern the bill would allow M to amend the measure all the 
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way to his ideal point, making L worse off.  Under reconciliation, however, r(p) is protected by a 
closed rule.  C is able to introduce r(p) that sets policy at C’s ideal point; such a policy makes 
both L and M better off than remaining at Q, so L will name C and M will support a version of b 
that includes the committee.  The size of this region, moreover, will decrease as C becomes more 
extreme. 
We should also expect to observe the committee being named for some moderate values 
of Q—i.e. when M < Q < F.  For these values of Q, any proposal that will bring policy closer to 
C’s ideal point will also make L better off, so he would always schedule the committee’s bill, 
r(p).  To get M’s support for r(p), however, M must be at least as happy with r(p) as he would be 
with o, the regular order alternative, or Q.  The best C can do, then, is to introduce an r(p) that 
makes M indifferent between r(p) and Q AND between r(p) and o.  Because M knows that C’s 
eventual version of r(p) will be positioned to ensure M’s support, M will approve b naming the 
committee in the previous step of the game.  L, meanwhile, will include c in b’s instructions, 
since he is made better off by the ultimate policy outcome achieved using reconciliation—an 
outcome that makes C and L strictly better off, and M no worse off than either o or Q. 
For values of Q between L and M, meanwhile, the outcome achieved under regular order 
and reconciliation is the same: gridlock.  Even under the reconciliation rules, C could not get 
majority support for a version of r(p) that also moves policy closer to C’s ideal point.  L would 
schedule such a measure, but M would not support it on the floor.  At the same time, any version 
of o that L would introduce would meet a similar fate; any proposal that makes L better off 
makes M and F worse off, preventing its enactment.  Because the ultimate policy outcome is the 
same under both sets of procedures, L will be indifferent to including c in b’s instructions, and M 
will be indifferent to approving that version of b. 
Finally, for extreme right values of Q (that is, Q > F), M will actively oppose including c 
in the instructions because it will generate a final policy outcome that makes M worse off than 
using regular order to enact o.  This result is driven by the fact that r(p) is protected by a closed 
rule.  C is able to draft a version of r(p) that L will schedule and that M will pass on the floor 
because they prefer it to Q.  If, however, M could amend the proposal on the floor—as he can 
when regular order is used—M would be able to bring policy much closer to his own ideal point.  
M, then, will not pass a version of b that includes instructions to c, since doing so locks him into 
an eventual policy outcome that is less preferred than the one achievable using the regular rules.  
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While L still prefers to include c in the instructions, he knows that doing so will lead M to 
oppose b and thus avoids doing so. 
  
Figure 4.4: Regular Order vs. Reconciliation, Extreme Regime, Case 1 
 
Next, let us consider the Typical Regime, when L < C < M < F, in Figure 4.5.   Again, 
there are two regions in which the range of status quo points makes the reconciliation-pivotal 
actors no worse off under reconciliation than under regular order: in the extreme left of the 
policy space, and in the middle of the policy space.  As in the Extreme Regime, the farther left of 
these areas is generated by the fact that there are values of Q for which L chooses to exercise his 
gatekeeping rights; if L introduces o, M can take advantage of the open rule to amend it all the 
way to his own ideal point.  Under reconciliation, however, L’s ability to decide whether or not 
to schedule r(p) once the committee has produced it means the committee must accommodate 
L’s preferences.  Thus, if named, the committee will generate a version of r(p) that gets as close 
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as possible to C’s ideal point without making L strictly worse off.  All such versions of r(p) will 
make M better off, so M will support naming the committee in b.   
In the middle of the policy space, the left bound of the region in which we should observe 
the committee being named is still at M, but the right bound may now be beyond F, farther to the 
right than in the Extreme Regime.  Specifically, if C is closer to M than M is to F, the right 
bound is at 2F – 2M + C; this arrangement is depicted in Figure 4.5.  If M is closer to F than C is 
to M, however, the right bound is at F.  This range of moderate values of the status quo under 
which we should observe the committee being named will increase, moreover, as C gets closer to 
M; put differently, the more similar C and M’s preferences are, the more M will benefit from the 
committee’s proposal coming to the floor under a closed rule. 
For all other values of Q, the end result is the same under the Extreme and Typical 
Regimes.  When L < Q < M, we again observe gridlock and indifference towards naming the 
committee.  Under regular order, this stalemate is caused by the fact that there is no policy 
change preferred by pivotal actors L and F.  Under reconciliation, meanwhile, there are two 
possible sources of that stalemate.  If L < Q < C, L is the pivotal actor preventing policy change 
under reconciliation; any change that C and M would prefer makes L worse off.  When C < Q < 
M, on the other hand, there are changes that C and L would prefer, but these make M worse off.   
Finally, if Q is on the right extreme of the policy spectrum, M is able to bring policy closer to his 
ideal point under regular order than under reconciliation, and thus he does not support naming 
the committee in b. 
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Figure 4.5: Regular Order vs. Reconciliation, Typical Regime, Case 1 
 
 
 
 Finally, let us consider the Centrist Regime, presented in Figure 4.6 and where M < C < 
F.  Just as in the other two regimes, there are two ranges of values of Q that should generate a 
committee being named in the instructions.  The first of these is on the extreme left-hand side of 
the policy space, and is identical to the equivalent area in the Centrist Regime in that its right 
bound is L.  In the middle of the policy space, meanwhile, the left bound of the inclusion region 
is now C, rather than M, and the right bound is 2F – C.  There are now fewer values of Q for 
which C’s ideal point—which he can achieve under reconciliation—is closer to M’s ideal point 
than the outcome obtainable under regular order.  As C gets farther away from M in this regime, 
moreover, the region in which M is willing to name the committee because doing so will make 
him at least no worse off gets smaller as well.  In the extreme case of C = F, for example, M 
would never strictly prefer to name the committee.  For values Q < F in this situation, gridlock 
occurs regardless of the rules used, and for values Q > F, M is better off under regular order.  For 
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all other values of Q (i.e., L < Q < C or Q > 2F – C), the committee will not be named, under the 
same basic logic as in the other two regimes. 
 
Figure 4.6: Regular Order vs. Reconciliation, Centrist Regime, Case 1 
 
 In each of these three cases, we observe both of our fundamental claims about 
majoritarian exceptions at work.  First, we see that the procedures are used to produce policy 
changes that we would not observe under the chamber’s regular rules.  In each regime, there are 
status quo points that fall in the gridlock interval under regular order on which action is possible 
using the reconciliation rules.  Second, we observe the reconciliation procedures being used in a 
way that benefits the majority party.  More specifically, committees are named in the instructions 
only when the preferences of the panel and of the majority party are similar enough that a 
majority of the majority party also favors the change advocated by the committee.  Put 
differently, because committee proposals are privileged by the procedures, the majority leader 
will only initiate the process if the ultimate policy outcome is to the benefit of his party.  In 
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addition, because the floor median has input into the content of the instructions—since a simple 
majority must approve the budget resolution—there are some situations where the majority 
leader is limited in his ability to leverage the procedures to his full advantage.   
The results in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 leverage comparisons between the final policy 
outcomes obtainable under regular order and under reconciliation when the committee responds 
to the directive to ascertain when we should observe committees being included in the 
reconciliation instructions.  Recall, however, that the instructions are not binding on a 
committee; a panel cannot be forced to report out a reconciliation proposal.  If it fails to do so, 
however, the majority leader has the right to use a motion to recommit to bring his own proposal 
covering the committee’s programs to the floor under an open rule.   
Does this contingency ever incentivize a named committee to ignore its directives?  In 
short, no.  Figure 4.7 displays the final policy outcome is named but does not respond to the 
instructions, as well as the outcomes if the committee follows its directive in each regime.28  The 
solid line represents the final outcome if the committee ignores its directive, while C indicates an 
Extreme Committee, C′ denotes a Typical Committee, and C′′ represents a Centrist Committee.  
Note first that, when the committee ignores its instructions, the outcome does not vary based on 
the location of the committee.  In the event that the committee ignores its directive, M is 
empowered by a combination of the simple majority voting rule and the possibility of unlimited 
amendments, constrained only by L’s unique proposal rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
28 Because r(o) cannot be filibustered, the outcomes in Figure 4.7 do not depend on whether we are in Case 1 or 
Case 2. 
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Figure 4.7: Policy Outcome if Committee Ignores Instructions 
 
If the committee ignores its instructions, L is faced first with the decision of whether to 
introduce r(o).  Importantly, because r(o) is considered under an open rule, it can be amended.  
The outcomes are not, however, identical to those under regular order, since r(o) cannot be 
filibustered.  If Q < 2L – M, L would introduce r(o), because he is at least as well off with an 
ultimate policy outcome at M as he is with Q.  In each regime, however, the committee is made 
worse off by this final outcome than it would be if it had responded to the instructions.   
When 2L – M < Q < L, meanwhile, gridlock ensues if c ignores its directive.  L will 
exercise his gatekeeping rights over r(o), since any proposal he introduced would be amended 
away from his ideal point by M.  The committee, then, has an incentive to report out a 
reconciliation proposal.  In the Typical and Centrist regimes, reporting rather than ignoring 
makes the committee strictly better off for the entire interval [2L – M, L].  For the Centrist 
Regime, c is strictly better off in the interval [2L – M, C] and no worse off in [C, L].  Gridlock 
also results, regardless of c’s decision, if L < Q < M. 
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For extreme status quo points on the other side of the policy space (Q > 2F – M), 
meanwhile, if the committee disregards its instructions, the ultimate policy outcome is again the 
same if L introduces r(o) or o: policy is set at M.  In either case, L prefers the outcome 
achievable under the relevant rules to Q.  If, however, C does not ignore the directive, he is able 
to introduce a version of r(p) that brings policy either all the way to his own ideal point (see 
Figures 4 and 5) or to the point at which L is indifferent between r(p) and Q.  While C will not be 
named in equilibrium for these values of Q, if off-the-equilibrium-path behavior produces 
instructions, it is in his interest to respond to them. 
Finally, then, we must consider whether C will ever ignore its instructions when M < Q < 
2F – M.  As Figure 4.6 shows, if C does not comply for status quos in this range, policy will end 
up at M; L will introduce r(o), and M will amend that proposal to his own ideal point.  
Compliance by the committee, however, always produces an outcome that C prefers to policy at 
M.  When M < Q < 2F – M, the committee is able to set policy either at C’s ideal point or as 
close to C’s ideal point as makes another relevant pivotal actor indifferent.  In the Extreme 
Regime, this additional actor is L, and in the Typical and Centrist Regimes, it is M.  The 
committee, then, is never better off ignoring the instructions and allowing L to develop his own 
reconciliation proposal that is introduced using a motion to recommit. 
In sum, the model outlined above suggests that we should observe committees being 
named in the reconciliation instructions when the status quo in a policy area is in one of 
‘instruction zones.’  In both these zones, all reconciliation pivotal actors are made no worse off 
by using the procedures to enact policy change.29  The first (Zone 1) is when the status quo is 
more extreme on the same side of the policy space than the median member of the majority party 
(here, the left side), but not so extreme that the floor median would be able to amend a proposal 
all the way to its ideal point under regular order.  The second (Zone 2) is when the status quo is 
moderate, with the exact bounds of the region varying slightly depending on which regime 
characterizes the arrangement of the committee, majority party, and floor medians.   
 The model does not only, however, yield predictions that depend on measuring the 
precise location of the status quo.  Assuming a uniform distribution of status quo points (Chiou 
and Rothenberg 2003; Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith 2006; Jenkins and Monroe 2012), as 
                                                     
29 Technically, this is also true for the gridlock zone in the middle of the policy space ([min(L,C), M]).  Given that 
agenda space is a scarce resource, I assume that Congress will not go through the trouble of creating reconciliation 
instructions that would be of no consequence. 
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each zone gets larger, the number of current policies that fall within the zone should increase.  
The likelihood that a committee is named in the instructions, then, should also get larger.30  We 
can define the zones as follows: 
  
Table 4.3: Instruction Zones, by Regime 
 
 Zone 1 (Extreme) Zone 2 (Center) 
Extreme    
Case 1 [2L - M, C] [M, F] 
Case 2   
if C < 2M – F [∅] [M, F] 
if C > 2M – F [4M – 2F – C, C] [M, 2F – 2M + C] 
   
Typical   
Case 1   
if |C – M| < |M – F| [2L – M, L] [M, 2F – 2M + C] 
if |C – M| > |M – F| [2L - M, L] [M, F] 
Case 2   
if |C – L| < |(2M – F) – L| & |C – M| < |M – 
F| 
[4M – 2F – 2L + C, L] [M, 2F – 2M + C] 
if |C – L| < |(2M – F) – L| & |C – M| > |M – 
F| 
[4M – 2F – 2L + C, L] [M, F] 
if |C – L| > |(2M – F) – L| & |C – M| < |M – 
F| 
[2M – F, L] [M, 2F – 2M + C] 
if |C – L| > |(2M – F) – L| & |C – M| > |M – 
F| 
[2M – F, L] [M, F] 
   
Centrist   
                                                     
30 This approach to testing the predictions of a spatial model follows that taken by Primo, Binder, and Maltzman 
(2008). 
169 
 
 
Case 1 [2L - M, L] [C, 2F – C] 
Case 2   
if |C – L| < |(2M – F) – L| [4M – 2F – 2L + C, L] [C, 2F – C] 
if |C – L| > |(2M – F) – L| [2M – F, L] [C, 2F – C] 
  
We can also summarize the predictions in the form of hypotheses: 
 
Zone 1 Hypothesis: As the size of Zone 1 (in the extreme of the policy space) increases, the 
probability that a committee is named in the reconciliation instructions also increases. 
 
Zone 2 Hypothesis:  As the size of Zone 2 (in the center of the policy space) increases, the 
probability that a committee is named in the reconciliation instructions also increases. 
 
Testing the Model’s Predictions Empirically 
 
Using these definitions of the instructions zones, we can test the model’s predictions 
empirically.  For some zones in some regimes, the boundaries do not vary within a given year; 
for example, in the Typical and Centrist regimes, the right boundary of Zone 1 is always the 
median member of the majority party and is thus constant across committees.  For other zone-
regime pairs, however, the boundaries are determined in part by the location of the committee 
and there is substantial within-year variation.  Occasionally, for example, the floor median and 
the median member of a given committee are identical.  At other points, however, they are quite 
far apart.  The maximum observed distance on the DW-NOMINATE scale between a committee 
median and the floor median is 0.26 (the Senate Banking Committee in 2001); this represents 
about one-eighth of the possible range of the variable.  In all, the average distance between the 
median members of a committee and the floor is 0.07, with a standard deviation of 0.06.   
To determine which Senate committees were named in the reconciliation instructions in 
each year, I reviewed each final budget resolution enacted by Congress between 1980 and 
2012.31  A committee was coded 1 if it was mentioned in the instructions, and zero otherwise; 
                                                     
31 For full citations for each budget resolution, see Heniff 2014.  For a full list of which committees were named in 
which years, see Appendix Table A4.1. 
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this represents the dependent variable in the analysis.  The zero cases can be divided into three 
groups.  The first are committees that were left out of the instructions in years in which some 
other committees were named.  The second arises in years in which Congress successfully passes 
a budget resolution, but chooses not to name any committees in the instructions.  The final group 
consists of committees in years in which Congress fails to enact a budget resolution entirely.   
This heterogeneity among the zero cases has implications for our estimation strategy.  If 
we ignore the difference between zeroes generated because Congress fails to pass a budget 
resolution and those that result from the choice not to include committees in an otherwise 
successful budget resolution, our results may be biased.  To address this issue, I estimate a 
Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979) where the first stage predicts whether or not 
Congress passes a budget resolution in a given year.  Conditional, then, on a successful budget 
resolution, the second stage models which committees are named in that measure’s reconciliation 
instructions.32   
To predict the probability of a budget resolution, I first control for the general budgetary 
environment (Binder 2003), as measured by the budget deficit in the previous calendar year 
(Howell and Jackman 2013).33  Next, because the Senate does not operate in a vacuum in 
constructing the budget resolution, I include separate measures accounting for the preferences of 
the House and the president.  Previous work has found that Congress has more difficulty passing 
a budget resolution when there are substantial bicameral differences in preferences, as well as 
when Congress and the executive branch are controlled by different parties (Binder 2003; 
LeLoup 2005).   In the case of the House, because both legislative chambers must agree on a 
resolution for it to take effect, we would expect fewer budget resolutions when the House and 
Senate’s preferences diverge; to account for this, I control for whether the House and Senate are 
controlled by the same party. 
In the case of the president, meanwhile, it may be the case, as Binder (2003) argues, that 
when the congressional majority and the White House share partisanship, they have a shared 
interested in demonstrating their capacity for effective budgeting.  The president, then, may 
                                                     
32 The zero observations in the second stage include both non-named committees in years where some committees 
were named AND all committees in years in which the resolution contained no instructions at all.  
33 The budget deficit is measured as the total surplus or deficit over total federal outlays, as measured in constant 
2009 dollars.  See “Table 1.1: Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits: 1789-2017,” Fiscal Year 
2015 Historical Tables, Budget of the U.S. Government (Washington, D.C.: Office of Management and Budget, 
2014). 
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become more involved behind the scenes in working for the resolution’s passage.  At the same 
time, when the president and the Senate majority are not co-partisans, the budget resolution may 
be a particularly attractive vehicle in which senators can achieve political goals because it does 
not require the executive’s signature.   
Dynamics within the Senate may also affect the probability that a budget resolution is 
adopted.  As a result, I include a variable measuring congressional polarization, defined as the 
difference between the 1st-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores of the median members of the 
Senate majority and minority parties (e.g. Schickler 2000; Brady and Han 2007).34  Previous 
work has also suggested that polarization has affected Congress’s ability to budget effectively, 
increasing the amount of delay in the passage of appropriations bills (Klarner, Phillips, and 
Muckler 2012) and affecting the internal dynamics of the Senate Budget Committee in ways that 
have made it more difficult for the panel to successfully generate a proposal (Bafumi 2012).  In 
addition, I control for the extremity of the median member of the Budget Committee (as 
measured by the absolute value of his DW-NOMINATE score).  This choice may seem puzzling, 
given that in the model, I assume that the Budget Committee acts as a perfect agent of the 
majority leader.  At the same time, the extremity of the committee may affect the efficiency with 
which the process operates; even if a more extreme committee eventually conforms to the 
preferences of the median member of the majority party, the delay introduced in the negotiating 
process may affect the overall probability that a resolution is ultimately produced.  In addition, 
while null results for this measure in the empirical specification would not confirm our choice to 
model the Budget Committee as agent of the majority leader, statistically significant effects 
might cause us to revisit that choice. 
The second stage of the selection model, then, tests the predictions from the model.  The 
dependent variable in this stage takes on a value of 1 if a committee is named in the 
reconciliation instructions and 0 otherwise.  For the independent variables, I use 1st-dimension 
DW-NOMINATE scores, to define, for each committee-year pair, the two reconciliation zones 
                                                     
34 For all NOMINATE-based variables that measure only Senate preferences, I prefer DW-NOMINATE to the 
Common Space scores because the former allows for change over time in the ideal points of individual members. 
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described in Table 4.3 above.35  Per the Zone 1 and Zone 2 Hypotheses, as the interval gets 
larger, so should the probability of a committee being named in the reconciliation instructions.36   
In the second stage, I also control for two additional factors that are likely to affect the 
probability that a committee is included in the instructions.  First, we would anticipate that, in 
addition to influencing the decision to pass a budget resolution, the size of the budget deficit 
would also play a role in the drafting of the instructions.  As the budget deficit grows, so should 
the pressure to reduce spending and, as a result, the probability that any given committee is 
included in the instructions.  Second, I control for the logged size of a committee’s mandatory 
portfolio in the previous year (as measured in constant 2009 dollars).  We would expect that, in 
pursuit of deficit reduction, the instruction writers might be particularly attracted to committees 
with much larger mandatory portfolios; these committees have more programmatic levers to pull 
in pursuit of their budgetary goals.  The process by which I determine the size of the committee’s 
mandatory portfolio is described in detail in Chapter 5, but for the purposes of this analysis, it is 
worth noting that underlying expenditure data comes from the Census Bureau’s Consolidated 
Federal Funds Report.  That data are available from 1983 to 2010, limiting my analysis here to 
years between 1984 and 2011.  Thus, the analysis below has 308 committee-year observations.   
The model is estimated as two separate probit equations using Stata’s heckprobit 
command.  The parameter estimates from the first stage are used to calculate an additional 
regressor (known as the inverse Mills ratio) that is included in the second stage.37  The results of 
                                                     
35 I exclude from the analysis the Senate Budget Committee, which has no programmatic jurisdiction, and the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, since only mandatory, and not discretionary, programs can be changed through the 
reconciliation process.  In addition, I exclude three committees for which I lack reliable committee-level spending 
data for much of the time series: Rules, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services.  The source of this data limitation is 
described in detail in Chapter 5. 
36 The intervals in Table 4.3 rely, in many cases, on indifference points that are a function of the relative distance 
between two or more actors.  Measuring the size of the intervals by combining ideal point estimates and the 
expressions listed in Table 3 assumes that a legislator is actually located at that indifference point.  Because 
legislators are not evenly distributed across the policy space, this assumption may not be true in practice.  I address 
this concern in two ways.  First, controlling for polarization in the first stage accounts for the underlying distribution 
of member preferences.  Second, in Appendix Table A4.2, I take advantage that one of the indifference points (2M – 
F) can be measured more directly by using the filibuster pivot on the same side of the policy space as the majority 
median.  The empirical results are robust to this substitution. 
37 While Stata corrects for several issues related to the calculation of standard errors in selection models 
automatically, we might also be concerned about clustering, since the data are grouped both within years and across 
committees.  Unfortunately, guidance on how to cluster in two stage models is limited in the applied econometrics 
literature.  Karaca-Mandic and Train (2003) suggest clustering on first-stage observations, while Kuksov and Villas-
Boas (2008) recommend clustering on second-stage observations.  Appendix Table A4.3 includes estimations that 
cluster on the first stage (years) and second stage (committees), which are largely similar to the results that appear in 
Table 4.4 
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this estimation appear in Table 4.4, with the first stage results (predicting passage of the budget 
resolution) in the lower panel and the second stage results (predicting the naming of a committee 
in the instructions) in the upper panel.  First, it is worth noting that the chi-squared statistic for a 
likelihood-ratio test of whether the errors are correlated across the two stages is 14.86, which 
carries a p-value of 0.0001; this suggests that our choice of a selection model is appropriate for 
the dynamics in the data. 
While our theoretical interest is in the second stage results, it is worth noting that several 
of the first stage results behave as expected.  As intra-congressional preferences diverge, the 
probability of a budget resolution decreases, as reflected in the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on the variable measuring whether the House and Senate are controlled by 
the same party.  In terms of co-partisanship with the president, the effect of divided executive 
branch-Senate control on the probability of enacting a budget resolution is positive and 
marginally statistically significant (p=0.011).  Previous work that has suggested that budget 
resolutions are more difficult to enact when the president and Congress are controlled by 
opposite parties has generally covered an earlier time period than the one under study here.  This 
result, then, suggests that perhaps, in more recent years, the budget resolution has become an 
important way for the president and Congress to go on record with their respective partisan 
priorities (Garrett 2000; LeLoup 2005). 
Within the chamber, meanwhile, higher levels of polarization also mean a budget 
resolution is less likely to be enacted; despite the fact that the resolution itself cannot be 
filibustered, it is possible that larger partisan divides affect the overall legislative environment.  
Finally, the results do not provide evidence of a relationship between either the extremity of the 
Budget Committee or the deficit and the adoption of the budget resolution.  In the case of the 
Budget Committee, this result is unsurprising, since we expect the committee to act as an agent 
of the majority leader, leaving little room for its own preferences in the process. 
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Table 4.4: Probability of Committee Inclusion in Reconciliation Instructions, 1984-2011 
 
Instructions Stage   
Deficitt-1 -4.566*** 
 (0.837) 
Zone 1 Size 1.206* 
 (0.723) 
Zone 2 Size 0.875** 
 (0.432) 
Total Committee Mandatory Spendingt-1 0.060*** 
 (0.012) 
Constant -2.524*** 
 (0.401) 
  
Observations 242 
Budget Resolution Stage  
Deficitt-1 0.044 
 (0.820) 
Divided Control, House-Senate -1.707*** 
 (0.368) 
Divided Control, Senate-President 0.220 
 (0.137) 
Polarization -15.672*** 
 (3.130) 
Budget Committee Median 0.226 
 (1.858) 
Constant 12.463*** 
 (2.075) 
  
Observations 308 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Chi-Square, LR Test of Independent Equations: 14.86 (p=.0001) 
Log likelihood: -243.833 
 
 In the top panel of Table 4.4, then, are the results for the test of the model’s predictions.  
In the case of both the Zone 1 and Zone 2 Hypotheses, we see the expected relationship between 
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the size of the reconciliation zone and the probability that a committee is included in the 
instructions in a given year.  As the region in which the majority party is better off under the 
reconciliation procedures grows, so does the likelihood that a committee is named.  Figures 4.8 
and 4.9 illustrate the size of this effect visually.  The x-axis in each figure runs from the 
minimum size of the relevant Zone to the maximum, while the y-axis indicates the predicted 
probability that a committee is included, conditional on observing a budget resolution and 
holding other second-stage explanatory variables at their means.  In Figure 4.8, the minimum 
size of Zone 1 (0) corresponds to the most extreme committee median in the dataset (-0.377, for 
the HELP Committee in 1989); the extremity of this committee, relative to the other actors, 
meant there was no region in the extreme of the policy space for which reconciliation was Pareto 
optimal for all reconciliation pivotal actors.  The maximum value of Zone 1 (0.595), meanwhile, 
is associated with the Judiciary Committee in 2011, thanks to a very large distance between the 
floor median and the filibuster pivot.  When Zone 1 is at its smallest, the predicted probability of 
a committee being included in the instructions is roughly 30 percent.  By comparison, the 
likelihood doubles—to approximately 61 percent—when Zone 1 is at its largest. 
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Figure 4.8: Probability of Inclusion in Reconciliation Instructions, by Zone 1 Size 
 
 
We see similar results in Figure 4.9, which displays the predicted probability of inclusion 
by Zone 2 size.  The minimum size of Zone 2 (0.052) occurred for the Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee in 1994, which features the most centrist committee median in the period 
under study.38  Zone 2 is at is largest, meanwhile, in 2011, when nine of the eleven committees 
analyzed have observations between 0.9 and 1 because of the relative extremity of the filibuster 
pivot.  Here, we see that moving the from the minimum observed value to the maximum 
observed value again nearly triples the predicted probability of inclusion, conditional on a budget 
resolution, from 23 percent to 60 percent. 
 
                                                     
38 The senator associated with this ideal point was Richard Shelby of Alabama.  The 103rd Congress was Shelby’s 
final term in the Democratic Party. 
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Figure 4.9: Probability of Inclusion in Reconciliation Instructions, by Zone 2 Size 
In addition, the two control variables included in the second stage also behave as expected.  As 
the deficit gets smaller and eventually becomes a surplus, each committee is less likely to be 
named.  This is consistent with reconciliation’s underlying purpose as a deficit reduction tool; 
the smaller the deficit, the less need on the part of Congress to cut it.  In addition, committees 
with larger mandatory portfolios, and thus more programmatic levers to pull, are also more likely 
to be named.  Exactly how those programmatic levers are pulled—and to whose advantage—is 
taken up in the next chapter, but in sum, we find results consistent with the model’s testable 
implications.  When the size of the regions in which the majority party can benefit from using 
reconciliation increases, so does the probability that a committee is included in the reconciliation 
instructions. 
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Additional Insights from the Theoretical Model  
 
While the results in Table 4.4 are encouraging for the model’s account of how 
reconciliation can benefit the majority party, a large-N empirical test can only tell part of our 
story.  The difficulty in measuring the status quo, however, prevents us from systematically 
testing any hypotheses regarding the naming of committees based on the current policy location.  
Here, I present two cases that illustrate how, when we can reasonably approximate the location 
of the status quo, we observe behavior that is consistent with the model’s predictions, even if it 
might appear puzzling at first. 
 The inability to locate the status quo systematically is not, however, the only limitation of 
the model.  Like all models, it represents a stylized version of reality and does not capture 
various nuances of the process.  In a final case study, I introduce an additional possible 
dynamic—that there may be costs to using reconciliation—and discuss how other features of the 
reconciliation process might help us understand one of the most prominent uses of reconciliation 
in recent history to achieve the majority party’s goals: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010. 
 
Wither Cap-and-Trade: The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, 2009 
 
 At the start of the 111th Congress in January 2009, the Democratic Party found itself in a 
situation not seen since 1995: unified control of the House of Representatives, the Senate, and 
the presidency.  The 58 seats they held in the Senate was the largest majority held by either party 
since 1980, which, combined with a new president’s governing mandate, put them in an 
unusually strong position to enact policy change in several priority areas, including health care, 
education, tax reform, and the environment. 
 The fate of several of these legislative goals quickly became tied up with the 
congressional budget process when Congressional Democrats began drafting their budget 
resolution for Fiscal Year 2010.  While the president lacks a formal mechanism to influence the 
congressional budget resolution—it does not require the executive’s signature—the majority 
leadership in both chambers found itself under substantial pressure from the White House to 
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draft reconciliation instructions that would allow for the use of the procedures to enact health 
care reform, changes to federal student loan programs, and a new cap-and-trade initiative to 
address climate change.  The House Budget Committee responded to the president’s request in-
kind, instructing the House Energy and Commerce and Ways and Means Committees to generate 
a proposal to enact “health care reform” and the House Education and Labor Committee to do 
the same for a plan to “investing in education.”39 
 In the Senate, meanwhile, the initial budget resolution reported out by Budget Committee 
contained no reconciliation instructions, but Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) 
remained committed to “exploring all options” (Harwood 2009) during the chamber’s 
consideration of the measure.  Indeed, the final compromise of the budget resolution passed by 
both chambers included instructions to both the Senate Finance and Health, Education, and 
Labor Committees, allowing for the eventual use of the rules to enact major policy change in 
those two high-profile areas (Hulse 2009b).   
Cap-and-trade, however, was a different matter.  Reid, having stated publicly when asked 
about the prospect of using reconciliation to enact such legislation that “I love 51 compared to 
60” (Samuelsohn and Ling 2009), was clearly open to the idea.  Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA), 
chair of the Senate committee that would have needed to be named in the instructions to make 
cap-and-trade reconciliation-eligible (the Environment and Public Works Committees), was 
openly in favor of the plan.  When it became clear, however, that a straight inclusion of the 
committee in the instructions was unlikely to clear the Senate floor, she partnered with the fellow 
committee member Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) to introduce an alternative version that 
would have allowed for the use of reconciliation to enact a cap-and-trade proposal if the Senate 
found that doing so would have “a positive impact on the country’s economy, environment, or 
energy security” (Kaplun 2009).  When that amendment failed, Boxer turned her efforts to 
defeating an additional amendment on the topic, offered by Senator Mike Johanns (R-NE), 
which would have made it nearly impossible for the Senate to use reconciliation to pass cap-and-
trade.40 
                                                     
39 See H. Con. Res. 85, 111th Congress, 1st session. 
40 Specifically, the amendment prohibited Congress from using the “reserve fund” for climate change legislation, 
also included in the budget resolution, if the Senate passed a reconciliation bill containing cap-and-trade.  “Reserve 
funds” are provisions in the budget resolution that allow the House and Senate Budget Committees to permit other 
committees to spend more than their original budgetary allocation if other conditions are met (Lynch 2009).  
Without the reserve fund, any legislation that spends more than the committee’s original allocation is subject to a 
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A review of the floor debate over the amendments might lead an observer to conclude 
that the 2009 budget resolution failed to include the Senate Committee on Environment and 
Public Works because senators felt that using the reconciliation process to enact cap-and-trade 
legislation was against the principles of the Senate.  Senator Lindsay Graham (R-SC), for 
example, claimed that “if you took climate change…and put [it] on the reconciliation track, you 
would basically be doing a lot of damage to the role of the Senate in a constitutional 
democracy.”41  Senator Mike Enzi (R-ID) compared using reconciliation for policy change, 
including on the environment, to a “shotgun wedding.”42  On the opposite side, meanwhile, 
Whitehouse emphasized that using reconciliation in this way was nothing new and entirely 
consistent with the history of the chamber.  “The party of reconciliation,” he claimed, “is the 
Republican Party.  They have used it 13 times.”43  Boxer argued similarly; “it is perfectly in 
order,” she asserted, “to use something called reconciliation, which is a way to get around a 
filibuster, and it is a way to govern with a majority.”44 
Previous work on procedural choice in the Senate, however, suggests that senators rarely 
make procedural choices—like whether to use reconciliation—based on principles alone (Binder 
and Smith 1997).  Indeed, in this particular case, Graham, Enzi, and their allies objected just as 
strenuously to including reconciliation instructions that mentioned the Senate Finance 
Committee in order to permit the procedures’ use to enact health care reform.  When asked about 
the potential handling of health and environment measures through reconciliation, Senator Judd 
Gregg (R-NH) claimed that doing so would be equivalent to “running over the minority, putting 
them in cement, and throwing them in the Chicago River” (Montgomery 2009).  Despite this 
opposition, in their final budget compromise with the House, the Senate accepted instructions to 
the Finance Committee—a decision that, as is clear in the case study, proved pivotal to the 
package’s eventual passage. 
                                                     
point of order under the Congressional Budget Act, which requires 60 votes to waive.  In this case, the budget 
resolution included a reserve fund that allowed the Senate Budget Committee to revise committee allocations if 
“climate change legislation” was enacted.  The Johanns amendment would have prohibited any Senate committees 
from spending more than originally allocated on various environmental initiatives if the underlying “climate change 
legislation” was enacted through reconciliation.  In practice, this amendment made it so difficult for the Senate to 
use reconciliation to enact a cap-and-trade program as to essentially prohibit the procedures’ use (Kaplun 2009). 
41 Congressional Record S4143, 1 April 2009. 
42 Congressional Record S4140, 1 April 2009. 
43 Congressional Record S4141, 1 April 2009. 
44 Congressional Record S4141, 1 April 2009. 
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Given that there was also vocal opposition to naming the Finance Committee, what made 
the Environment and Public Works Committee different?  The spatial model outlined above 
provides some useful insight.  Figure 4.10 provides a visual depiction of the regime (Typical) 
that characterized the relevant actors in 2009.  Using DW-NOMINATE scores, Senator Amy 
Klobuchar (D-MN) was the median member of the Environment and Public Works Committee 
(C), Senator Kay Hagan (D-NC) was the median member of the full chamber (M), and Senator 
Olympia Snowe (R-ME) was the filibuster pivot (F).  The median of the Democratic (majority) 
party (L) fell between Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) and Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI).   
 
Figure 4.10: Regime Describing Cap-and-Trade Policy, March 2009 
 
 
 Identifying the location of the status quo on cap-and-trade is more difficult.  On one 
hand, no program of tradable credits as a means to combat greenhouse gas emissions existed in 
2009, and we might consider the complete absence of such a system to be the most conservative 
possible status quo.  Under this logic, creating any sort of cap-and-trade regime would represent 
a more liberal policy, with the exact location depending on various aspects of the policy, such as 
the restrictiveness of the emissions cap.  If, however, we think about cap-and-trade as part of the 
nation’s broader environmental policy, we can use previous Senate action to speculate in more 
concrete way about the location of the status quo.  In June 2008, the Senate spent three-and-a-
half days considering the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008—including nine 
hours spent reading the full text of the bill aloud (Montgomery and Birnbaum 2008)—before 
failing to invoke cloture on the measure (Herszenhorn 2008).  The legislation, which was the 
first proposal on cap-and-trade to reach the Senate under regular order, would have reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions by 70 percent below 2005 levels by 2050 (Pew Center 2008).   
While the Senate’s consideration of the Lieberman-Warner measure in 2008 does not 
allow us to pinpoint the exact location of the status quo on cap-and-trade in 2009, the positions 
of various senators—specifically, Republicans—provides us with a rough sense of where policy 
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was relative to their preferences.  Seven Republican senators voted for cloture on the bill: 
Senators Susan Collins (R-ME), Elizabeth Dole (R-NC), Mel Martinez (R-FL), Gordon Smith 
(R-OR), John Sununu (R-NH), Olympia Snowe (R-ME), and John Warner (R-VA).45  Because 
the Lieberman-Warner bill would have made environmental policy more liberal, the support of 
these seven senators suggests that the status quo on the issue was to their right; otherwise, they 
would not have supported a measure moving policy in a liberal direction.  Again, we cannot 
identify precisely how far to the right the status quo was, but the average of these seven 
members’ DW-NOMINATE scores (0.342) suggests that it was moderately conservative, as 
indicated by Q in Figure 4.10. 
 Given this arrangement of preferences and the approximate location of the status quo, 
what fate does my spatial model predict for the Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee in the 2009 reconciliation instructions?  Because we are in the Typical Regime, the 
majority party leader (again, captured as the majority party median) will always favor including 
the committee in the instructions for status quo points that are to his right, because he is never 
made worse off, and often made better off, by enacting policy change through reconciliation 
rather than under regular order.  The support by Majority Leader Reid for naming the committee, 
then, is consistent with our model-based expectations. 
The floor median, however, does not always agree with the majority leader.  When the 
status quo is extreme on either side of the policy space, he prefers to use regular order to 
reconciliation because the procedural advantages afforded to the committee-generated proposal 
under reconciliation mean he is forced to accept a policy change that he prefers to the status quo, 
but that brings him less utility than the policy he could achieve under the Senate’s regular rules.  
In 2009, the absolute distance between the median member of the Environment and Public 
Works Committee and the floor median (0.026) was less than the absolute distance between the 
floor median and the filibuster pivot (0.289).  According to the results of the model, then, the 
floor median will oppose including the committee in the reconciliation instructions if Q > 2F – 
2M + C.  Did this condition hold in 2009?  Again, because we cannot precisely locate Q, it is 
impossible to be certain, but in 2009, 2F – 2M + C = 0.308, a moderately conservative point.  It 
is plausible, then, the status quo on cap-and-trade was sufficiently conservative that floor median 
preferred attempting policy change under regular order, rather than through reconciliation.  
                                                     
45 See Vote Report #145, 6 June 2008. 
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Following the passage of the Johanns amendment to the budget resolution, this was indeed the 
path the Senate took during the 111th Congress, ultimately failing to pass a cap-and-trade bill in 
the summer of 2010 (Lizza 2010). 
 
Rejecting the Rules: The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 1995-96 
 
 The case of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee in 2009 is not the only 
example of how the location of the status quo can make reconciliation suboptimal from the 
perspective of the floor median.  Fifteen years prior, another Senate committee encountered a 
similar situation—but with a twist.  In 1995, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, 
and Forestry began its periodic reauthorization of the farm bill—a wide-ranging piece of 
legislation that includes such disparate policies as farm subsidies, soil conservation programs, 
food stamps, and child nutrition initiatives—through the reconciliation process.  By April 1996, 
however, the farm bill had taken a major procedural detour, with the ultimate legislation 
reauthorizing the farm bill’s programs handled through regular order by both chambers. 
What explains this particular path?  The 1995-96 farm bill’s journey with reconciliation 
began two years earlier.  In 1993, the Agriculture Committee was under a reconciliation directive 
to cut $3.2 billion from the programs in its jurisdiction over the next five years.46  Concerned 
about Democratic priorities—such as President Clinton’s proposal to means-test subsidies to 
commodity producers (Palmer 1993), the minority Republicans on the committee contemplated 
attempting to prevent committee action on a reconciliation measure.  The Republican leadership, 
wanting to make sure reconciliation remained available to them as a procedural tool in the future, 
sought to prevent this kind of obstruction.  In a letter to Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), the 
Ranking Republican Member of the Agriculture Committee, Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) 
cautioned Lugar: 
 
…we as Republican’s [sic] have used reconciliation to advance our policy objectives 
effectively over the years.  If we as Republicans choose this year to undermine the 
reconciliation process by claiming, as an example, that the reconciliation instructions 
are unenforceable or meaningless, that tool may not be available to us in the future.  We 
                                                     
46 See H. Con. Res. 64, 103rd Congress. 
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must be careful in our strategy.  While advancing a Republican alternative, we must not 
jeopardize the tool that could help us achieve that alternative.47  
 
When Republicans regained control of both houses of Congress following the 1994 
elections, it appeared this chance to use the expedited procedures to reform the nation’s system 
of farm price supports had arrived.  The wide-ranging farm bill was up for reauthorization, 
having last been tackled by the Democratic Congress in 1990.  Substantial cuts to existing farm 
programs were attractive to the new majority, with Domenici trumpeting reductions as a key 
piece of the Republicans’ pledge to balance the budget by 2002 and House Majority Leader Dick 
Armey (R-TX) arguing that there was no place for subsidies in a free market agricultural 
economy (Hosansky 1995c).  At the same time, however, many rank-and-file Republicans in 
both houses—especially those from farm districts and states—vigorously opposed the proposed 
cuts.  When asked about his opposition to a proposal that would transition the farm support 
system to one in which recipients would get gradually diminishing fixed payments, rather than 
subsidies related to farm prices, Representative Saxby Chambliss (R-GA) responded “‘when 
asked why I wasn’t voting with the team, I said, “My team is my farmers and the good folks 
back home in central and south Georgia.”’” (Bradsher 1995). 
Given that the Republican leadership was facing possible dissent from its own members, 
reconciliation appeared a particularly attractive vehicle for enacting the farm bill, especially to 
Senator Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS).  Despite a preference from both Lugar—now the 
chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee—and his House counterpart, Representative Pat 
Roberts (R-KS) to handle the legislation separately, as a standalone bill, the fiscal year 1996 
budget resolution included a reconciliation directive for both houses’ Agriculture committees, 
keeping the possibility of reauthorizing the farm bill’s programs through reconciliation alive 
(Hosansky 1995a).  
Lugar, then, was confronted with a directive to reduce outlays by $48.4 billion over five 
years.48  By late September, he had managed to wrangle enough votes on his committee to 
respond to those instructions with a reconciliation proposal that would cut agriculture programs 
                                                     
47 Pete Domenici, Ranking Republican Member, Senate Committee on the Budget, to Richard G. Lugar, Ranking 
Republican Member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, April 28, 1993; UC 8/4/77, Box 
No. 4; , Senate Budget Committee Republicans, FY 83-87 Budget Reconciliation; Records of the United States 
Senate, 100th Congress, Record Group 46; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
48 See H. Con. Res. 67, 104th Congress. 
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by $13.6 billion and nutrition initiatives by $35.7 billion.  Sources of major savings in the 
measure included doubling the acreage of farmland that would be disqualified from receiving 
subsidies, shrinking the dairy price support program, cutting export subsidies, reducing the 
allowable deductions in calculating food stamp eligibility, and lowering payments to school 
lunch programs (Hosansky 1995b).  Once the proposal reached the Senate floor as part of the 
larger reconciliation measure, it was largely uncontroversial, facing only one major amendment, 
to create a farmer-financed price support program for dry milk and butter.  The debate turned 
contentious again when the reconciliation measure went to conference, with the dairy provisions 
removed from the bill altogether and additional cuts to the peanut and sugar programs (CQ 
Almanac 1995).  In the end, this carefully negotiated compromise on the farm bill’s programs 
proved moot, as Clinton vetoed the broader reconciliation measure on December 7, 1995; the 
White House provided 82 reasons for the veto, including provisions that would reduce Medicare 
and Medicaid spending, cut taxes, open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil drilling, and 
allow corporations to tap pension funds in order to make available funds for other priorities 
(Purdum 1995).   
While the veto generally dampened the prospects for many of the Republicans’ policy 
initiatives included in the bill, it was perilous for farmers because of the structure of several key 
programs in the bill.  While some, like crop insurance, are permanently authorized, most are 
subject to periodic reauthorization.  If Congress does not reapprove this latter category of 
programs, the effects vary.  Some, like the bill’s nutrition programs, can be kept operating by 
appropriations (Johnson and Monke 2014), but this is not the case for the bill’s commodity 
programs.  Those initiatives were originally created by two laws, the Agricultural Adjustment of 
1938 and the Agriculture Act of 1949.  Each subsequent reauthorization of the commodity 
programs has been a suspension of these “permanent laws,” which means that if the 
reauthorization expires, the programs are again governed by the legislation that initially created 
them (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2008).   
In the 1995 case, the first effects of reversion to permanent law would be felt in the corn 
and wheat markets.  The original authorizing legislation for supports for these commodities 
directed the Secretary of Agriculture to set corn prices between $2.94 and $5.39 per bushel and 
wheat prices between $5.64 and $7.82 per bushel.  At the end of 1995, these crops were at $3.33 
and $5.22 per bushel, respectively—prices high enough that under the provisions enacted in 
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1990, the federal government was providing no subsidies.  If those conditions were allowed to 
expire, and permanent law took effect, it was projected that the government would have to 
purchase all of the 1996 wheat crop and nearly all of the corn haul—exactly the opposite 
outcome from that desired by Republicans pushing to decrease the federal role in agriculture 
(Gugliotta 1995).  Without a reauthorization, the cotton, sugar, and dairy markets would also be 
affected in 1997 and 1998.   
In the words of one expert, the looming specter of permanent law was “‘somebody’s 
holding a gun to the head of Congress on this one’” (Hosansky 1996d).  When Congress returned 
for the second session of the 104th Congress in January 1996, they had an estimated 90 days to 
respond to this threat and reauthorize commodity programs.  By late April, Southern growers 
would begin harvesting their winter wheat, triggering government purchases at the 1949 prices 
(CQ Almanac 1995).  Both chambers managed to clear this deadline by about a month, passing 
another five-year farm bill, the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, in 
late March under the chambers’ regular procedures.49  Despite the looming prospect of budget-
busting payments to farmers, the road to enactment was not smooth.  Initial passage in both 
chambers required significant maneuvering and swapping of amendments in both chambers 
(Hosansky 1996a; Hosansky 1996c). The final measure was hammered out in a marathon fifteen 
hour meeting of conferees on March 20 and 21, during which members resolved nearly 500 
differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill on issues including peanuts, dairy, 
and the question of whether to keep the current permanent law plus suspension approach to 
enacting the farm bill (Hosansky 1996b). 
Given the difficulty of passing the 1996 farm bill—even under the threat of a massive 
increase in government obligations—why did the Republican leadership choose to forgo the 
reconciliation procedures for regular order?  One possibility is that because current interpretation 
of the rules limits Congress to a single reconciliation bill dealing with outlays each year (Heniff 
2010b), Republicans wished to reserve the special rules for enacting welfare reform, an initiative 
they did not expect to complete in time to avoid the reversion to permanent law with the farm 
bill.  Indeed, the welfare package enacted in August 1996 was handled through the reconciliation 
procedures—but under the auspices of a new set of reconciliation instructions, provided for by a 
                                                     
49 The only exception was the food stamp program, which was reauthorized for only two years by the 1996 farm bill 
and subsequently reauthorized through FY2002 by the 1996 welfare reform law, which was passed using the 
reconciliation procedures (Aussenberg 2013, fn. 17). 
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new budget resolution for fiscal year 1997, enacted in June 1996 (Heniff 2014).  Senate 
parliamentarians have generally interpreted reconciliation instructions as remaining viable until 
the end of the Congress rather than the end of fiscal year (Binder 2010).  Because no 
reconciliation bill initiated by the fiscal year 1996 instructions had been signed into law by the 
time Congress resumed work on the farm bill in early 1996, using reconciliation remained 
plausible, at least parliamentarily. 
The model suggests another possible explanation.  In 1995 and 1996, the Agriculture 
Committee was in the Typical Regime, with the committee median between the floor median and 
the median member of the majority party.  This arrangement is depicted in Figure 4.11; note that 
since the Republicans controlled the Senate, the filibuster pivot is now to the left of the floor 
median.  While we cannot specify the status quo on agricultural policy precisely, it is reasonable 
to assume it to be slightly liberal, given the vigorous support among many members of the 
Republican Party for altering the existing system of subsidies and prices supports.  Thus, I place 
the status quo—that is, policy under the 1990 farm bill, due to expire at the end of 1995—at Q. 
 
Figure 4.11: Regime Describing the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry, 1995-96 
 
 
 
 The reversion to permanent law at the start of 1996, however, moved the status quo in a 
more liberal direction, as it ushered in the prospect of far more generous agricultural spending; 
this shift is indicated in Figure 4.11 by Q′.  Recall that, in the Typical Regime, there are some 
extreme status quo points for which reconciliation produces a policy that is less preferred by the 
floor median than the outcome achieved under regular order.  Under the Senate’s regular 
procedures, the floor median has amendment power that allows extreme status quo points to be 
moved to its ideal point.  Under reconciliation, however, the influence of the committee, 
generated in part by the Byrd Rule, makes it much more difficult to amend a proposal, resulting 
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in a bill that is more reflective of the committee’s preferences.  In the case of the farm bill in 
1995 and 1996, it is likely that the mid-stream shift in the status quo made reconciliation a less 
attractive option than it was at the start of the debate.   Here, rules and the underlying structure of 
the policy interacted in a particular way to shape the Senate majority’s incentives surrounding 
procedural choice.  Indeed, one of the final points of compromise before the final passage of the 
1996 farm bill was over whether to maintain the permanent law plus suspension approach.  
Democrats, concerned that a repeal of the underlying statute would make it easier for 
Republicans to eliminate entire portions of the farm safety net when the law next expired in 
2002, pushed hard to retain the core 1938 and 1949 laws.  They were ultimately successful (CQ 
Almanac 1996b), setting up the possibility of future showdowns on shifting procedural ground.50 
 
How Much Policy Gain for the Procedural Buck?  The Senate Finance Committee, 2009-10 
 
 In the two cases described above, we saw situations in which reconciliation was avoided, 
since using it would actually make a reconciliation-pivotal actor (the floor median) worse off.  
Another example from 2009 and 2010, meanwhile, provides a different kind of insight.  Given 
that the model represents a simplified, stylized version of the reality, how might it help us 
understand situations that at first appear to be off the equilibrium path?   
For proponents of the comprehensive health care reform measure being championed by 
President Barack Obama during the first fifteen months of his presidency, there was perhaps no 
darker day than January 19, 2010.  Following Republican Scott Brown’s victory in a special 
Senate election in Massachusetts, the Democratic majority in the Senate was down to 59 
members, losing its ability to invoke cloture by relying solely on votes from within its own party 
(Cooper 2010).  Without that key, 60th member of the caucus, Senate Democrats now required 
the support of at least one Republican to pass a conference report on the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA).  The House had passed its version of the president’s health care 
initiative in November 2009 (Hulse and Pear 2009a), and the Senate had responded by enacting 
                                                     
50 Indeed, in 2012, Congress was faced with a similar situation, as the 2008 farm bill expired (Steinhauer 2012).  
Because no budget resolution had been passed by both houses during the 112th Congress (for either the 2012 or 2013 
fiscal years), there were no available reconciliation instructions, eliminating the possibility of using the procedures 
to handle a reauthorization. 
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its version just before Christmas (Herszenhorn and Hulse 2009)—but little progress had been 
made on resolving the two chambers’ difference before Brown’s victory. 
 Why hadn’t the House and Senate been able to accomplish the president’s signature 
legislative priority more quickly?  While developing and shepherding a bill as complex as the 
ACA to passage is inevitably a lengthy process, the speed of progress in the Senate was partially 
the result of the approach utilized by Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), the chair of the Senate 
Finance Committee, to develop his committee’s parts of the measure.  As the chair of the 
committee with jurisdiction over Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, and other mandatory health programs, Baucus was ensured a central role in the drafting 
of the legislation, but his profile grew with Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
Committee Chairman Edward Kennedy (D-MA) sidelined by a battle with cancer.  Baucus was 
committed to producing a bipartisan bill, working with a so-called “Gang of Six”—a group of 
three Democratic senators (Baucus, Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND), and Senator Jeff Bingaman 
(D-NM)) and three Republicans (Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Senator Michael Enzi (R-
WY), and Senator Olympia Snow (R-ME)) (Herszenhorn and Pear 2009).  His slow, methodical 
approach in pursuit of compromise proved troublesome, however.  By the time that version of 
the bill was released publicly and scheduled for markup in early September, the underlying 
politics of the debate had shifted significantly with, among other factors, the emergence of the 
pernicious “death panel” rumor during the congressional recess in August (Rutenberg and 
Calmes 2009).  Baucus lost the support of Enzi and Grassley before the measure was officially 
rolled out, and some of his own Democratic colleagues expressed concerns about the absence of 
a robust public option and insufficient subsidies for low-income individuals (Hulse and Pear 
2009b; Pear and Herszenhorn 2009b).  By October, Snowe was the only Republican to support 
the bill in committee (Pear and Herszenhorn 2009a) and when asked about the chances the 
measure would ultimately clear the full chamber, Baucus was left to report, “I don't know. I don't 
know. I don't know. I just really don't know.”51 
 At various points in this journey, Reid pressured Baucus explicitly to speed up his efforts 
and threatened that if the Finance Committee failed to report out a health reform measure 
promptly, the majority leader would circumvent the committee chair and simply introduce a bill 
on the floor (Cohn 2010).  The longer Baucus stalled, moreover, the more serious this threat 
                                                     
51 “Quotation of the Day,” New York Times 28 October 2009. 
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became—not only because Reid’s frustration was increasing, but because the reconciliation 
instructions included in the fiscal year 2010 budget had given the Finance Committee a deadline 
of October 15, 2009 to report out “changes in laws within its jurisdiction to reduce the deficit by 
$1,000,000,000 for the period of fiscal years 2009 through 2014.”52  Starting on October 15, 
then, Reid would have gained another tool to shepherd health reform to passage: the ability to 
use a motion to recommit to bring a reconciliation bill dealing with programs in Finance’s 
jurisdiction directly to the floor.  Use of this maneuver would have been optional—the rules do 
not require that reconciliation be used, even conditional on the existence of instructions—but by 
waiting until October 12 to report Finance’s bill, Baucus came awfully close to providing the 
majority leader with an extra procedural mechanism to get what he wanted. 
 Even if Reid lacked the ability to force the Senate to consider health reform through the 
budget reconciliation process before October 15, he was still widely blamed for, in the words of 
the Washington Post’s Ezra Klein, “letting [Baucus] spend three months playing footsie with the 
Gang of Six” (Klein 2009).  While there are a multitude of reasons why Reid might have pursued 
this strategy—a shared desire to produce a bipartisan bill or a commitment to deference to the 
wishes of his committee chairs, to name just two—the spatial model also provides a potential 
explanation.  Figure 4.12 depicts the preferences of the various actors in 2009; the majority party 
median, floor median, and filibuster pivot are identical to those described in the Environment and 
Public Works case described above.  The committee median in the Finance example, however, is 
Baucus himself.  With a DW-NOMINATE score of -0.194, this places the committee in the 
Centrist regime. 
 
Figure 4.12: Regime Describing the Senate Finance Committee, 2009 
 
 
Recall from the model’s predictions that, in the Centrist Regime, there is a relatively small range 
of status quo points for which the majority party median and the floor median are made better off 
                                                     
52 See S. Con. Res. 13, 111th Congress, 1st Session. 
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by the use of reconciliation than regular order—that is, when C < Q < 2F – C.  If the status quo is 
beyond 2F – C, both the floor median and the majority party median prefer the outcome under 
regular order.  Even when Q is in the reconciliation zone—that is, even when the majority party 
median and the floor median prefer the outcome achieved under reconciliation—the magnitude 
of those policy gains from using reconciliation may be quite small; this is depicted by the size of 
the triangle that is shaded in the middle of Figure 4.6.   Put differently, in the Centrist regime, the 
bill produced by the committee under the reconciliation rules is not all that different from the 
measure the entire chamber would craft using regular order because of the committee’s own 
moderate preferences.   
Given this similarity, if the majority party leader perceives any possible costs of using 
reconciliation that might wipe out the small policy gains, he might simply opt to forgo use of the 
procedures.  While I do not model the potential costs explicitly, it is not hard to imagine from 
where they might arise.  In the particular case of health reform in 2009, two sources are 
immediately evident.  Obama had sought office in 2008 as the “change” candidate, rejecting the 
“partisanship…that has poisoned our politics for so long.”53  While using reconciliation to enact 
his signature legislative achievement was by no means unprecedented, the president’s Senate 
allies may have been wary of abandoning his desire for bipartisanship right out of the gate.  
Alternatively, and more substantively, congressional Democrats and the president alike had 
myriad goals for health reform that involved large amounts of discretionary spending—
approximately $100 billon between 2011 and 2022 (Redhead et al. 2014)—non-budgetary policy 
change, which would have been difficult maintain as part of the bill in the face of Byrd Rule 
challenges from Republicans.  The final version of the ACA authorized discretionary 
appropriations of $106 billion over ten years (Redhead et al. 2011).  It is entirely possible, then, 
that in 2009, when armed with a filibuster-proof majority, the costs to Reid of foregoing these 
discretionary changes simply outweighed the relatively small amount of additional gains on 
mandatory health programs and health-related provisions of the tax code that would have been 
realized as part of a reconciliation bill generated by the Centrist Finance Committee.  While 
using the reconciliation procedures from the start might have shepherded the measure to 
enactment more quickly, the finished product would have certainly looked much different. 
 
                                                     
53 http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=6181477&page=1&singlePage=true 
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Conclusion 
 
 In 1996, during debate over the reconciliation instructions to be included in the 
congressional budget resolution, Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) claimed that if 
the budget reconciliation process was used to enact tax cuts, “and this precedent is pushed to its 
logical conclusion, I suspect there will come a day when all legislation will be done through 
reconciliation.”54  Senate party leaders are occupationally disposed to hyperbole, and this 
statement is no exception.  The theoretical model presented above predicts that we should 
observe committees being named in the reconciliation instructions in only limited 
circumstances—that is, for a set of status quo policies more extreme than median member of the 
majority party, as well as when policy is such that the floor median prefers policy change but the 
filibuster pivot would obstruct change under regular order.  In both these cases, using 
reconciliation produces a policy that is more preferred by a majority of the members of the 
majority party than the policy achievable under the chamber’s regular rules.  For the more 
extreme status quos, this advantage results from the closed rule protections of reconciliation 
bills, preventing the floor median from amending the proposal away from the preferences of the 
majority party median.  When the status quo is moderate, on the other hand, the advantage to the 
majority party is driven by the simple elimination of the possibility of a filibuster.   
In addition, for both the sets of status quo policies described above, our expectations 
about committee inclusion are consistent with the central claims laid out in the Introduction.  
Because the rules both limit amendments and preclude the possibility of a filibuster, they 
facilitate the passage of policy changes that would not otherwise be possible—the first stated 
goal of majoritarian exceptions.  In addition, the fact that the outcomes produced by the 
procedures’ use bring policy closer to the preferences of the majority party median is consistent 
with my second central claim: that majoritarian exceptions make the majority party in the Senate 
better off.   
 Observational data about reconciliation’s use also suggests that Daschle’s concerns were 
overblown.  As Table A4.1 makes clear, even since 1996, only some committees have been 
mentioned in the reconciliation instructions.  As the large-N empirical test demonstrates, the 
patterns in committee inclusion are largely consistent with the predictions of the theoretical 
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model.  Committees are directed to report reconciliation bills, the results suggest, when the 
members of the majority party are made better off by the ultimate policy outcome; these policy 
outcomes help the majority party appear competent and enhance its reputation in the eyes of 
voters.  Finally, the model also helps us understand a series of other empirical observations about 
reconciliation’s use.  Three incidents—one from 1995 and 1996, and two from 2009 and 2010—
that may appear puzzling at first blush are largely consistent with the majority party-centric 
expectations generated by the theoretical account. 
 The reconciliation process, then, appears to be initiated in such a way that should 
advantage members of the majority party in the Senate.  Are the policy changes made under its 
auspices similarly directed?  Chapter 5 explores that very question. 
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Appendix 4.1 
 
Model Solution 
 
I begin by defining a set of proposals for which each legislative actor (L, M, and F) will not 
obstruct further progress on the measure at hand.  For the floor median (M), I define the set of 
proposals, b, r(p), r(o), and o, that he will approve in a floor vote.  For the majority leader (L), I 
define the set of proposals, r(p), that he will schedule.  Finally, for the filibuster pivot (F), I 
define the set of proposals, o, that he will not filibuster. 
 
Beginning, then, in the final stage of the regular order phase: 
 
Definition 1: Let F’s no-filibuster set for o be: 
 
𝑁[𝑄, 𝑓] = {
[𝑄, 2𝑓 − 𝑄] if 𝑄 ≤ 𝑓
[2𝑓 − 𝑄,𝑄] if 𝑄 > 𝑓
} 
 
Under regular order, F will filibuster any proposal that makes him worse off than the status quo, 
Q.  Knowing the proposals that F will not filibuster, L will engage in the following equilibrium 
behavior in the regular order phase: 
 
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, in the regular order phase, L will introduce the following 
proposal, o*: 
 
𝑜∗ =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑚 if 𝑄 < 2𝑙 − 𝑚 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
∅ if 2𝑙 − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑓 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
𝑚 if 𝑄 < 3𝑚 − 2𝑓 and 2𝑚 − 𝑓 < 𝑙
4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 3𝑚 − 2𝑓 < 𝑄 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and 2𝑚 − 𝑓 < 𝑙
∅ if 2𝑚 − 𝑓 < 𝑄 < 𝑓 and 2𝑚 − 𝑓 < 𝑙
2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 𝑓 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 −𝑚
𝑚 if 𝑄 ≥ 𝑓 }
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L will introduce the proposal, o, which brings policy as close as possible to L’s ideal point that 
within F’s no-filibuster set.  Recall, however, that L only makes a choice about whether or not 
introduce o if the reconciliation phase of the game is either not played or fails in some way.  To 
consider what happens in that phase of the game, let us define M’s approval sets for r(p) and 
r(o): 
 
Definition 2: Let M’s approval sets for r(p) and r(o) be: 
 
𝐴[𝑄,𝑚] = {
[𝑄, 2𝑚 − 𝑄] if 𝑄 < 𝑚
[2𝑚 − 𝑄,𝑄] if 𝑄 ≥ 𝑚
} 
 
M will approve any reconciliation bill, either r(p) or r(o), if doing so makes him at least as well 
off as the status quo, Q.  There are two possible ways that M is given the choice of whether or 
not to approve such a bill.  The first occurs if L chooses the schedule r(p) after it has been 
reported out by the committee.  L will introduce r(p) if the following holds: 
 
Definition 3: Let L’s schedule set for r(p) be: 
 
𝑆[𝑄, 𝑙] = {
[𝑄, 2𝑙 − 𝑄] if 𝑄 < 𝑙
[2𝑙 − 𝑄,𝑄] if 𝑄 ≥ 𝑙
} 
 
Because r(p) comes to the floor under a closed rule, L is willing to schedule any version of it that 
makes him at least as well off as Q; he is not concerned that r(p) will be amended on the floor in 
such a way that results in an outcome that makes L worse off than Q.  Because r(o) comes to the 
floor under an open rule, however, L’s proposal set for r(o) is more limited: 
 
Proposition 2: In equilibrium, L will introduce the following proposal, r(o)*: 
 
𝑟(𝑜)∗ = {
𝑚 if 𝑄 < 2𝑙 − 𝑚
∅ if 2𝑙 − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑚 
𝑚 if 𝑄 ≥ 𝑚
} 
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If Q < 2l - m, L introduces r(o) with the expectation that it will be amended to m; L is at least as 
well off under this outcome as under the status quo.  If 2l – m ≤ Q < m, however, the ultimate 
location of policy is away from L’s ideal point, making him worse off.  Finally, if Q ≥ m, 
however, ending up at M’s ideal point is as well as L can do, so he is willing to make the 
proposal.  Of course, deliberation about r(o) only occurs if a committee (c) receives 
reconciliation instructions but does not comply with them.  Given Definitions 2 and 3, we should 
expect c to produce the following proposals, r(p): 
 
 
Proposition 3: In equilibrium, c will report out the following proposal, r(p)*: 
 
𝑟(𝑝)∗ =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑡 if 𝑄 < 𝑡 or 𝑄 ≥ 2𝑚 − 𝑡 and 𝐶 < 𝐿
∅ if 𝐶 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑚 and 𝐶 < 𝐿
2𝑚 − 𝑄 if 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑚 − 𝑡
𝑡 if 𝑄 < 2𝑙 − 𝑡 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
2𝑙 − 𝑄 if 2𝑙 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑙 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
∅ if 𝑙 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑚 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
2𝑚 − 𝑄 if 𝑀 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑚 − 𝐶 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
𝑡 if 𝑄 ≥ 2𝑚 − 𝐶 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
𝑡 if 𝑄 < 2𝑙 − 𝑡 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶
2𝑙 − 𝑄 if 2𝑙 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑙 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶
∅ if 𝑙 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑡 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶
𝑡 if 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When charged with a set of reconciliation instructions, c will introduce a proposal—protected by 
a closed rule—that brings policy as close as possible to the ideal point, t, of its median member, 
C, while still getting the consent of M and L.  In order for c to have the opportunity to report out 
r(p)*, though, the floor must have approved a budget resolution, b, that names c in its 
reconciliation instructions.  Given Proposition 3, we can define M’s approval set for b as 
follows: 
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Definition 4: Let M’s approval set for b be: 
 
𝐴[𝑄,𝑚] =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[2𝑙 − 𝑚, 𝑓] if 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[𝑚, 𝑓] if 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and 𝑡 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑐, 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑐] if 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and 𝑡 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[2𝑙 − 𝑚, 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| < |𝑀 − 𝐹| and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[2𝑙 − 𝑚, 𝑓] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| ≥ |𝑀 − 𝐹| and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑐 , 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| < |𝑀 − 𝐹| 
and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| < |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
[4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑐, 𝑓] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| ≥ |𝑀 − 𝐹|
and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| < |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
[4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑐, 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| < |𝑀 − 𝐹|
and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| > |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
[4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑐, 𝑓] if if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| ≥ |𝑀 − 𝐹|
and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| > |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
 
 [2𝑙 − 𝑚, 2𝑓 − 𝑐] if 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[2𝑚 − 2𝑓 + 𝑐, 2𝑓 − 𝑐] if 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For these values of Q, M is no worse off under the eventual policy change, enacted via r(p) and 
the reconciliation rules, than he would be by avoiding the reconciliation process and moving to 
the regular order phase.  The final choice in the game is L’s, over whether to draft a set of 
instructions in b that name c.  Given Proposition 3 and Definition 4, L will draft b* naming c in 
equilibrium under the following conditions: 
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Proposition 4: L will introduce b* naming C under the following values of Q: 
 
[2𝑙 − 𝑚,∞]  if 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[2𝑚 − 𝑓, 2𝑓 − 2𝑙 + 𝑡 ] if 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and 𝑡 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓 
[−∞, 4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 2𝑙 + 𝑡] if 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and 𝑡 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑐, 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑙] if 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and 𝑡 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[2𝑙 − 𝑚,∞] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[−∞, 4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑡] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 2𝑙 + 𝑡,∞] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| < |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
[2𝑚 − 𝑓,∞] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| > |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
[2𝑙 − 𝑚, 2𝑓 − 𝑡] if 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 2𝑙 + 𝑡, 2𝑓 − 𝑡]  if 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| < |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
[2𝑚 − 𝑓, 2𝑓 − 𝑡] if 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| > |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
 
 
L is almost always willing to name c, since he is almost always made better off by r(p) than by o; 
the principal constraint on the frequency c’s inclusion is M, who is made better off less often.  
Given Propositions 1-5, then, we should expect to observe c being named in the reconciliation 
instructions under the following conditions: 
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Proposition 5: Committee c will be named in the reconciliation instructions under the following 
conditions: 
 
[2𝑙 − 𝑚, 𝑓] if 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[𝑚, 𝑓] if 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and 𝑡 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑡, 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡] if 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and 𝑡 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[2𝑙 − 𝑚, 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| < |𝑀 − 𝐹|
[2𝑙 − 𝑚, 𝑓] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| > |𝑀 − 𝐹|
[4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 2𝑙 + 𝑡, 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓 
and |𝑀 − 𝐶| < |𝑀 − 𝐹| and |𝐶 − 𝐿| < | (2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
[4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 2𝑙 + 𝑡, 𝑓] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
and |𝑀 − 𝐶| > |𝑀 − 𝐹| and |𝐶 − 𝐿| < | (2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
[2𝑚 − 𝑓, 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓 
and |𝑀 − 𝐶| < |𝑀 − 𝐹| and |𝐶 − 𝐿| > | (2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
[2𝑚 − 𝑓, 𝑓] if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
and |𝑀 − 𝐶| < |𝑀 − 𝐹| and |𝐶 − 𝐿| > | (2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
[2𝑙 − 𝑚, 2𝑓 − 𝑡] if 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 and 𝑙 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
[4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 2𝑙 + 𝑡, 2𝑓 − 𝑡] if 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| < | (2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
[2𝑚 − 𝑓, 2𝑓 − 𝑡] if 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 and 𝑙 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| > | (2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
 
 
Finally, given Propositions 1-5, we should expect the following ultimate policy outcomes, Q*, at 
the end of the game: 
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Proposition 6: In equilibrium, policy will be located at: 
 
Case 1: 
 
𝑄∗ =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑚 if 𝑄 < 2𝑙 − 𝑚 and 𝐶 < 𝐿
𝑡 if 2𝑙 − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑡 and 𝐶 < 𝐿
𝑄 if 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑚 and 𝐶 < 𝐿
2𝑚 − 𝑄 if 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑓 and 𝐶 < 𝐿
2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 𝑓 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 −𝑚 and 𝐶 < 𝐿
𝑚 if 2𝑓 − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 and 𝐶 < 𝐿
𝑚 if 𝑄 < 2𝑙 − 𝑚 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
𝑡 if 2𝑙 − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑙 − 𝑡 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
2𝑙 − 𝑄 if 2𝑙 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑙 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
𝑄 if 𝑙 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑚 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
2𝑚 − 𝑄 if 𝑀 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑚 − 𝑡 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
𝑡 if 2𝑚 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| < |𝑀 − 𝐹|
𝑡 if 2𝑚 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 − 𝑡 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| > |𝑀 − 𝐹|
2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 −𝑚 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| < |𝑀 − 𝐹|
2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 2𝑓 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 −𝑚 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| > |𝑀 − 𝐹|
𝑚 if 2𝑓 − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
𝑚 if 𝑄 < 2𝑙 − 𝑚 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶
2𝑙 − 𝑄 if 2𝑙 − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑙 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶
𝑄 if 𝑙 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑡 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶
𝑡 if 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 − 𝑡 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶
2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 2𝑓 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 −𝑚 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶
𝑚 if 2𝑓 − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 }
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Case 2: 
 
𝑄∗
=
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑚 if 𝑄 ≤ 3𝑚 − 2𝑓 and 𝐶 < 𝐿
4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 3𝑚 − 2𝑓 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑡 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 3𝑚 − 2𝑓 ≤ 𝑄 < 4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑡 and 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑡 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓
𝑡 if 4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑡 and 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑡 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓
𝑄 if 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑚 and 𝐶 < 𝐿 
2𝑚 − 𝑄 if 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑚 − 𝑡 and 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑡 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓
𝑡 if 2𝑚 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡 and 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑡 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓
2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 −𝑚 and 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑡 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓
𝑚 if 2𝑓 − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 and 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑡 > 2𝑚 − 𝑓
2𝑚 − 𝑄 if  𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑡 if 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑡 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 −𝑚 and 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑡 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
𝑚 if 2𝑓 − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 and 𝐶 < 𝐿 and 𝑡 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓
𝑚 if 𝑄 ≤ 3𝑚 − 2𝑓 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 3𝑚 − 2𝑓 ≤ 𝑄 <  4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 2𝑙 + 𝑡 and  𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| < |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 3𝑚 − 2𝑓 ≤ 𝑄 <  2𝑚 − 𝑓 and  𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| > |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
𝑡 if  4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 2𝑙 + 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑙 − 𝑡 and  𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| < |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
2𝑙 − 𝑄 if 2𝑙 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑙 and  𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| < |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
2𝑙 − 𝑄 if 2𝑚 − 𝑓 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑙 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| > |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
𝑄 if 𝑙 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑚 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
2𝑚 − 𝑄 if 𝑀 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑚 − 𝑡 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
𝑡 if 2𝑚 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| < |𝑀 − 𝐹|
2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 2𝑓 − 2𝑚 + 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 −𝑚 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| < |𝑀 − 𝐹|
2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 2𝑓 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 −𝑚 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝑀 and |𝑀 − 𝐶| > |𝑀 − 𝐹|
𝑚 if 2𝑓 − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 and 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶 < 𝑀
𝑚  if 𝑄 ≤ 3𝑚 − 2𝑓 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶
4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑄 if  3𝑚 − 2𝑓 ≤ 𝑄 < 4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 2𝑙 + 𝑡 and  𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| < |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿| 
4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 𝑄 if  3𝑚 − 2𝑓 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑚 − 𝑓 and  𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| > |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
2𝑙 − 𝑡 if 4𝑚 − 2𝑓 − 2𝑙 + 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑙 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| < |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
2𝑙 − 𝑡 if 2𝑚 − 𝑓 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑙 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 and |𝐶 − 𝐿| > |(2𝑀 − 𝐹) − 𝐿|
𝑄 if 𝑙 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑚 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶
𝑡 if 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 − 𝑡 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶
2𝑓 − 𝑄 if 2𝑓 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑄 < 2𝑓 −𝑚 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶
𝑚 if 2𝑓 − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑄 and 𝑀 ≤ 𝐶 }
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Figures A4.1 and A4.2 display these outcomes graphically.  The solid line depicts outcomes in 
the Extreme Regime.  The medium gray dotted line depicts outcomes in the Typical Regime.  
The light gray dotted line depicts outcomes in the Centrist Regime.  In the Extreme and Typical 
Regimes, the vertical dotted lines indicate discontinuities in the prediction.  Outcomes are 
identical in all three regimes when Q ≤ 2l – m, l ≤ Q < m, and 2f – m ≤ Q for Case 1.  For Case 
2, as depicted here, outcomes are the same when Q ≤ 2m –f, l ≤ Q < m, and 2f – m ≤ Q.  
 
Figure A4.1: Final Policy Outcomes, by Regime, Case 1 
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Figure A4.2: Final Policy Outcomes, by Regime, Case 2 
 
 
 
 
Case 2 Illustrations: 
 
The basic logic of Case 2 (L > 2M – F) is identical to Case 1: we will observe reconciliation 
instructions naming c when the eventual policy outcome produced by this choice makes L and 
M, the pivotal actors for that choice, better off than proceeding under regular order.  Indeed, 
many of the outcomes are also identical.  The principal difference is that, on the left side of the 
policy space, the boundary of the reconciliation zone is no longer 2L – M.  Because L > 2M – F, 
there are no longer outcomes under regular order for which L wishes to gatekeep.  Rather, 2M – 
F (the reflection of F about M) is now the binding constraint on the left side of the policy space.  
For any values 2M – F < Q < M, we now observe gridlock under reconciliation; by comparison, 
in Case 1, the gridlock interval under reconciliation was min(L, C) < M.  This has the effect of 
reducing the size of Zone 1, the reconciliation zone on the left side of the policy space.   
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The left bound of Zone 1 is now either the point at which L or M is indifferent between the 
reconciliation outcome and the regular order outcome, whichever is larger.  Formally, if L ≤ C, 
we can define this as max(4M – 2F – C, 4M – 2F – 2L + C) if | C – L | < | (2M – F) – L | and as 
2M – F if | C – L | > | (2M – F) – L |.  If C < L and 2M – F < C, then the boundary is also 4M – 
2F – C.  If C < L and 2M – F > C, there is no Zone 1 (see Figure A4.2 for an illustration of this.)  
These alternative boundaries are reflected in the definitions and propositions described above, 
and Figures A4.3, A4.4, and A4.5 display the comparison between regular order and 
reconciliation graphically. 
 
Figure A4.3: Reconciliation vs. Regular Order, Extreme Regime, Case 2 
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Figure A4.4: Reconciliation vs. Regular Order, Typical Regime, Case 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
206 
 
 
Figure A4.5: Reconciliation vs. Regular Order, Centrist Regime, Case 2 
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Table A4.1: Senate Committees Mentioned in Reconciliation Instructions, 1980-2012 
 
Calendar 
Year 
Fiscal 
Year 
Committees Mentioned in Instructions 
1980 1981 Appropriations, Agriculture, Armed Services, Commerce, Environment and 
Public Works (EPW), Finance, Governmental Affairs, Labor and Human 
Resources, Small Business, Veterans’ Affairs 
1981 1982 Agriculture, Armed Services, Banking, Commerce, Energy, EPW, Finance, 
Foreign Relations, Governmental Affairs, Judiciary, Labor and Human 
Resources, Small Business, Veterans’ Affairs 
1982 1983 Agriculture, Armed Services, Banking, Commerce, Foreign Relations, 
Governmental Affairs, Veterans’ Affairs 
1983 1984 Finance, Governmental Affairs, Small Business, Veterans’ Affairs 
1984 1985 No reconciliation instructions in budget resolution 
1985 1986 Agriculture, Armed Services, Banking, Commerce, Energy, EPW, Finance, 
Government Affairs, Small Business, Labor and Human Resources, Veterans’ 
Affairs 
1986 1987 Agriculture, Banking, Commerce, Energy, EPW, Finance, Governmental 
Affairs, Labor and Human Resources, Small Business 
1987 1988 Agriculture, Banking, Commerce, Energy, EPW, Finance, Governmental 
Affairs, Labor and Human Resources, Veterans’ Affairs 
1988 1989 No reconciliation instructions in budget resolution 
1989 1990 Agriculture, Banking, Commerce, EPW, Finance, Government Affairs, Labor 
and Human Resources, Veterans’ Affairs 
1990 1991 Agriculture, Banking, Commerce, Energy, EPW, Government Affairs, Veterans’ 
Affairs, Finance, Labor and Human Resources, Judiciary 
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1991 1992 No reconciliation instructions in budget resolution 
1992 1993 No reconciliation instructions in budget resolution 
1993 1994 Finance, Agriculture, Armed Services, Banking, Commerce, Energy, EPW, 
Foreign Relations, Governmental Affairs, Judiciary, Labor and Human 
Resources, Veterans’ Affairs 
1994 1995 No reconciliation instructions in budget resolution 
1995 1996 Agriculture, Armed Services, Banking, Commerce, Energy, EPW, Finance, 
Government Affairs, Judiciary, Labor and Human Resources, Veterans’ Affairs 
1996 1997 Finance, Agriculture, Armed Services, Banking, Commerce, Energy, EPW,  
Governmental Affairs, Judiciary, Labor and Human Resources, Veterans’ 
Affairs 
1997 1998 Agriculture, Banking, Commerce, Energy, Finance, Governmental Affairs, 
Labor and Human Resources, Veterans’ Affairs 
1998 1999 No budget resolution 
1999 2000 Finance 
2000 2001 Finance 
2001 2002 Finance 
2002 2003 No budget resolution 
2003 2004 Finance 
2004 2005 No budget resolution 
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2005 2006 Agriculture, Banking, Commerce, Energy and Natural Resources, Environment, 
Finance, Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP), Judiciary 
2006 2007 No budget resolution 
2007 2008 HELP 
2008 2009 No reconciliation instructions in budget resolution 
2009 2010 Finance, HELP 
2010 2011 No budget resolution 
2011 2012 No budget resolution 
2012 2013 No budget resolution 
 
Sources: Yearly congressional budget resolutions.  For a list, see “Table 1: Congressional Budget Resolutions, FY1976-FY2012,” in 
Bill Heniff Jr., “Congressional Budget Resolutions: Historical Information,” Congressional Research Service, 7 February 2014. 
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Table A4.2: Probability of Inclusion in Reconciliation Instructions, 1984-2011, Alternative 
Interval Measurement 
 
Instructions Stage   
Deficitt-1 -6.029*** 
 (1.108) 
Zone 1 Size 3.692*** 
 (1.274) 
Zone 2 Size 0.888* 
 (0.537) 
Total Committee Mandatory Spendingt-1 0.062*** 
 (0.019) 
Constant -3.449*** 
 (0.650) 
  
Observations   
Budget Resolution Stage  
Deficitt-1 0.485 
 (0.963) 
Divided Control, House-Senate -1.661*** 
 (0.336) 
Divided Control, Senate-President -0.060 
 (0.211) 
Polarization -13.983*** 
 (2.660) 
Budget Committee Median -1.549 
 (1.656) 
Constant 11.719*** 
 (1.790) 
  
Observations   
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Chi-Square, LR Test of Independent Equations: 15.69 (p=.0001) 
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Table A4.3: Probability of Inclusion in Reconciliation Instructions, 1984-2011, with 
Clustered Standard Errors 
 
Instructions Stage (1) (2) 
Deficitt-1 -4.566*** -4.566** 
 (0.404) (2.223) 
Zone 1 Size 1.206*** 1.206 
 (0.323) (1.819) 
Zone 2 Size 0.875** 0.875 
 (0.406) (0.943) 
Total Committee Mandatory Spendingt-1 0.060*** 0.060** 
 (0.011) (0.026) 
Constant -2.524*** -2.524*** 
 (0.364) (0.831) 
   
Observations 242 242 
Budget Resolution Stage   
Deficitt-1 0.044 0.044 
 (0.283) (2.077) 
Divided Control, House-Senate -1.707*** -1.707** 
 (0.124) (0.723) 
Divided Control, Senate-President 0.220*** 0.220 
 (0.064) (0.302) 
Polarization -15.672*** -15.672*** 
 (1.192) (4.845) 
Budget Committee Median 0.226 0.226 
 (0.766) (4.385) 
Constant 12.463*** 12.463*** 
 (0.806) (3.309) 
   
Observations 308 308 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Chi-Square, LR Test of Independent Equations:  p=0.0000 p=0.0000 
 
 
Column (1) displays results with errors clustered by committee, while column (2) does the same 
for errors clustered by year.  For the statistically insignificant results in column 2, the p-value for 
Zone 1 is p=0.051.  For Zone 2, it is p=0.353.
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Chapter 5: The Policy Consequences of Procedural Choice: Programmatic Change Using 
Budget Reconciliation 
 
As the clock neared midnight on December 31, 2012, the Congress was locked in a 
showdown over the so-called ‘fiscal cliff.’  Unless the two chambers and the president reached a 
deal, Americans would be subject to hundreds of billions of dollars in tax increases—an average 
of $3500 per household (Williams et al. 2012).  Among the cuts set to end absent further action 
were reductions in individual rates, in rates for investment income, and in the estate tax.  
Expansions of several tax credits, including the child tax credit, were to lapse as well; extending 
all these expiring provisions was projected to cost $202 billion in 2013 alone (Bivens and 
Fieldhouse 2012).  This fight was not new; Congress had been debating it in some form since 
2010 (Herzenhorn and Calmes 2010).   
How did this dramatic conflict arise? In part, this confrontation had its roots in the 2001 
decision to use budget reconciliation to enact tax cuts at the initiative of President George W. 
Bush.1  Faced with a narrow Republican majority in both instances, the Senate majority 
leadership chose to handle the legislation using this particular majoritarian exception, described 
at length in Chapter 4.  Thanks to the Byrd Rule, the package was only eligible for 
reconciliation’s procedural protections if it did not increase the deficit outside of the ten-year 
window covered by the then-current congressional budget resolution.   To get the benefits of 
reconciliation’s reduced vote threshold, the measure’s authors had to pay the cost of a sunset 
provision.  The tax cuts would expire at the end of 2010 and return to their 2000 levels; Paul 
Krugman, referencing the effect of this provision on the estate tax, famously referred to the bill 
as the “Throw Momma from the Train Act of 2001” (Krugman 2001).  Had the cuts been enacted 
through the Senate’s ordinary rules, however, the sunset provisions would not have been 
necessary and, a decade later, one component of the fiscal cliff would have never appeared.  
                                                     
1 A second round was enacted using the same procedures in 2003. 
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The Bush tax cuts are but one example of how choices about congressional rules can 
have consequences for the policy outcomes Congress produces.  Indeed, the existence of these 
effects has been anticipated by the accounts, both theoretical and empirical, offered in earlier 
chapters.  In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that the Senate should create special rules when doing so 
would ease the passage of policies in issue areas that should enhance the electoral fortunes of the 
majority party.  The model and associated empirical tests in Chapter 4, meanwhile, suggest that 
the Senate should employ existing majoritarian procedures when doing so generates 
opportunities for policy change benefitting the majority party (that is, bringing policy closer to 
the ideal point of its median member) that are not achievable under regular order.   
Up to this point, however, we have yet to explore whether the policy outcomes produced 
under the auspices of majoritarian exceptions are actually consistent with this expectation.  Does 
the Senate use its special rules to enact policies that benefit its majority party?  To answer that 
question, I again turn to the case of budget reconciliation.  First, I propose a partisan electoral 
account of policy change in which a cartelized Senate majority party uses the reconciliation 
procedures to enhance its chances of remaining the majority in the future by delivering selective 
programmatic benefits to, and minimize selective programmatic costs borne by, the voters most 
critical to the Senate majority’s electoral success. Using a new, comprehensive dataset of 
mandatory federal programs from 1984-2011, I test the predictions of this account, first 
independently and then against a plausible, non-partisan alternative hypothesis.  The results 
suggest that reconciliation is, in fact, used by the majority party to benefit areas critical to its 
efforts to remain in control of the chamber. 
 
Reconciliation as a Partisan Programmatic Tool 
 
 The theoretical account in Chapter 4 illustrates how the initiation of the reconciliation 
process should be governed by expectations about the kind of policy change achievable under the 
procedures.  When the reconciliation-pivotal actors—the majority party median and the floor 
median—expect that the process will generate outcomes that make them better off than using 
regular order, we expect to observe reconciliation instructions directing particular committees to 
report out changes to mandatory programs in their jurisdictions. 
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 Once a committee is named, however, the process of determining exactly which 
programmatic changes to make is left, largely, to the committee itself.  At times, the instructions 
are specific as to whether the stipulated changes should be achieved through revenue-side or 
expenditure-side reforms.2  For revenue increases and spending cuts, the amount prescribed in 
the instructions is considered a floor on changes, while for revenue reductions and spending 
increases, it is a ceiling.  In addition, compliance with these levels is judged on a net basis, 
meaning that even if it is under a directive to reduce the deficit, a given committee may still use 
reconciliation to expand existing programs in its jurisdiction—or even to create new initiatives—
as long as it also makes offsetting adjustments elsewhere (Lynch 2012). 
What do these decisions look like in practice?  A specific example of programmatic 
change through reconciliation is illustrative, and, indeed, suggestive of how the majority party 
might use the rules to help it achieve its goal of remaining the majority party.  In 2003, the 
Senate Finance Committee was under a directive to increase outlays by $27 billion over ten 
years. Among the items on its agenda was an increase in the matching rate for Medicaid funds to 
states following the 2001 recession (Adams 2003). Another option was to alter the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) allocation formula to reallocate unspent funds to 
the other states instead of them reverting to the Treasury (“GOP Senate Leaders…” 2003). The 
former made it into the 2003 reconciliation bill, but the latter did not. This choice was 
consequential—the CHIP shortfalls were not addressed for another two years (Dennis 2006)—
but its cause is not immediately obvious. Could changing Medicaid rather than CHIP have 
produced more electoral benefits for the majority party? 
If reconciliation does facilitate partisan legislating, how might it do so? Here, I propose 
an account that relies on the two basic assumptions laid out in the Chapter 1.  First, I assume that 
the Senate majority party acts as a procedural cartel (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005); that is, 
rank-and-file members delegate some of their power to the leaders of their party, who, in turn, 
assume fiduciary responsibility for acting in the party’s favor. The result is a legislative process 
that is overwhelmingly biased in favor of the majority party in ways ranging from advantages in 
committee assignments to control over the agenda. Second, I assume that the proximate shared 
goal of majority party senators is for their party to maintain its majority status (Cox and 
                                                     
2 See, for example, H. Con. Res. 95, 108th Congress, 1st session. 
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McCubbins 1993, 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 2000); the benefits of holding such status are well-
documented empirically (Albouy 2013; Cox and Magar 1999). 
Previous work on how cartelized majority parties seek to remain as such focuses on the 
House of Representatives, emphasizing the need to create a positive shared brand that bolsters 
the reputation of all members equally (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). In the House, to retain 
the majority, party leaders must defend all the seats they currently hold; a common reputation of 
legislative accomplishment represents an efficient way to bolster the fortunes of the entire 
coalition. The Senate—the chamber in which reconciliation reshuffles the procedural deck to the 
majority party’s advantage—has an entirely different electoral structure. The chamber’s 
staggered, six-year terms mean that the specific building blocks of a continued majority vary 
across elections, both in terms of the number of contested seats and the particular characteristics 
of the critical constituents. Indeed, we know that this electoral structure has consequences for the 
issues on which individual members are active (Sulkin 2005).  From the perspective of the party 
as a whole, the crucial voters in the next election may look very different from their counterparts 
in the following contest in many ways.  In a given election, for example, the Senate majority 
party may be defending seats in states with many friendly voters or with relatively few. Figure 
5.1 illustrates this variance; it displays the mean share of co-partisans (as measured by the share 
of the two-party vote received by the Senate majority party’s presidential candidate in the 
previous election) in the states where the majority party is defending seats in the next election. 
Even two senators from the same state, moreover, running in consecutive elections, may have 
distinctive electoral bases to which they must appeal (Schiller 2000). In addition, the 
complicated dynamics of challenger entry and incumbent retirement decisions that transpire over 
the six years of a Senate electoral cycle (King 2013) make it exceedingly difficult to predict 
exactly which seats are likely to be the most competitive more than two years in the future. This 
uncertainty, coupled with the election-specific variation in constituency factors, means that the 
Senate majority party is best served by a specific and individualized focus on the seats it holds 
that are being contested in the next election.  
 
 
 
216 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Variation in Senate Electoral Constituencies, 1984-2011 
 
The chances of successfully defending each of these Senate seats are affected by a range 
of factors, but I assume that opportunities for party members to claim credit for accomplishments 
(Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1989) and to avoid blame for negative events (Weaver 1987) will 
increase the probability that the majority continues to the hold the seats it currently occupies. 
Indeed, the positive effects of these strategies have been established by a wealth of empirical 
work (e.g. Bickers and Stein 1996; Grimmer, Messing, and Westwood 2012; Levitt and Snyder 
1997; McGraw 1990).  The potential for simple majority rule, moreover, makes reconciliation a 
procedurally efficient way to create these kinds of opportunities through the legislative process. 
The implication of this account is straightforward: the majority party should use 
reconciliation to enact program expansions in those states where it will be defending seats in the 
next election. At the same time, it should seek to minimize the costs in those states of policy 
reforms made through the reconciliation process.  Expanding programs in these areas provides 
the majority party’s candidates with an opportunity to claim credit for changes that benefit that 
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state’s voters. Avoiding cuts, meanwhile, deprives the minority party’s challengers of an issue 
with which they can attack their opponents of the incumbent majority party. This combination of 
credit-claiming and denial of issue ammunition increases the likelihood that voters critical for the 
party’s proximate electoral success will reward majority candidates.  
This sort of electorally-motivated distribution credit claiming and blame avoidance 
opportunities is consistent with existing empirical work on earmarks in both the House (e.g. 
Engstrom and Vanberg 2010) and the Senate (e.g. Balla et. al., 2002; Shepsle et. al. 2009). By 
delivering selective benefits to, and minimizing selective costs in, states in which contests are 
imminent, the majority party is able to most efficiently match a fixed set of governmental 
resources to the places where they are likely to do the most electoral good. This need to balance 
targeting for political gain with a recognition of resource constraints is especially acute in the 
case of reconciliation, since reconciliation bills are prohibited from increasing the deficit over a 
period longer than ten years. In addition, by focusing on states with imminent contests where it 
already holds the seats, the majority can avoid the possibility that a minority member up for re-
election claims credit or avoids blame.  Together, this logic generates my primary hypothesis: 
Partisan Electoral Hypothesis: In reconciliation bills, programs that benefit voters in states in 
which the majority party is defending seats in the next election are expanded more and cut less. 
While the ways in which reconciliation alters the Senate’s procedural environment should 
allow the majority party to make advantageous changes using the procedures, the existing 
literature on programmatic change suggests several other factors that might affect the structure of 
reconciliation bills as well—some of which are also related to partisan concerns.  In the 
empirical test below, we will control for these various considerations, so it is worth explaining 
them here.  A given Congress, with a particular partisan makeup, inherits a wealth of existing 
programs from its predecessors.  Each of these programs, in turn, was the product of a set of 
negotiations between Congress and the president.  The composition of that coalition might affect 
the program’s durability in a number of ways.  If the enacting coalition was unified in terms of 
party, we might expect a program to be more robust and better immune to repeal.  Laws passed 
under unified control might be more internally consistent, be more likely to contain self-
executing provisions that protect them from future intrusion, and have delegated more authority 
for implementation to the bureaucracy, reducing the need for Congress to revisit the underlying 
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legislation as conditions change (Maltzman and Shipan 2008).  Conversely, measures enacted 
under divided government might live longer lives, as they may have required more policy 
deliberation, be more moderate or bipartisan, and be less prone to attack from the opposite party 
as a campaign issue (Ragusa 2010). 
While the empirical evidence on whether programs created under unified government or 
divided government are more likely to be repealed is mixed, these accounts share a focus on the 
composition of the enacting coalition, both across chambers and branches, as well as an 
emphasis on the determinants of policy repeal.  A related but distinct explanation allows also for 
program expansion by emphasizing not only the partisanship of the actors that authored a 
measure, but also the difference between the enacting coalition and its successors. Berry, 
Burden, and Howell (2010) argue that any given Congress might be more likely to cut those 
programs that were created by predecessors with distinctly different preferences.  Conversely, 
that same chamber might also expand those initiatives that were developed by forerunners with 
similar priorities.  The difference between the enacting and current coalition, then, is the 
principal determinant of policy change—rather than simply the makeup of the former.  
A final relevant account of coalition formation in the lawmaking process comes from 
work that emphasizes the way in which equal representation of the states in the Senate shapes the 
distributive policies produced by the chamber (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999; Lee 2000).  All 
states may be represented by two senators, but the value of given programmatic changes to those 
senators is not equal across states.  An equal-sized grant, for example, would have a greater per 
capita impact on the constituents of a small-state senator than on those of his colleague from a 
larger state.  From the perspective of a senator attempting to build a coalition in support of a 
particular change, this disparity means that the small-state senator’s vote is easier to obtain; the 
absolute size of the grant needed to achieve the same per capita benefit is decidedly smaller 
when the senator in question represents fewer constituents.  Assuming a rational coalition leader 
will seek to build the least expensive winning coalition, small-state senators will have an 
advantage over their colleagues from large states in the allocation of the distributive resources. 
Just as a coalition builder in the Senate can get more mileage out of expanding a program 
benefitting small-state senators, he can also get more mileage out of increasing funding for a 
program whose benefits are highly targeted as opposed to one in which they are broadly 
dispersed.  Take, for example, a mandatory program of the U.S. Forest Service that compensated 
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several Minnesota counties for the appraised value of the National Forest lands between 1980 
and 1995.3  If one or both of Minnesota’s senators were wavering on a reconciliation bill, a more 
generous formula for determining the allocation of those resources would likely shore up their 
support for the measure and would be of relatively low cost.  Suppose, by contrast, that one or 
both of those same senators felt that Minnesota’s doctors should receive higher reimbursements 
for care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries.  The change to that formula necessary to bring 
Minnesota’s senators on board might solidify their support in the same way that a change of 
equivalent size to the Forest Service program would, but it would come at a far higher cost, as it 
would apply to all doctors treating Medicare beneficiaries in all areas of the country. 
 
Data and Estimation 
 
Reconciliation has represented a frequent and substantial tool in the process of 
programmatic change since 1980.  Used sixteen times since 1980, the average annual deficit 
reduction achieved by a reconciliation bill is roughly $7.4 billion,4 suggesting that that the 
reconciliation rules are not just relatively minor procedures, as some have argued (Schick 2004).  
Table 5.1 illustrates this significance, showing the changes made through reconciliation to three 
major mandatory spending programs: Medicaid, student loans, and agricultural commodity price 
supports.  Each has been altered significantly through reconciliation, with notable variance in the 
magnitude of the change over time; Medicaid, notably, has been both cut and expanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 See, for example, “Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance,” 1994, volume 1, p. 100. 
4 See Appendix Table A5.1 for the size of the deficit reduction achieved by reconciliation bills. 
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Table 5.1: Changes Made through Reconciliation, Selected Programs, 1984-2009 
Year Estimated budgetary 
change, Medicaid 
Estimated budgetary 
change, federal student 
loans 
Estimated budgetary 
change, USDA commodity 
price supports 
1985 -$40 million (one year) -$1.3 billion (five years) -$235 million (three years) 
1986 +$170 million (one year) -$644 million (one year)  
1987 -$360 million (one year) -$250 million (one year) -$215 million (two years) 
1989 +$183 million (one year) -$185 million (three years) -$52 million (one year) 
1990 -$1.7 billion (five years)  -$2.9 billion (five years) 
1993 -$7.2 billion (five years) -$3.6 billion (five years) -$460 million (five years) 
1995 -$163.4 billion (seven years) -$3.5 billion (seven years)  
1996 -$4.1 billion (seven years)  -$486 million (seven years) 
1997 -$10.4 billion (five years) -$1.8 billion (five years)  
2005 -$6.9 billion (five years) -$11.9 billion (five years)  
2007  -$13.8 billion (five years)  
2009 +$174.5 billion (ten years) -$5 billion (five years)  
For source information, see Appendix Table A5.1. Figures have been rounded. Different time windows for different 
estimates are due to available source material and changes in Congressional Budget Office procedures for cost 
estimates. 
 
To test whether these changes—and those made to countless other mandatory 
programs—are consistent with my theory of majority party power, I construct a comprehensive 
dataset of domestic mandatory spending programs in existence between 1984 and 2011, 
representing all the programs with the potential to be altered via reconciliation. The data come 
from the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance and represent an extension of the data used by 
Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010).5 Like any data source, the CFDA has limitations, omitting 
some kinds of mandatory spending. First, it does not contain any mandatory foreign activities, 
nor does it contain any benefits or assistance that are only available to current employees of the 
federal government, either civilian or military.  This latter category also contains military and 
civilian retirement benefits, which comprised roughly 7% of mandatory spending in 2011 
(Austin and Levit 2012).6  Second, the CFDA does not contain information on mandatory 
components of the budget that flow only to other federal entities, like the Postal Service and 
                                                     
5 See https://www.cfda.gov/. I expand the data to cover programs created prior to 1971, as well as those initiated 
since 2004. The Berry, Burden, and Howell data is itself an expansion of data assembled by Bickers and Stein 
(1991) that has been widely use to study spending on federal programs (e.g. Stein and Bickers 1995; Lowry and 
Potoski 2004).  
6 Other excluded categories of funding are: solicited contracts under procurement laws; personnel recruitment 
programs of individual federal departments; new programs proposed in the Budget for which appropriations have 
not been enacted; and programs that are no longer active due to expired authorization or appropriation. 
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Amtrak.   Third, because its focus is on programmatic assistance, the CFDA does not contain 
information about non-programmatic components of the federal budget, such as user fees and 
refundable tax credits.  Substantively, however, the CFDA-based compilation of programs 
covered the 89% of the outlays on programs identified by the Congressional Budget Office as 
major mandatory spending programs in 2011.7 
In addition to these data limitations, my analysis of patterns of programmatic change, 
while wide-ranging, is constrained in several other ways worth noting. First, I can only speak to 
changes to existing programs; I cannot analyze programs created by reconciliation bills. To do 
the latter would require a universe of all possible mandatory spending programs that could have 
been created in a given year. Other efforts at constructing such a universe of potential actions 
(e.g. Binder 2003) have involved general issues (i.e., farm subsidies) rather than the specific 
programs (i.e., dairy price supports). Second, my analysis does not speak to the revenue side of 
the reconciliation process. The majority of the federal government’s revenue comes via taxes, 
and because no tractable list of individual tax provisions exists, I cannot create a list of tax issues 
on the reconciliation agenda at the same level of detail as I can for the spending programs. 
Finally, I am only able to speak to whether or not a given reconciliation bill cut, expanded, or did 
not change a particular program; I cannot analyze the magnitude of changes for two reasons. 
First, the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) estimates of budgetary changes are made over a 
multiple year window, but the amount spent on each program is measured annually. As a result, 
the predicted size of the programmatic change is not directly comparable to the overall spending 
on the program. In addition, prior to 1997, the window used by the CBO was generally five 
years; more recently, it has generally been ten (Graetz and Shapiro 2005). This variation prevents 
me from obtaining consistent, annual measures of the magnitude of each programmatic change.  
Even with these limitations, I am able to assemble information on 3,211 separate 
programs, both mandatory and discretionary, in existence for all or part of period between 1984 
and 2011. To determine which of these programs are mandatory, I match the programs to their 
corresponding budgetary accounts using the Office of Management and Budget’s Public Budget 
                                                     
7 See “Table 3.2: Mandatory Outlays Projected in CBO’s Baseline,” The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal 
Years 2012-2022 < http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/01-31-2012_Outlook.pdf>.  The 
programs listed by the CBO not included in the CFDA are: MERHCF (military health insurance); earned income 
and child tax credits; Making Work Pay and other tax credits; Federal Civilian and Military Retirement; Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac; and TARP.  The “Other Programs: Other” category, which comprises 3.5% of mandatory outlays, 
was not included in the calculation above. 
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Database (Office of Management and Budget 2012), which classifies each account as 
“discretionary,” “mandatory,” or both.8 Next, using CBO data, I map each mandatory account to 
the Senate committee that authorizes its programs. The result is a list of 539 programs and 7,054 
program-year observations.  
To construct the final dependent variable for the analysis, I assemble a list of all 
programs that were ‘reconciliation-eligible’ in a given year; to be eligible, a program must be 
authorized by a committee mentioned in that year’s reconciliation instructions. For each such 
program, I then consult that year’s final reconciliation bill to determine if the measure altered the 
program.9 Finally, for all changed programs, I use information from the CBO to determine 
whether the reconciliation bill increased or decreased the size of the program. If, on net, the 
changes made to a program would increase the deficit, I consider that an expansion. Conversely, 
if the CBO predicts a net decrease in the deficit, I interpret that as a cut.10 The result of this 
coding is a trichotomous variable by which each of the 2,292 reconciliation-eligible program-
year observations are coded as either cut, expanded, or not changed.11  
Testing my principal hypothesis about the role of partisan electoral considerations in 
program change requires measuring the degree to which each program benefits voters in states 
where the majority party is defending a seat in the next election. To do this, I use data from the 
Census Bureau’s Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR), which tabulates federal 
expenditures and obligations on individual programs at the state level, to calculate state-by-state 
spending for approximately 69 percent of the mandatory program-year observations described 
                                                     
8 Accounts containing both types of budget authority are classified as mandatory if more than half of their budget 
authority was mandatory (Government Accountability Office 2006).  For programs where this classification 
produces a coding that varies across years, I count the program as mandatory for all years if in more than half of the 
years it is classified as mandatory. 
9 Information on instructions collected from each congressional budget resolution as listed in Heniff (2014). 
Citations for each reconciliation bill are provided in Lynch (2010).  In the analyses below, I include the changes 
made in the final congressional versions of the three reconciliation measures that were vetoed by the president 
(1995, 1999, and 2000) since we would expect the Senate to have used the rules to make programmatic changes 
benefitting the majority party regardless of the bill’s final outcome.  The results in Table 5.2 are robust to counting 
reconciliation-eligible programs in those years as unchanged.  
10 Information on deficit implications comes from the CBO’s cost estimates, or from the CQ Almanac summaries of 
each reconciliation bill. See Appendix Table A5.2 for a full list of citations.  
11 The dataset also contains an additional 4,762 program-year observations. These are programs that could not be 
altered through reconciliation because their authorizing committees were not named in the reconciliation 
instructions. Because the process of generating the instructions might produce selection bias in the sample, I 
estimate a Heckman selection model in Appendix Table A5.3 using the independent variables from the instructions 
model in Chapter 4 as the first stage predictors. The results are consistent with those in Table 5.2, but a Wald test 
indicating selection bias carries a p-value of 0.26; thus, a selection model is not indicated. The results are also robust 
to treating reconciliation-ineligible programs as ‘not changed;’ see Appendix Table A5.4. 
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above.12 To test my primary, partisan electoral hypothesis, I determine the share of that spending 
that went, in the previous year, to states in which the Senate majority party would be defending a 
seat in the next election. Program-years demonstrate ample variation on this measure, ranging 
from no spending in ‘defense’ states (approximately 3% of reconciliation-eligible observations) 
to all spending in such areas (roughly 1% of observations); on average, roughly 34% of a 
program’s funding goes to ‘defense’ states.  
The CFDA data also allows me to construct Gini coefficients for each program to control 
for geographic dispersion; a value of 1 indicates all spending is concentrated in a single state, 
and a value of a 0 reflects all states receiving equal amounts. I use authorization information 
provided in the CFDA to establish whether the program was created under unified or divided 
government and, following Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010), I calculate the share of seats held 
by the majority party at the time of enactment and compare that with the share of seats held by 
that same party in each year. This difference is included as either a seat gain or seat loss.13  
In addition, contextual factors at the year, committee, and program levels may influence 
decisions over which programs to alter.  I include the current year budget deficit/surplus as a 
share of total outlays, with the expectation that larger deficits will correspond to higher 
likelihoods of programmatic change.  At the committee level, a larger reconciliation directive 
might also increase the probability that a program is altered, so I include the logged dollar size of 
the committee’s instructions. Finally, at the program level, I include the log of the total spending 
on the program in the previous year and the share of the funds spent in states represented on the 
committee of jurisdiction, to control for program-level dynamics.14 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
12 Of the remaining 30.7%, approximately 3% are observations for which there is no spending data from the 
previous year because the program is in its first year. The remaining observations are program-years for which the 
CFDA indicates that the program existed, but the CFFR does not indicate spending. Of these, roughly 8% of the 
total are gaps in the data; the CFFR indicates funding in year t and year t+2 but not t+1, while the CFDA indicates 
uninterrupted funding. The results presented below in Table 2 are robust to both assigning zeroes to key independent 
variables in the first year of a program’s life and to carrying forward prior observations to address gaps (i.e., using 
the value from year t in year t+1 to fill the gap between years t and t+2); see Appendix Table A5.5. 
13 In 1965, for example, the Democrats held 68% of the Senate’s seats. In 2011, they held 53%. In 2011, then, seat 
loss would be 15% for Medicare, while seat gain would be zero.  
14 All monetary variables are measured in 2009 dollars. 
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Results 
 
Because the dependent variable in this analysis is trichotomous—cut, no change, 
expand—I first estimate an ordered logit model with “no change” as the middle value.  To 
address the structure of the data (programs nested in committees, with observations across 
multiple years), I follow Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011)’s scheme for clustering within 
one dimension (here, programs) across time, as well as within that dimension in a given year.15  
The results are presented in Table 5.2, Model 1. Since these are ordered logit coefficients, 
a negative coefficient indicates that increases in that independent variable correspond to a 
decrease in the likelihood of achieving a higher value of the dependent variable. Here, that move 
from a lower value to a higher value would be moving from a cut to no change, or from no 
change to an expansion. Conversely, for positive coefficients, the likelihood of observing a 
higher level of the dependent variable increases with each one unit increase in the independent 
variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
15 The results are also robust to two-way clustering by year and committee.  To address concerns that clustered 
errors are insufficient to deal with the multi-level structure of the data, the Appendix contains two crossed random 
effects specifications: one with committee and year effects, and one with an additional program-level effect nested 
within the committee-level effect. The results are robust; see Appendix Table A5.6.  
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Table 5.2: Probability of Change via Reconciliation, 1984-2011 
 
  (1) (2) 
Share of Spending to Areas Where Majority Party is Defending a Seat 0.848*** -0.821** 
 (0.328) (0.374) 
Divided Government at Enactment 0.250 -0.216 
 (0.188) (0.181) 
Enacting Majority Seat Gain 0.226 -8.256 
 (8.310) (9.812) 
Enacting Majority Seat Loss -0.102 1.662* 
 (1.231) (0.875) 
Gini Coefficient -0.529* 0.835 
 (0.302) (0.670) 
Share of Spending to Committee Members 0.043 -0.451 
 (0.256) (0.511) 
Logged Spending on Program -0.068 0.319*** 
 (0.048) (0.058) 
Size of Reconciliation Instructions (Log) -0.042** 1.096*** 
 (0.020) (0.254) 
Current Budget Deficit -1.234 -4.372*** 
 (1.301) (1.558) 
Cut (1) -4.087***   
 (1.144)  
Cut (2) 0.752  
 (1.117)  
Constant  -35.821*** 
  (6.988) 
   
Log Pseudolikelihood -919.661 -610.875 
Pseudo-R2 0.014 0.188 
Observations 1,589 1,589 
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
The results are consistent with the Partisan Electoral Hypothesis: as the share of 
spending on a given program in the Senate majority party’s ‘defense’ states increases, that 
program is more likely to be expanded in a reconciliation bill and less likely to be cut. The left 
panel of Figure 5.2 presents the predicted probability of cuts in a program as the percentage of 
spending on that program in ‘defense’ states goes from zero to 75%, and right panel does the 
226 
 
 
same for the predicted probability of expansion; the rug plot across the bottom of each figure 
depicts the actual distribution of the ‘defense’ variable, and all other independent variables are 
held at their means. Clearly, as constituents in these states benefit more from a given program, 
that program is more likely to be expanded and less likely to be cut. The probability of an 
expansion is 4.2% when none of the funds are spent in ‘defense’ states and 7.6% when 75% are 
expended in those areas. Moving through the middle range of the variable, the comparison is 
smaller—a 5.1% chance of expansion when 25% of the funds go to ‘defense’ states versus a 
6.5% chance when 55% of the spending does. While the difference in probabilities appears 
slight, the fact that program expansion through reconciliation is itself a rare event means that 
even small increases are notable; a program with 75% of its funds spent in ‘defense’ states is, 
after all, almost twice as likely to be expanded as one where no funds are. 
Figure 5.2: Probability of Program Change, Ordered Logit Model 
 
The results for program cuts are similar. Here, the probability of a cut for a program in 
which all funds go outside of ‘defense’ states is 15.4%, compared to 8.8% for one with 75% of 
expenditures in ‘defense’ states. Moving from 25% spent in ‘defense’ states to 55%, meanwhile, 
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corresponds to a shift in the likelihood of a cut from 12.8% to 10.2%. Again, the absolute 
difference between the probabilities is small, but the rarity of change through reconciliation 
makes even a shift of three or six percentage points notable. 
Because the ordered nature of the dependent variable in Model 1 makes the results 
somewhat cumbersome to interpret, I also provide, in Model 2, a simpler analysis: a 
straightforward logit estimation, with the cut and expand categories collapsed as “change” and 
compared to those programs not changed.16 Here, the coefficient on the variable measuring the 
share of spending going to ‘defense’ states is negative and statistically significant; this indicates 
that as more of a program’s funds going to states where the majority party is defending a seat in 
the next election, the less likely the program is to be changed. Here, moving from zero percent of 
funds in ‘defense’ states to 75 percent decreases the probability of change by roughly half 
(11.2% versus 6.4%).  Given that roughly 68% of the changes to programs through reconciliation 
represent cuts, this negative relationship is intuitive; most changes are reductions in spending, 
and we would expect fewer of these as the share of a program’s funding going to ‘defense’ states 
increases.   These results are depicted graphically in Figure 5.3. 
 
                                                     
16 This also addresses another issue with ordered logit models: the proportional odds assumption, which supposes 
equal distance between each ordered category. This assumption, as tested using a Brant test, is frequently violated in 
applied work, and the estimation in Table 5.2 is no exception. One common response is to use a simpler 
dichotomous model (see Long and Freese 2006). 
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Figure 5.3: Probability of Program Change, Logit Model 
 
 
The results in Table 5.2 are clearly consistent with the Partisan Electoral Hypothesis.  
While that evidence is of primary interest, it is also worth noting that the results provide some 
additional insight into the other accounts of programmatic change described above.  In both 
Models 1 and 2, the variable measuring authorization under divided government does not 
achieve statistical significance (p= 0.19 and p=0.23, respectively), but is in a direction consistent 
with Ragusa (2010)’s account; creation under divided government may make programs more 
stable.  Results for the partisan change account are similarly mixed.  Neither the seat gain nor 
seat loss measures are statistically or substantively significant in Model 1.  In Model 2, however, 
we see the same results for the seat gain measure, but a statistically significant effect for seat 
loss. Given that most of the changes made through the process represent reductions, this 
relationship is expected: when the enacting party’s current coalition is smaller, a program is 
more likely to be cut through reconciliation.  Finally, in Model 1, the Gini coefficient, measuring 
geographic concentration of spending, is negative and statistically significant.  The negative 
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coefficient indicates that as a program benefits constituents in fewer states, it is less likely to be 
left alone or expanded, suggesting that the effect of spending has more to do with constituency 
effects than coalition-building.  The more members affected, the greater the chance that some or 
all of those senators are up for re-election in the next cycle.  (In Model 2, the coefficient is 
positive but does not reach conventional levels of significance (p=0.21).) 
Finally, it is worth noting that several of the contextual controls behave intuitively. 
Larger programs are more likely to be cut, as are programs authorized by committees with larger 
reconciliation instructions. Lastly, programmatic cuts are more likely in years with larger 
projected budget deficits—precisely the periods when members of Congress should feel pressure 
to rein in spending. While the Senate majority party’s electoral concerns affect policy change 
through reconciliation, decision-making does not exist in an economic vacuum. 
 
The Role of Electoral Competition  
 
Table 5.2, then, suggests that majority party ‘defense’ states fare better under 
reconciliation; within those states, however, not all seats are created equal.  While inter-electoral 
uncertainty should lead Senate majority party to focus on the next election, the contested seats 
will vary in their competitiveness. The more competitive the race is expected to be, the more 
important are credit claiming and blame avoidance opportunities in increasing the probability 
that the seat is retained.  To explore this implication of my theory, I divide ‘defense’ states into 
two groups: those in which the majority party seats being defended in the next election were won 
with less than 55 percent of the vote in the previous election (as competitive seats) and those 
won with greater than 55 percent of the vote (safe seats).  The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 5.3.  The effect for the share of funds going to competitive states is positive 
and statistically significant; this suggests the majority party is indeed drawing an intuitive 
distinction among the seats it is defending and making policy change accordingly.  (The effect of 
the share of resources going to safe states, meanwhile, is also positive, but carries a p-value of 
0.15, preventing us from rejecting the null hypothesis at conventional significance thresholds.)   
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Table 5.3: Probability of Program Change via Reconciliation, Ordered Logit, Including 
Senate Electoral Competitiveness, 1984-2011 
 
Share of Spending to Competitive Majority Party Defense States 1.316** 
 (0.535) 
Share of Spending to Non-Competitive Majority Party Defense States 0.554 
 (0.382) 
Divided Government at Enactment 0.244 
 (0.187) 
Enacting Majority Seat Gain 0.040 
 (8.133) 
Enacting Majority Seat Loss 0.113 
 (1.221) 
Gini Coefficient -0.555* 
 (0.293) 
Share of Spending to Committee Members 0.048 
 (0.258) 
Logged Spending on Program -0.068 
 (0.047) 
Size of Reconciliation Instructions (Log) -0.045** 
 (0.021) 
Current Budget Deficit -1.218 
 (1.287) 
Cut (1) -4.206*** 
 (1.154) 
Cut (2) 0.641 
 (1.121) 
  
Log Pseudolikelihood -918.469 
Pseudo-R2 0.016 
Observations 1,589 
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Do Population Differences Matter? 
 
One possible critique of the results in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 is that they do not account for 
population differences in calculating the relative spending that occurs in different categories of 
states.  Could the effects that support the partisan electoral hypothesis be driven by the fact that 
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high population states are likely to have larger shares of spending on broad-based programs like 
Medicare?  From a theoretical standpoint, we might argue that important variation is captured 
when a large amount of the funds for a program go to a state because that state has a large 
population.  Suppose, for example, a Democratic Senate majority is trying to help an incumbent 
in California, like when Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) was running a reasonably close race 
against former Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly Fiorina in 2010.  If a programmatic change through 
reconciliation was going to be made in order to help Boxer’s electoral prospects, it will 
necessarily have to be one with large budgetary consequences, merely because the senator in 
question represents a large state.   Even ignoring this theoretical concern, the question of 
measurement is also a vexing one.  What is the appropriate denominator in a by-program 
population adjustment?  Possibilities include total state population, the total population 
participating in the program in a given state, and the total population in the state eligible for the 
program. 
 Because only the first of these (total state population) is readily available, I elect to use it 
as a first attempt at addressing these concerns.  In Table 5.4, I present an analysis where the 
spending-related variables (the share of spending going to ‘defense’ states; the Gini coefficient; 
and the share of spending to committee members) are all adjusted for population as follows.  
Before calculating the share of spending going to states in a given category, I multiply the 
amount in each state on each program by that state’s share of the national population, yielding a 
weighted share. 
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Table 5.4: Probability of Program Change via Reconciliation, Ordered Logit, Weighting by 
Population, 1984-2011 
 
Share of Spending to Areas Where Majority Party is Defending a Seat, Adjusted for Population 0.564** 
 (0.282) 
Divided Government at Enactment 0.276 
 (0.189) 
Enacting Majority Seat Gain 0.544 
 (8.213) 
Enacting Majority Seat Loss -0.095 
 (1.231) 
Gini Coefficient 0.014 
 (0.505) 
Share of Spending to Committee Members 0.278 
 (0.329) 
Logged Spending on Program -0.055 
 (0.047) 
Size of Reconciliation Instructions (Log) -0.044** 
 (0.020) 
Current Budget Deficit -1.094 
 (1.339) 
Cut (1) -3.527*** 
 (1.332) 
Cut (2) 1.301 
 (1.262) 
  
Log Pseudolikelihood -921.220 
Pseudo-R2 0.013 
Observations 1,589 
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 As we can see, the results for the Partisan Electoral Hypothesis are robust to this 
population adjustment, though the coefficient is smaller than the comparable one in Table 5.2, 
Model 1.  In Table 5.4, the difference in probability of a cut to a program where none of the 
funds go to majority party ‘defense’ states versus 75% is roughly 4.4 percentage points, as 
compared to 6.6 percentage points in Table 2.  This suggests that the Senate majority party may 
be balancing a set of competing concerns in choosing which programs to change.  On one hand, 
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having 51 members in the chamber bestows the benefits of being the majority, regardless of the 
composition of that majority; this suggests that each senator’s seat is of equal value when 
building the majority coalition.  On the other hand, the majority leadership may be concerned 
about the overall budgetary consequences of a particular set of programmatic changes, and may 
want to make strategic tradeoffs among programs, and the senators whose states benefit from 
those programs, in trying to increase the likelihood of retaining majority status.  The notion, 
suggested by the smaller effect of partisan considerations when we adjust for population, that 
coalition leaders are cognizant of the overall cost of assembling a majority is consistent with the 
account, described above, of the distributional consequences of varying state sizes across 
senators (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999; Lee 2000). 
 
A Non-Partisan Alternative Hypothesis 
 
The results described thus far, both here and in earlier chapters, provide evidence 
consistent with the notion that majoritarian exceptions are created and used to the Senate 
majority party’s advantage.  I do not explore explicitly, however, what patterns might hold if my 
account were not true.  That is, what patterns should we expect if decisions about the 
development and deployment of special rules are made in a non-partisan way? 
Here, I am able to investigate one explicitly non-partisan alternative hypothesis which 
arises from the fact that the simple floor majority needed to enact a reconciliation bill in the 
Senate is not necessarily a unified coalition of majority party members.  Thus, it is possible that 
reconciliation does not advantage the majority party, but rather the group of 51 senators with the 
most similar preferences.  Indeed, Krehbiel’s (1998; see also Brady and Volden 2006) pivotal 
politics theory makes straightforward predictions about which senators will be most affected by 
reconciliation—expectations unrelated to the partisanship of the legislators in question.  Because 
reconciliation bills are exempt from a filibuster, the filibuster pivot—and the other members 
located spatially between him and the floor median—lack the ability to demand that policy 
reflect their preferences in exchange for their support.  In other words, the senators in this portion 
of the ideological middle (that is, between the filibuster pivot and the floor median) are explicitly 
disadvantaged by the use of reconciliation, making programs that disproportionately benefit their 
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constituents more vulnerable to cuts than they are under regular order.  If this non-partisan 
account of Senate organization is true, we should expect the following: 
Pivotal Politics Hypothesis: In reconciliation bills, programs that benefit voters in states 
represented by senators with ideological locations between the floor median and the filibuster 
pivot are cut more and expanded less than programs that benefit senators outside that interval. 
 Results of a model specification including a variable measuring the share of a program’s 
spending that goes to states where at least one senator is in the filibuster interval appear in Table 
5.5.  The results for the partisan electoral hypothesis are the same as in earlier models; as the 
share of spending to majority party ‘defense’ states increases, the probability that a program is 
expanded relative to being cut or left alone increases, and the chance that it is cut relative to 
being left unchanged or expanded decreases.  In addition, we also see that, while the coefficient 
on the filibuster interval variable is in the expected direction, it is not statistically significant 
(p=0.38).  While an inability to reject the null hypothesis does not constitute evidence that the 
hypothesis is false, the results in Table 5.5 provide no support for one important, non-partisan 
account of the patterns in reconciliation’s use. 
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Table 5.5: Probability of Program Change via Reconciliation, Ordered Logit, Including 
Filibuster Interval Measure, 1984-2011 
 
Share of Spending to Areas Where Majority Party is Defending a Seat 0.860*** 
 (0.318) 
Share of Spending to Filibuster Interval States -0.445 
 (0.504) 
Divided Government at Enactment 0.255 
 (0.190) 
Enacting Majority Seat Gain 0.264 
 (8.291) 
Enacting Majority Seat Loss -0.142 
 (1.224) 
Gini Coefficient -0.538* 
 (0.304) 
Share of Spending to Committee Members 0.049 
 (0.257) 
Logged Spending on Program -0.067 
 (0.048) 
Size of Reconciliation Instructions (Log) -0.042** 
 (0.020) 
Current Budget Deficit -1.356 
 (1.277) 
Cut (1) -4.129*** 
 (1.154) 
Cut (2) 0.713 
 (1.126) 
  
Log Pseudolikelihood -919.296 
Pseudo-R2 0.015 
Observations 1,589 
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Conclusion 
 
While we cannot test whether the outcomes produced by reconciliation differ from those 
generated by an identical, counterfactual world in which the Senate is forced to continually 
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overcome the filibuster hurdle, the results presented above provide the first systematic evidence 
to date that the Senate majority party is able to translate majoritarian procedural exceptions like 
reconciliation into beneficial policy outcomes, with advantageous policy consequences defined 
with respect to constituents in states where its members are up for re-election. It also helps 
resolve the puzzle of why, in 2003, the Senate Finance Committee chose to expand Medicaid and 
not SCHIP. In 2002, 25% of Medicaid funding went to states in which the Republican Senate 
majority was defending seats in 2004, while only 19% of SCHIP funding did; expanding 
Medicaid gave the Republicans more electoral bang for their programmatic buck.  
By providing evidence consistent with the notion that the majority party uses 
reconciliation to its advantage, these results provide additional support for the accounts offered 
in earlier chapters.  Previously, we saw that majoritarian exceptions are created and deployed in 
ways that should benefit the majority party; here, we also observe that the outcomes achieved by 
using the procedures should also deliver partisan benefits.  My results indicate that the majority 
party’s influence extends to systematically directing governmental resources in its favor and, 
importantly, does not rely on the roll call record, avoiding longstanding debates over the ability 
to identify party effects on voting (e.g. Krehbiel 1993; Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999).  
In addition, my findings are in the context of a theoretical account that takes seriously the 
prospect of a cartelized majority party, but derives specific predictions about how such a 
coalition should behave in the unique electoral context of the Senate.  
There is reason to believe, moreover, that reconciliation is actually a difficult test of the 
Senate majority’s ability to leverage a majoritarian procedural exception.  The required 
bargaining with the House and the president introduces competing goals, yet the Senate is still 
able to steer policy change in its preferred direction.  This is true even when we control for two 
sets of House-related electoral variables, as we see in Table 5.6.  In Model 1, I include a variable 
measuring the share of spending on a program going to states where the number of marginal 
House districts (i.e., those where the last election was decided by fewer than 10 points) is above 
the national mean number of such districts in a state.  In Model 2, I include the share of spending 
to states where the House majority party controls a majority of the House delegation.  In both 
cases, we see that the results for the share of spending going to majority party ‘defense’ states 
continues to predict the programmatic changes that my theoretical account anticipates. 
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Table 5.6: Probability of Program Change via Reconciliation, Controlling for House 
Characteristics, 1984-2011 
 
  (1) (2) 
Share of Spending to Areas Where Majority Party is Defending a Seat 0.825*** 0.799** 
 (0.316) (0.333) 
Share of Spending to States with More Competitive Districts than 
National Average 0.145  
 (0.473)  
Share of Spending to States where House Majority Party Controls a 
Majority of the House Districts  -0.251 
  (0.486) 
Divided Government at Enactment 0.253 0.246 
 (0.186) (0.188) 
Enacting Majority Seat Gain 0.254 0.131 
 (8.331) (8.267) 
Enacting Majority Seat Loss -0.149 0.005 
 (1.170) (1.142) 
Gini Coefficient -0.539* -0.529* 
 (0.300) (0.298) 
Share of Spending to Committee Members 0.048 0.061 
 (0.265) (0.268) 
Logged Spending on Program -0.069 -0.066 
 (0.048) (0.048) 
Size of Reconciliation Instructions (Log) -0.042** -0.041** 
 (0.020) (0.019) 
Current Budget Deficit -1.095 -1.060 
 (1.433) (1.300) 
Cut (1) -4.028*** -4.159*** 
 (1.113) (1.116) 
Cut (2) 0.811 0.682 
 (1.078) (1.086) 
   
Observations 1,589 1,589 
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
In addition, current interpretation of the rules restricts the chamber to one reconciliation 
bill addressing outlays each year, preventing the majority from returning repeatedly to the 
procedures as changing political circumstances warrant (Keith and Heniff 2005). Similarly, 
Senate precedents interpret the limit on “debate” as a restriction on actual discussion, rather than 
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on consideration entirely. At the conclusion of the permitted 20 hours, senators may continue to 
offer and vote on amendments, provided no actual floor time is expended on debate; this allows 
members to vote on many alternative policy proposals that may be opposed by the majority party 
(Heniff 2010b). Finally, the Byrd Rule prevents reconciliation bills from including ‘extraneous 
matter’ for which the principal goal is not deficit reduction, such as a Republican-favored 
provision limiting cash benefits to women receiving public assistance who have additional 
children in 1996 (Keith 2010). Because each of these restrictions temper the ability of the 
majority party to leverage reconciliation, it is even more notable that I uncover a strong partisan 
trend in its use. 
The results here offer evidence on questions of majority party power that is firmly 
anchored in choices about observable, programmatic policy choices. Often, our ability to draw 
conclusions about the policies on which Congress focuses is limited by an inability to define a 
relevant set of possible issues.17 I address this problem in a new way, defining a set of policies on 
which Congress might be active as those domestic programs funded through mandatory 
spending. This universe is both broad in its scope and specific in its unit of analysis. It covers a 
sizable share of the ways in which citizens receive benefits from the federal government, and 
analyzes congressional choices at something close to the level at which lawmakers actually view 
them. These findings also, then, speak to other questions that have been plagued by selection 
issues, including how issues move from the systemic agenda, or the items on which there is 
broad agreement about the importance of attention, and a formal agenda, or the policy questions 
that are ripe for active consideration (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1984).  
The exploration in earlier chapters of majoritarian exceptions—of which reconciliation is 
but one case—certainly adds to our understanding of congressional lawmaking.  Analyzing their 
creation and noting their existence is, however, somewhat unsatisfying unless we can also 
establish that their use matters for the kinds of policies that Congress is able to produce. Based 
on the evidence presented here, I argue that these majoritarian procedures can be translated into 
programmatic changes that advantage the majority party.   What consequences might this pattern 
of outcomes have for efforts to reduce congressional obstruction?  I take up that question, and 
several others about the implications of this work, in the concluding chapter.
                                                     
17 See Binder (2003) and Adler and Wilkerson (2012) for two existing approaches. 
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Appendix 5.1 
Table A5.1: Effect of Budget Reconciliation Bills on the Federal Budget Deficit 
Year Estimated Net Effect on 
Federal Budget Deficit 
Estimated Federal Budget 
Deficit/Surplus 
1980 -$8.2 billion (one year) -$73.1 billion 
1981 -$130.6 billion (three years) -$73.9 billion 
1982 -$129.1 billion (three years) -$120.6 billion 
1985 -$24.9 billion (four years) -$207.7 billion 
1986 -$17.0 billion (three years) -$237.9 billion 
1987 -$39.6 billion (three years) -$168.4 billion 
1989 -$14.7 billion (one year) -$205.4 billion 
1990 -$236 billion (five years) -$277.6 billion 
1993 -$433 billion (five years) -$300.4 billion 
1996 -$54.6 billion (five years) -$174 billion 
1997 -$127.2 billion (five years) -$103.2 billion 
2001 +$552 billion (five years) -$32.4 billion 
2003 +$342.9 billion (five years) -$538.4 billion 
2005 +$31 billion (four years) -$493.6 billion 
2007 -$752 million (five years) -$342.2 billion 
2009 -$5.0 billion (five years) -$1.5 trillion 
Source: For reconciliation bills in years 1981-2007 excluding 1989, see Thomas E. Mann, Norman J. Ornstein, 
Raffaela Wakeman, and Fogelson-Lubliner, “Reconciling with the Past,” New York Times 6 March 2010; for 1980, 
see “$8.2 Billion Reconciliation Bill Cleared,” CQ Almanac 1980, 36th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Quarterly, 1981), 124-130; for 1989, see “Reconciliation Cuts Total $14.7 Billion,” CQ Almanac 1989, 45th ed. 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1990), 92-113; for 2009, see “Cost Estimate: H.R. 4872, the 
Reconciliation Act of 2010,” Congressional Budget Office, 20 March 2010, 
<http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/amendreconprop.pdf>, Table 7. For federal 
budget deficit/surplus data, see data supplement to “Updated Budget Projections: 2014 to 2024,” Congressional 
Budget Office, 14 April 2014, Table 1 <http://www.cbo.gov/publication/45249>. 
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Table A5.2: Citations for Estimated Budget Effects of Reconciliation Bills 
Year Source 
1985 S. Rpt. 99-146, “Report to Accompany S. 1730, Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act 
of 1985,” 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); “Holdover Deficit-Reduction Bill Approved,” CQ 
Almanac 1986, pp. 555-59; “Pension Safeguards Added to Deficit-Cut Bill,” CQ Almanac 
1986, pp. 592-94 (for additional information on pension insurance, unemployment 
insurance, and railroad benefits provisions); “Social Security Adjustments,” CQ Almanac 
1986, p. 594 (for Social Security); “Congress Enacts Sweeping Overhaul of Tax Law,” CQ 
Almanac 1986, pp. 491-524 (for coal miners’ disability); “Small Business Programs,” CQ 
Almanac 1986, pp. 322-23. 
1986 “$11.7 Billion Deficit-Reduction Bill Cleared,” CQ Almanac 1986, pp. 559-576 (for all 
committees except Finance); “Key Provisions of Fiscal 1987 Reconciliation Bill.” CQ 
Weekly (October 25, 1986): 2710 (for Finance Committee); “Major Medicare, Medicaid 
Changes Enacted,” CQ Almanac 1986, pp. 252-59 (for additional information on Medicare 
and Medicaid) 
1987 “Reconciliation Bill Raises Taxes, Cuts Spending,” CQ Almanac 1987, pp. 615-627 (for 
Agriculture, Banking, Energy, and Environment and Public Works Committees); “Congress 
OKs Medicare Cuts, Medicaid Changes,” CQ Almanac 1987, pp. 558-567 (for Finance 
Committee); Elizabeth Wehr, “Taxes, Medicare Among Key Disputes... ...As Reconciliation 
Bills Go to Conference,” CQ Weekly (December 12, 1987): 3032-33 (for Labor and Human 
Resources Committee and additional information on Agriculture Committee); “Disability 
Appeals Protected,” CQ Almanac 1987, p. 545 (for additional information on Social Security 
Disability Insurance) 
1989 “Reconciliation Cuts Total $14.7 Billion,” CQ Almanac 1989, pp. 92-113 (for all 
committees except Labor and Human Resources); Phil Kuntz, “Curbs on Loan Defaulters,” 
CQ Weekly (December 9, 1989): 3369 (for Labor and Human Resources Committee); 
“Modest Expansion OK’d in Medicaid Coverage,” CQ Almanac 1989, pp. 171-75 (for 
additional information on Medicaid); “Physician-Payment Overhaul Enacted,” CQ Almanac 
1989, pp. 157-67 (for additional information on Medicare); “Welfare in Reconciliation,” CQ 
Almanac 1989, p. 224 (for additional information on Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children); “Congress Moves to Stem Student-Loan Losses,” CQ Almanac 189, pp. 189-91 
(for additional information on student loans) 
1990 “Budget Adopted After Long Battle,” CQ Almanac 1990, pp. 111-166; “Medicaid Expands 
To Aid Poor Children” CQ Almanac 1990, pp. 569-71 (for additional information on 
Medicaid); “Medicare Beneficiaries To Pay More,” CQ Almanac 1990, pp. 563-68 (for 
additional information on Medicare); Carl W. Ek and Charles E. Hanrahan, “Agricultural 
Commodity and Trade Policy: The Farm Bill, the Budget, and the GATT,” Congressional 
Research Service 25 February 1991 (for additional information on Agriculture Committee). 
1993 “Deficit-Reduction Bill Nearly Passes,” CQ Almanac 1993, pp. 107-124; Ralph M. Chite, 
“Agriculture and the Budget,” Congressional Research Service 25 October 1993 (for 
additional information on Agriculture Committee). 
1995 “No Winners in Budget Showdown,” CQ Almanac 1995, pp. 2-44 – 2-63; “Plan to Cut Farm 
Programs Stalls,” CQ Almanac 1995, pp. 3-47-3-56 (for additional information on farm 
subsidies); “Medicare Cuts Vetoed as Part of Budget Reconciliation,” CQ Almanac 1995, 
pp. 7-3 – 7-15 (for additional information on Medicare); “Republicans Seek to Revamp 
Medicaid,” CQ Almanac 1995, pp. 7-6 – 7-22 (for additional information on Medicaid) 
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1996 “After 60 Years, Most Control Sent to States,” CQ Almanac 1996, pp. 6-3 – 6-24; “Congress 
Clears Hospital Construction, Deficit Reduction Targets, and Veterans' Benefits in Veterans 
Affairs Bill,” CQ Almanac 1995, pp. 8-17 – 8-18. 
1997 “Reconciliation Package: Spending Cuts,” CQ Almanac 1997, pp. 2-47 – 2-52; “Budget 
Cuts,” CQ Almanac 1997, pp. 7-31. 
2005 “Budget Reconciliation Provisions,” CQ Almanac 2005, pp. 4-18 – 4-24 
2007 “Cost Estimate: H.R. 2669, College Cost Reduction and Access Act,” Congressional Budget 
Office, 19 September 2007. 
<http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/86xx/doc8643/hr2669pago.pdf>. 
2009 “Cost Estimate: H.R. 4872, the Reconciliation Act of 2010,” Congressional Budget Office, 
20 March 2010, 
<http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/amendreconprop.pdf>. 
(See Tables 2, 5, 6, and 7)  
For years not listed, either there was no reconciliation bill (1984, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1998, 
2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2011) or the reconciliation bill contained only revenue 
provisions (1999, 2000, 2001, and 2003).
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Table A5.3: Probability of Program Change via Reconciliation, Heckman Selection Model, 
1984-2011 
 
Share of Spending to Areas Where Majority Party is Defending a Seat 0.508** 
 (0.206) 
Divided Government at Enactment 0.082 
 (0.079) 
Enacting Majority Seat Gain -1.012 
 (3.894) 
Enacting Majority Seat Loss 0.156 
 (0.628) 
Gini Coefficient -0.205 
 (0.183) 
Share of Spending to Committee Members 0.022 
 (0.153) 
Logged Spending on Program -0.019 
 (0.013) 
Size of Reconciliation Instructions (Log) -0.012 
 (0.010) 
Current Budget Deficit -1.163* 
 (0.644) 
Cut (1) -1.489*** 
 (0.456) 
Cut (2) 1.251*** 
 (0.446) 
  
Log Pseudolikelihood -2197.515 
Observations 1,589 
Standard errors clustered by committee-year in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A5.4: Probability of Program Change via Reconciliation, Ordered Logit, Including 
Non-Reconciliation-Eligible Programs, 1984-2011 
 
Share of Spending to Areas Where Majority Party is Defending a Seat 0.699** 
 (0.278) 
Divided Government at Enactment 0.144 
 (0.168) 
Enacting Majority Seat Gain -1.669 
 (5.197) 
Enacting Majority Seat Loss 0.959 
 (1.137) 
Gini Coefficient -0.530* 
 (0.273) 
Share of Spending to Committee Members -0.089 
 (0.237) 
Logged Spending on Program -0.068 
 (0.042) 
Size of Reconciliation Instructions (Log) -0.067 
 (0.045) 
Current Budget Deficit -0.701 
 (0.756) 
Cut (1) -6.191*** 
 (1.574) 
Cut (2) 0.962 
 (1.513) 
  
Log Pseudolikelihood -1248 
Pseudo-R2 0.013 
Observations 4,695 
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A5.5: Probability of Program Change via Reconciliation, Ordered Logit, Including 
Imputed Values for Missing Data, 1984-2011 
 
Share of Spending to Areas Where Majority Party is Defending a Seat 0.840*** 
 (0.273) 
Divided Government at Enactment 0.326* 
 (0.174) 
Enacting Majority Seat Gain 0.154 
 (8.597) 
Enacting Majority Seat Loss -0.316 
 (1.054) 
Gini Coefficient -0.162 
 (0.293) 
Share of Spending to Committee Members 0.173 
 (0.244) 
Logged Spending on Program -0.051 
 (0.032) 
Size of Reconciliation Instructions (Log) -0.041** 
 (0.021) 
Current Budget Deficit -1.147 
 (1.300) 
Cut (1) -3.460*** 
 (0.543) 
Cut (2) 1.641*** 
 (0.462) 
  
Log Pseudolikelihood -992.004 
Psuedo-R2 0.014 
Observations 1,853 
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A5.6: Probability of Program Change via Reconciliation, Ordered Logit, Two-Way 
Clustered Standard Errors by Year and Committee, 1984-2011 
 
Share of Spending to Areas Where Majority Party is Defending a Seat 0.848*** 
 (0.146) 
Divided Government at Enactment 0.250** 
 (0.115) 
Enacting Majority Seat Gain 0.226 
 (4.475) 
Enacting Majority Seat Loss -0.102 
 (0.606) 
Gini Coefficient -0.529** 
 (0.208) 
Share of Spending to Committee Members 0.043 
 (0.381) 
Logged Spending on Program -0.068 
 (0.063) 
Size of Reconciliation Instructions (Log) -0.042* 
 (0.022) 
Current Budget Deficit -1.234 
 (0.850) 
Cut (1) -4.087** 
 (1.920) 
Cut (2) 0.752 
 (1.284) 
  
Log Pseudolikelihood -919.661 
Pseudo-R2 0.015 
Observations 1,589 
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A5.7: Probability of Program Change via Reconciliation, Crossed Random Effects 
(Year, Committee, and Program), 1984-2011 
 
  (1) (2) 
Share of Spending to Areas Where Majority Party is Defending a Seat 0.791** 0.774* 
 (0.392) (0.411) 
Divided Government at Enactment 0.151 0.147 
 (0.174) (0.205) 
Enacting Majority Seat Gain 0.383 1.864 
 (6.601) (6.833) 
Enacting Majority Seat Loss 0.224 -0.315 
 (1.117) (1.253) 
Gini Coefficient -1.057** -0.907** 
 (0.414) (0.459) 
Share of Spending to Committee Members 0.003 0.017 
 (0.359) (0.385) 
Logged Spending on Program -0.112*** -0.100*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) 
Cut (1) -4.602*** -4.378*** 
 (0.677) (0.701) 
Cut (2) 0.599 1.124 
 (0.657) (0.693) 
Var (Year RE) 0.143* 0.155* 
 (0.076) (0.082) 
Var (Committee RE) 0.324* 0.328 
 (0.196) (0.208) 
Var (Program RE)  0.372*** 
  (0.121) 
   
Log Likelihood -885.361 -876.647 
Observations 1,589 1,589 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Column (1) included crossed random effects by year and committee.  Column (2) includes 
crossed random effects by year and committee, with an additional random effect by program 
nested within the committee effect.  Because the random effects term is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables, I omit several independent variables for which 
this concern is greatest. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 For most legislation, consideration in the U.S. Senate remains profoundly shaped by the 
need to build a 60-vote coalition to invoke cloture and end debate.  As the preceding chapters 
make clear, however, the story is not that simple.  Since 1969, Congress has created 111 separate 
special procedures that prevent a filibuster on specified measures; these debate limitations are 
often accompanied by provisions preventing both committee obstruction and amendments to the 
protected bills on the floor of the chamber.  While many of these special rules date from the 
1970s and 1980s, moreover, they are not merely a relic of years past.  The ability to create new 
majoritarian exceptions continues to shape the lawmaking process.  In the spring of 2015, for 
example, a majoritarian exception that would allow Congress to more easily approve the 
president’s decision to reinstitute sanctions if Iran is found to be out of compliance with a 
nascent nuclear agreement proved to be a key chip in the broader bargaining between the two 
branches over related legislation (Wolfensberger 2015; DeYoung and DeBonis 2015). 
 In the preceding chapters, I explore the creation, use, and policy consequences of these 
rules.  The Introduction lays out the two central purposes of majoritarian exceptions: to ease the 
passage of the policies they cover, and to deliver benefits, in the form of electoral advantages, to 
the majority party.  These electoral advantages include both enacting favorable policy changes 
and creating opportunities for individual senators to both claim credit and avoid blame. 
In Chapter 2, I explore one particular category of these procedures, called oversight 
exceptions.  These are rules that not only increase Congress’s ability to oversee the actions of the 
executive, but also, under certain alignments of key actors, can induce the president to take 
actions he would otherwise avoid; I illustrate these strategic dynamics using a spatial model.  
Building from the model’s predictions, I also argue that Congress is more likely to create these 
particular procedures in policy areas on which elite allies of the Senate’s majority party are 
demanding action.  These policy changes facilitated by oversight exceptions both build the 
majority party’s brand by moving policy in its preferred direction and generate credit claiming 
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opportunities for individual members who are seeking re-election; both of these dynamics help 
the Senate’s majority party achieve its goal of continued majority status. 
In Chapter 3, I turn to a second class of these procedures, known as delegation 
exceptions.  Rather than limiting the president’s ability to exercise existing authority, these rules 
explicitly delegate power to a special agenda setter, either inside or outside the chamber, and 
then grant that actor’s proposal protected procedural status.  Like the patterns in the creation of 
oversight exceptions documented in Chapter 2, Congress appears to adopt this latter kind of 
special procedure in response to partisan issue pressures—specifically, the Senate majority 
party’s desire to minimize the traceability of certain actions.  By reducing the chances that its 
members are blamed for negative events, the majority party is again able to enhance its chances 
of retaining its position in the future. 
While Chapters 2 and 3 documented how exceptions are created with an eye towards 
helping the majority party, in Chapter 4, I begin to examine whether the same is true for the 
procedures’ use.  I describe in detail one particularly important majoritarian exception—the 
budget reconciliation process—and make the case that the process is initiated when key actors 
within the Senate’s majority party expect that the policy results will make them better off.  I 
formalize this argument using a spatial model and find support for its predictions using both a 
large-N empirical test and several key case studies.  Just as creating the rules should help the 
majority party attain its goal of remaining the majority, the findings in Chapter 4 suggest the 
procedures’ use should do the same by facilitating policy changes preferred by a majority of the 
majority party in the Senate.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I seek to move beyond an argument about exceptions being created 
and used in situations when the majority expects that the rules will beneficial.  By examining the 
actual programmatic policy changes made using the reconciliation procedures since the mid-
1980s, I am able to document how the majority party in the Senate actually uses the rules to 
generate the opportunities for credit claiming and blame avoidance that should help it maintain 
its status in future congresses. 
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Contributions 
 
The contributions of these theoretical accounts and empirical findings are several.  First 
among them is substantive; the procedures explored here have been largely neglected as an 
independent object of interest in research on the U.S. Senate.  By documenting the creation of 
these procedures, the patterns in their use, and their potential policy consequences, my work here 
demonstrates an important majoritarian dynamic in a chamber otherwise considered to be 
supermajoritarian.  Beyond this substantive impact, however, are several additional contributions 
to ongoing debates in the political science literature. 
  
Explaining Rule Change in the Senate  
 
 First of all, both the theoretical accounts and empirical findings add to our understanding 
of the origins and evolution of the Senate’s cloture rule.  Wawro and Schickler (2006) argue that 
the persistence of the filibuster in the Senate is due to “remote majoritarianism”—that is, 
supermajority rule endures for most policymaking because a simple majority of senators prefer it 
that way.  A simple majority, they argue, is capable of retaliating and engaging in “reform-by-
ruling” (Koger 2010).  This prospect looms large over minority decisions about obstruction, 
causing the minority party to avoid blocking some bills out of fear of reprisal.  Binder and Smith 
(1997), meanwhile, argue that the evolution of supermajority rule in the Senate has been shaped 
by short-term political considerations and that efforts by the majority party to reduce the 
filibuster threshold have been constrained by vigorous minorities 
 How does the account provided above help us adjudicate between these competing 
explanations?  First of all, because majoritarian exceptions are created as part of statutory law, 
they must clear the filibuster threshold in the Senate in order to be enacted.  In that sense, they 
represent a departure from Wawro and Schickler’s argument.  The existence of majoritarian 
exceptions suggests that instances of majority rule result not only from situations where the 
majority party chooses not to exercise its “nuclear option.”  Rather, they represent situations 
where a sufficient number of senators, often from both parties, are made better off by alternative 
procedures in the short run. 
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 Second, the patterns we observe in the issues for which majoritarian exceptions are 
created suggest that the short-term electoral interests of the majority party are playing a role, 
adding support to Binder and Smith’s argument.  Consistent with the notion that the majority 
party responds to policy demands from its activist members and interest group allies, we observe 
more oversight exceptions created on issues owned by the majority party.  When, however, the 
policy object of the rule change will impose concentrated costs on potential voters—as is the 
case with delegation exceptions—we see the majority party behave in a way that should 
minimize the negative, mass-level response from voters.  
 The findings above also bear on the literature that examines rule change in Congress 
beyond just the Senate filibuster.  The positive relationship between majority party capacity and 
the probability of procedural change are not our primary theoretical focus, but are consistent with 
earlier work arguing that stronger (Binder 1997), rather than weaker (Dion 1997), majority 
parties will reduce minority rights in the House of Representatives.  The fact that the preferences 
of the House and the president appear to affect decisions about procedures in the Senate, 
moreover, echoes other work on the role of inter-chamber and inter-branch relations in 
determining the rules within a single chamber (Sin 2014). 
  
Understanding Budget Reconciliation 
 
A second contribution of this work is that it represents one of the first systematic 
explorations of the use and consequences of the budget reconciliation procedures.  Several 
historical accounts examine the rules’ creation and use, but in a largely descriptive way (Gilmour 
1990; LeLoup 2005).  Accounts of procedural change in Congress explore reconciliation only in 
broader context, either as an exception to prevailing evolutionary trends (Binder 1997) or as a 
component of the larger budget process (Schickler 2001).  Studies of institutional gridlock 
(Binder 2003; Brady and Volden 1998; Krehbiel 1998; Mayhew 1991) generally ignore it as a 
possible solution to stalemate.  Work on minority obstruction, meanwhile, explores 
reconciliation only as evidence for broader theoretical arguments about the role of the filibuster 
(Binder and Smith 1997; Wawro and Schickler 2006).  In their work on majority party power in 
the Senate, finally, Den Hartog and Monroe (2011) use reconciliation bills to operationalize a 
component of their theory about party influence, but do not explore it as independent object of 
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interest. 
 In Chapters 4 and 5, I document two prevailing trends in the use of reconciliation.  First, 
we see the process initiated—in the form of the reconciliation instructions—when key actors (the 
majority leader and the median member of the chamber) expect that the outcomes produced by 
using the procedures will be closer to their most preferred policy than what could be achieved 
under regular order.  The fact that these expected products of reconciliation better reflect the 
preferences of the median member of the majority party is consistent with my argument that 
majoritarian exceptions are meant to help the majority party achieve its policy and political 
goals.  Second, we observe that the changes made to mandatory programs using the procedures 
are systematically biased in favor of the majority party’s electoral interests; programs where 
many benefits flow to states in which the majority party must defend seats in the next election 
are expanded more and cut less in reconciliation bills.   
 
The Power of the Majority Party 
 
Finally, my argument and supporting evidence on the influence of the majority party in 
creating and using majoritarian exceptions adds to a growing body of work challenging the long-
held view that the Senate is dominated by individuals, not parties (e.g. Matthews 1960; Smith 
1989; Sinclair 1989; Smith and Flathman 1989; Ainsworth and Flathman 1995; Krehbiel 1998); 
rather, the majority party is able to exercise influence in a number of important ways.  My 
findings here join evidence that the majority party is quite successful at protecting committee-
generated bills from amendment on the floor (Campbell, Cox, and McCubbins 2002), exercising 
negative agenda control (Gailmard and Jenkins 2007), and ensuring partisan cooperation on 
procedural votes (Lee 2009).  More broadly, Den Hartog and Monroe (2011) demonstrate how a 
range of commonly observed Senate practices and procedures, such as committee gatekeeping 
rights, tabling motions, and filling the amendment tree, provide the majority party with a 
disproportionate advantage in influencing the agenda by affecting the ‘consideration,’ or 
opportunity, costs that the majority and minority parties must pay in order to shepherd their 
preferred to measures to final passage votes.  They also, moreover, present evidence that bills 
that pass the chamber are more likely to move policy in the direction of the majority party than 
the minority.  Here, I add evidence both that procedural change is undertaken on issues that 
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should benefit the majority party and that the majority party deploys these procedures to achieve 
electorally beneficial policy outcomes.  In doing so, I contribute to this important literature 
without relying on the roll-call record, a concern that has plagued many previous studies of 
majority party influence. 
 
Directions for Future Work 
 
 This project provides answers to several important questions but also leaves a number of 
others open for further investigation.  First, while the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 examine the 
aggregate decisions to create majoritarian exceptions, there may be additional implications of my 
theoretical account to be tested by exploring members’ voting behavior on individual cases of 
procedural change.  Of particular interest are rules that have been attempted or created more than 
once, such as the delegation exceptions for approving trade agreements or military base closings.  
We should expect, for example, that individual members who are up for re-election and/or have 
large constituencies that would feel the perceptible negative effects of the underlying policy 
change would be more likely to support the special procedures; their need to minimize 
traceability is greater than that of some of their legislative peers.  In addition, further, case-based 
work is needed to illuminate the apparent—and interesting—differences in selection dynamics 
between oversight and delegation exceptions. 
 Chapters 4 and 5, meanwhile, contribute much to our understanding of the use and 
consequences of majoritarian exceptions, but they do so with evidence, rich as it may be, from 
just a single case.  Reconciliation is not, of course, the only majoritarian exception that Congress 
has chosen to deploy at some eligible junctures and not at others.  Balla (2000), for example, 
explores early uses of the oversight exception in the Congressional Review Act allowing 
Congress to disapprove of regulations promulgated by the executive branch, but his analysis is 
confined to the period immediately after the rules’ creation.  The list of enacted exceptions in 
Appendix Table A1.1 of the Chapter 1, moreover, provides several other cases that are ripe for 
similar investigation.  For example, what helps explain the attempts to reject actions taken as part 
of delegation exceptions under the Trade Act, or instances in which Congress attempted to 
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exercise the oversight exceptions under the Arms Export Control Act?1   Are these procedures 
used to produce policy outcomes that help the Senate’s majority party achieve its policy and 
partisan electoral goals? 
 The unanswered questions generated by this project extend beyond just further 
exploration of majoritarian exceptions; they also include important topics in the study of budget 
reconciliation specifically and the congressional budget process more generally.  While I draw 
important conclusions about the policy consequences of procedures from my aggregate analysis 
of reconciliation, an investigation at that level unavoidably obscures some interesting aspects of 
the decisions about altering specific programs in specific years.  While the case studies in 
Chapter 4 begin to explore of this variation, a similar, case-based investigation of patterns of 
programmatic change in particular programs would add to our understanding of how the process 
is used to serve the majority party’s electoral goals.  Of particular interest are those programs 
that affect key partisan constituencies, such as Medicare, student loans, and farm subsidies.   
In addition, my analysis of reconciliation’s policy consequences finds evidence consistent 
with the notion that programmatic changes are made to maximize the majority’s chances of 
retaining its status, but does not include systematic evidence of whether members of Congress 
and their staff are actually considering those potential electoral consequences when developing 
reconciliation bills.  Preliminary archival evidence does suggest that the state-by-state 
consequences of policy changes have played a role in decisions about programmatic change.  An 
example from 1986 is illustrative.   One change considered for that year’s reconciliation bill was 
a change to the Medicaid matching formula (FMAP), which also applies to other mandatory 
programs, including welfare, foster care support, and child support enforcement; specifically, the 
Senate Finance Committee was considering whether to alter the rules under which states would 
be “held harmless” against the loss of funds as the formula changed.2  Among the states that 
would be hurt without a shift in the hold harmless rules was Georgia, where the Senate 
(majority) Republicans were defending a seat in a very close race between Senator Mack 
                                                     
1 Attempted uses of the Trade Act provisions in the Senate include: 94th Congress, S. Con. Res. 213; 101st Congress, 
S. J. Res. 382; 102nd Congress, S. J. Res. 153; 104th Congress, S. J. Res. 37 and S. J. Res. 56; 105th Congress, S. J. 
Res. 31 and S. J. Res. 47; 106th Congress, S. J. Res. 27, S. J. Res. 28, and S. J. Res. 47.  Attempted uses of the Arms 
Control Export Act provisions in the Senate include: 101st Congress, S. J. Res. 378; 102nd Congress, S. J. Res. 165, 
S. J. Res. 177, and S. J. Res. 344. 
2 Letter from Senator Sam Nunn to Senator Russell Long, July 21, 1986; Box No. 2; Senate Finance Committee 
Democrats, Debt Limit & Budget Reconciliation Legislative Files, Records of the United States Senate, 95th-101st 
Congresses, Record Group 46; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. 
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Mattingly (R) and Representative Wyche Fowler (D).  Fowler eventually won the race, but not 
before the provision benefitting Georgia made it into the final reconciliation bill.3  This is 
obviously but one example, so further exploration in this vein would add to our understanding of 
how reconciliation is leveraged for political gain. 
Finally, my findings about reconciliation suggest that other components of the budget 
process may be exploited by congressional majority parties for partisan gain.  One potential 
avenue involves the increasing inclusion of “deficit neutral reserve funds” in the congressional 
budget resolution.  These “reserve funds” represent provisions that “establish…procedures to 
revise budget levels…for certain legislation or if some condition is met” (Heniff 2014); they 
have the effect of designating areas for subsequent policymaking activity without having to 
specify, in the budget resolution, how Congress would pay for it.  The inclusion of these funds in 
the budget resolution has grown precipitously over the past 30 years.  The 1986 budget 
resolution included none, while the 2009 resolution included 37 (Matthews 2013).  Another 
would involve examining the amendments offered to the budget resolution each year.  The 
majoritarian exception used for the budget resolution functions similarly to the one that governs 
consideration of reconciliation bills, so at the conclusion of the 50 permissible hours of debate, 
the Senate votes on many amendments in quick succession.  In 2015, for example, more than 700 
amendments to the budget resolution were filed before consideration began (Associated Press 
2015).  Both reserve funds and amendments, then, might represent additional opportunities for 
the majority party in the Senate to leverage the budget process to its advantage, perhaps as 
mechanisms for sending messages to key interest group and elite constituencies about its policy 
priorities. 
 
Implications for Procedural Reform in Congress 
 
By documenting how rule changes are made to advantage the majority party, and how the 
majority party subsequently uses those procedures to achieve its policy and political goals, this 
project bears on broader questions about the difficulties of using rule change to reduce gridlock.  
Filibuster reform is often touted as a solution to obstruction by proponents of reform both inside 
                                                     
3 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, § 9421. 
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(Harkin 2011; Shaheen 2013) and outside (Mann and Ornstein 2012) the chamber alike.  What 
does this project say about the prospects for success of those efforts? 
On one hand, neither my argument nor my evidence are sanguine on the possibilities for 
sweeping change to the Senate’s filibuster rule, especially outside of the “reform-by-ruling” 
strategy pursued by Senate Democrats on judicial nominations in 2013.  As we saw in Chapters 2 
and 3, the conditions ripe for creating majoritarian exceptions are actually quite rare.  For 
oversight exceptions, the spatial alignment of the relevant actors must be just right—a reality that 
sometimes prevents rule change on issues (like the conduct of the war in Iraq in 2007) that would 
otherwise seem ripe for policy change through procedural reform.  For delegation exceptions, 
meanwhile, a relatively small share of the collective action problems for which the solutions 
require concentrated costs in exchange for diffuse benefits are actually the object of special 
procedures.   
In addition, this era of increasingly polarized parties that are not wont to cooperate with 
one another means that the value of holding majority status in the Senate has only increased.  
The evidence in Chapters 4 and 5 suggests that existing exceptions are used in ways that should 
augment the majority’s existing electoral advantages by facilitating policy gains and creating 
opportunities for credit claiming and blame avoidance.  Because the legislation creating a 
majoritarian exception must itself clear the filibuster hurdle, a bipartisan coalition is needed for 
enactment, unless the majority party enjoys an unusually large size advantage.  (Given that we 
saw no exceptions created during the period in which the Democrats held a filibuster-proof 
majority in the Senate in 2009, moreover, the ability for the majority party to accomplish this 
kind of procedural change without help from the minority does not appear to bolster its prospects 
significantly.)  Knowing that the rules are both intended to be used to help the majority, and that 
there is evidence the procedures are actually deployed to in order to deliver policy and political 
gains to the majority party, why should the minority party engage in the coalitional cooperation 
required to exempt future legislation from a filibuster?  This is especially true if we believe that 
members of both parties receive non-policy benefits from groups and individuals outside the 
chamber for exploiting their existing rights to obstruction (Binder and Smith 1997; Koger 2010).  
My results—both theoretical and empirical—suggest, then, that reformers are likely best served 
to look elsewhere to ameliorate the products of congressional polarization. 
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At the same time, all hope is not lost.  Appendix Table A1.1 in the Chapter 1 
demonstrates that, despite these incentives to the contrary, Congress has managed to enact 
procedural changes that facilitate otherwise difficult policy change more than 100 times in 45 
years.  Indeed, the theoretical account in Chapter 2 suggests that majoritarian exceptions may be 
a particularly important legislative tool under divided government, when we would otherwise be 
particularly worried about the gridlock (Binder 2003).  The policy accomplishments achieved 
with the help of majoritarian exceptions—such as major trade deals, various foreign and military 
policy decisions executed by the president, and the products of the reconciliation process 
catalogued in Chapters 4 and 5—demonstrate, moreover, that even if the rules are rare, they 
matter for what the federal government can achieve.  Certainly, Congress’s experience with 
majoritarian exceptions over the past nearly 50 years does not foreshadow a Senate in which all 
business is conducted by majority rule.  At the same time, it is likely that the Senate will 
continue to innovate procedurally in select circumstances.  Put differently, majoritarian 
exceptions will continue, as their name suggests, to function as “exceptions to the rule.”
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